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TilE VIETNAM WAR ON TRIAL:
TilE COURT-MARTIAL OF
DR. HOWARD B. LEVY
ROBERT

N.

STRASSFELD•

This Article examines the history of a Vietnam War-era case: the court-martial

of Dr. Howard B. Levy. The U.S. Army court-martialled Dr. Levy for refusing to

teach medicine to Green Beret soldiers and for criticizing both the Green Berets and
American involvement in Vietnam.

Although the Supreme Court eventually upheld

Levy's convi cti on in Parker v. Levy, ill decision obscures the political content of Levy's

court-martial and its relationship to the war. At the court-martial Levy sought to defend

himself by showing that his disparaging remarks about the Green Berets, identifying

them as "killers of peasants and murderers of women and children," were true and that
his refusal to teach medicine to Green Beret soldiers was dictated by medical ethics,

given the ways in which the soldiers would misuse their medical knowledge. Ultimately,
Levy put the war itself on trial by arguing that had he trained the soldiers he would have
abetted their war crimes.

This Article seeks to recapture the history of the Levy case as a case about the

Vietnam War.

*

Yet the case was also about much more.

The Article shows how
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imagery evoking beliefs about race and racial difference, war, frontier violence, and
medicine and healing all came into play in the Levy case. It also explores the manner
in which the court-martial became a forum in which the Vietnam War and aspects of
U.S. Anny policy and conduct were debated, and in which that debate was eventually
suppressed.

Ultimately, thia Article begins the exploration of how American legal

institutions coped with the crisis of political and moral legitimacy that they confronted
in the late 1960s.

On June 19, 1974, the United States Supreme Court upheld the
court-martial conviction of Dr. Howard

B . Levy,• and with it, the

constitutional validity of Uniform Code of Military Justice ("UCMJ")
Articles 1332 and 134.3

Parker

v.

The Court's announcement of its decision in

Levy4 prompted an unusual display of ire; Justice Potter

Stewart angrily read his dissenting opinion from the bench. One visiting
Senator who witnessed this remarked: "My God, we don't treat each
other that way at the Senate. "5

Despite the contentiousness of that

moment, the Court's decision masked a far greater contentiousness that
lay at the core of the case, for in his defense at the court-martial Dr.
Levy had attempted to put the Vietnam War on trial.
This masking does not mean that the opinions in

Parker

v.

Levy

conceal the Vietnam War context of the case. Even the most superficial
reading of the opinions unmistakably identifies the case as a product of
the war.

The court-martial had found Dr. Levy guilty of "willfully

disobeying a lawful command of his superior officer" in violation of

1.

Dr. Levy's rank was Captain

(0-3). Reflecting what I assume would be his

preference, I have chosen to refer to him as Dr. Levy (or just Levy) rather than Capt.
Levy in the text, except where I am quoting material that refers to him as Capt. Levy.
2.

Article

133 of the UCMJ provides: "Any commissioned officer, cadet, or

midshipman who is convicted of conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman shall be
punished as a court-martial may direct."

3.

Article

1 0 U.S.C.§ 933 (1993).
134 of the UCMJ provides in part:

Though not specifically mentioned in this chapter, all disorders and
neglects to the prejudice of good order and discipline in the armed forces, all
conduct of a nature to bring discredit upon the armed forces ...of which
persons subject to this chapter may be guilty, shall be taken cognizance of by
a general, special, or summary court-martial, according to the nature and
degree of the offense, and shall be punished at the discretion of that court.

10 u.s.c. § 934 (1993).

4.
5.

417 u.s. 733 (1974).

Interview with Judge Robert H. Bork, at the American Enterp<se Institute,

in Washington, D.C.(Apr.28,

1993). Judge Bork notes that "there was a lot of ... frre

in [Justice Stewart's] voice," and that the Justices seldom read anything from the bench
unless one of them "was very exercised and Stewart was very exercised ...."

Judge

Bork is uncertain of his �llection, but believes that the Senator was William Proxmire.

/d. ;

see

20,

1974, at At (describing a "relatively emotional exchange").

also Warren

Weaver, Jr.
, Justices

Uphold Levy Conviction,

N.Y. TIMES, June
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UCMJ Article 90, of engaging in "conduct unbecoming an officer and a
gentleman" in violation of UCMJ Article 133, and of publicly uttering
various statements "with design to promote disloyalty and disaffection
among the troops . . to the prejudice of good order and discipline in
the armed forces" in violation of UCMJ Article 134.6 The Article 133
and 134 charges rested solely on statements that Levy made about the
war, 7 about whether black soldiers ought to serve in it,8 and about the
conduct of United States Special Forces (the "Green Berets") in the war.9
Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion reproduces these statements.10 But
while Parker v. Levy identifies the case's origins in the war, it also alters
the relationship between the case and the war by shifting the war from the
center to the periphery of the case. No longer a case that put the war in
issue, Parker v. Levy had become, instead, a case that merely happened
to arise against the backdrop of the war. 11
The case came to the Supreme Court on appeal from the United
States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, which had ruled for Levy
in a habeas proceeding, declaring that Articles 133 and 134 were
unconstitutionally vague and overbroad .12 In reversing the Third
.

.

6.
For an exposition of the court-martial's findings, see generally Record at
2617. The court-martial record consists of 18 volumes. The court-martial transcript
comprises volumes 3-9 of the record and its pages are numbered consecutively. I have
adopted the citation form "Record at
for citations to the transcript. When citing
to other parts of the court-martial record, I identify the record volume number (and where
applicable a page number), the name of the cited document, and any other identifying
information (e.g., "Prosecution Exhibit no. 5"). Two other charges brought against Dr.
Levy relating to a letter he had written to a soldier in Vietnam were dismissed at the end
of the court-martial. ld. at 2618. These charges based on the letter are discussed below.
7.
"The United States is wrong in being involved in the VietNam War. I would
refuse to go to VietNam if ordered to do so." Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. at 738 n.
5
(quoting Specification to Charge II under Article 134).
8. For instance: "I don't see why any colored soldier would go to VietNam;
they should refuse to go to Viet Nam and if sent should refuse to fight because they are
discriminated against and denied their freedom in the United States, and they are
sacrificed and discriminated against in Viet Nam by being given all the hazardous duty
and they are suffering the majority of casualties." ld. at 738-39 n.
5 (quoting Specification
to Charge II under Article 34).
9.
For instance: "Special Forces personnel are ... killers of peasants and
murderers of women and children." /d. at 739 n.
5.
417 U.S. at 736-40.
10.
As with Tinker v. Des Moines Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969)
11.
(upholding the right of students to wear black armbands to school to protest the war), Levy
had become a case of, but not about, the war.
12.
Levy v. Parker, 478 F.2d 772, 793-96 (3d Cir. 1973). Shortly before the
Third Circuit decided Levy, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia struck down portions of Article 134 on vagueness grounds in Avrech v.
Secretary of the Navy, 477 F.2d 1237 (D.C. Cir. 1973). The Supreme Court heard
__"
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Circuit, the Court focused on the applicability of the vagueness and
overbreadth doctrines in a military justice setting. It framed the case as
one about the proper standard of review for challenges to the UCMJ
under the vagueness and overbreadth doctrines. More specifically, the
Court asked whether Levy was entitled to challenge the Articles as vague
on their face and whether he had standing to challenge them as overbroad
even if his own speech was unprotected.
negative to both questions.13

The Court answered in the

Only at the edges of Justice Rehnquist's

opinion, which obliquely mentions "medical ethics"14 and "participation
in a war crime, " 15 can one see hints of issues of conscience relating to

the war and of alternative constructions of the Levy case.
During Dr. Levy's court-martial seven years earlier, however, the
case looked very different. To be sure, questions of statutory vagueness
and overbreadth were always important.

Moreover, there was never a

single authoritative construction of the case. At issue in the court-martial
was the question of how to frame the case. Although many facts were not
in dispute, there was no single version of events. More important, there
was no single version of what was at issue, what legal categories for
interpreting events were appropriate for understanding the case, and what
significance to ascribe to events.16

The court-martial was, in other

words, a contest over these issues. The silencing of one construction of
the case, which ultimately resulted in the sterility of the Supreme Court's
opinion, began at the court-martial.17

argument in the two cases together.

417 U.S. at 752-61.
at 736.
at 761.

13.
14.
15.

Jd.
Jd.

16.

Cf. Kimber)e Crenshaw& Gary Peller,

Reel Time/Real Justice, 70 DENY. U.

L. REv. 283, 283 (1993) ("At stake at each axis of conflict is a contest over which
narrative structure will prevail in the interpretation of events in the social world. ").

17.

My understanding of the ways that legal disputes become contests over the

naming and interpreting of events is informed by Sally Engle Merry's writings.

See

SALLY ENGLE MERRY, GETIING JUSTICE AND GETIINO EVEN: LEGAL CONSCIOUSNESS
AMONG WORKING-CLASS AMERICANS (1990); Sally Engle Merry,

Mediation and the Power of Naming, 2

The Discourses of

YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 1 (1990).

As Merry

argues, naming and interpreting events are exercises of power and domination that direct
legal outcomes and silence competing accounts. MERRY,

supra,

at 111, 130-33. Merry

states:
One aspect of the power of law is its ability to establish a dominant way of
construing events and to silence others, thus channeling and determining the
outcome of legal proceedings. Legal processes can be seen as performances
in which problems are named and solutions determined . . . . The ability to

structure this talk and to determine the relevant discourse within which an

issue is framed-in other words, in which the reigning account of events is
established-is an important facet of the power exercised by law.

Court-Martial of Dr. Howard B. Levy
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The prosecution attempted to focus on Levy's conduct, statements,
and character, and to push the war into the background. It assumed the
war to be a just cause and relevant only to the extent that the war
heightened the dangerousness of Levy's words and deeds.

For the

defense, and for many observers of the court-martial, however, aspects
of America's war in Vietnam were on trial. Charged with making
disloyal statements, Levy sought to defend himself by proving the
truthfulness of his statements that Special Forces were "killers of
peasants" and "murderers of women and children. "18

He attempted to

defend the charge of willful disobedience of an order to teach medicine
to Special Forces aidmen (or medics) by arguing that given the-ways in
which the aidmen would misuse the training, the order demanded a breach
of medical ethics. 19

And for a brief moment in the history of the case

he raised a Nuremberg defense, the first ever heard in a U . S . court,
charging that had he trained the aidmen he would have been compl icitous
in war crimes committed by Special Forces.20 Rather remarkably, while
civilian courts were routinely precluding similar defenses, the claim that
the war was not merely wrong but unlawful was entertained, albeit in a
limited manner, in the unexpected forum of a military court-martial. Yet,
given the forum, the ultimate disposition of the questions relating to the
war may have been preordained.
The defense's vision of the case did not prevail, at least at the
Supreme Court.

Levy lost.

Nevertheless, the case's construction was

ultimately the result of an ongoing contest between the Army and the
defense to define it within legal rules and process constraints, as well as
within other important exogenous constraints, such as time and resource
limitations and government secrecy.

Neither side was able to frame the

case without reference to the other's construction, or without reference to
the expectations, and sometimes the intervention, of various audiences for
the stories that the two sides told. Consequent} y, to say that the Supreme
Court opinion is authoritative, in any but the most formal sense, is to take

Merry,

supra,

at 2.

Merry focuses on the contest in lower courts and in mediation

sessions to select the "discourse" that will apply to the problems plaintiffs present. She
identifies the tendency in these fora to transform legal problems into moral or therapeutic
issues by the substitution of moral or therapeutic discourse for legal discourse. MERRY,

supra,

at

110-33;

Merry,

supra,

at

3-9, 34-36.

While Merry is particularly interested in

the redefinition of problems as non-legal, her vision of the contest to name and interpret
events is also applicable to legal discourse, which is the focus of this Article.

Law's

See, e.g.,
Lucinda M. Finley, Breaking Women's Silence in Law: The Dilemma of the Gendered
Nature of Legal Reasoning, 64 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 886 (1987).
See infra notes 236-42 and accompanying text.
18.
19.
See infra notes 350-459 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 243-349 and accompanying text.
20.

power to silence has been explored by a number of feminist legal theorists.
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an ahistorical, static approach to the Levy case. The authority that we
give to the Supreme Court's construction of a case tends to silence other
understandings of that case including, quite often, the understandings of
parties and other participants. To focus on the Court's construction alone
also cabins our understanding of the case too narrowly by ignoring
extralegal responses to it. It obscures the possibility that many people
may reject the authoritativeness of the Court's construction, and that the
case's greater significance may lie in the contrarian readings it
spawned.21
Levy's court-martial was a cultural, as well as a political, event.
The advocates drew on popularly held myths, symbols, and beliefs, as
well as on legal doctrines, in an effort to persuade the decisionmak:ers.
Tacitly, these myths and beliefs were reaffirmed or refashioned as the
court-martial incorporated them into its understanding of the case. Yet
the trial was not merely a venue for the consumption of culture. More
than one hundred journalists crammed into the small courtroom to cover
the case. As they used familiar myths and symbols, the participants were
also engaged in the production of new ones.
This Article attempts to unmask the politics of the Levy case. It
seeks to recapture Levy's context and to rehabilitate its multiple meanings
that are submerged below the surface of the Supreme Court's decision.
To do so, it focuses on one part of Levy's history: the court-martial and
the events preceding it. 22 This Article begins by setting a context of
time, place, and military culture. Because of their importance to the Levy
case, this Article examines the Green Berets and the counterinsurgency
An Army
doctrine with which they were so closely associated .
intelligence investigation played a critical role in prompting Levy's court
martial and in fashioning the manner in which the court-martial unfolded
and was understood. Consequently, this Article closely examines Army
Intelligence's role in the Levy case. It reveals the prevalence of reflexive
anticommunism within the Army in the mid-1960s. It also shows how
anticommunism, often coupled with racial bigotry, produced fear and
intolerance of political dissidence and movements for social change.
In turning to the court-martial, this Article analyzes the way in which
the prosecution and the defense framed the case. It focuses on the

21.
22.

See Symposium, Legal Histories from Belew,

1985 WIS.

L. RBv. 759.

In another article I intend to examine the idea of the military as a "separate

society" that was the foundation for the majority's opinion in

Parker v. Levy.

I plan to

identify the origins of the separate society idea, trace the myths of the professional soldier
that it spawned, and examine the ways in which the

Levy

majority drew on those myths

in the service of a vision of the military and its relationship to society, a relationship that
was collapsing as it became more "civilianized" and civilian society became more
militaristic.

Court-Martial of Dr. Howard B.
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competing stories that the prosecution and defense attempted to tell and
on the myths, symbols, and ideas that they drew upon. This Article
shows how imagery evocative of beliefs about race and racial difference,
about war, frontier violence, and the civilizing force of law, and about
medicine and healing, all came into play in the Levy case.

And it

explores the manner in which the court-martial became a forum for
debating the Vietnam War and aspects of United States military policy
and conduct, a debate that was ultimately suppressed.
I. PRELUDE TO THE COURT-MARTIAL

A. The Army and Howard Levy
Dr. Howard Levy staunchly opposed U.S. involvement in the
Vietnam War when he arrived at Fort Jackson, South Carolina, on July

13, 1965, to begin two years of active military duty. Subject to an
1962 to avail himself of the

expansive doctors' draft, Levy chose in
"Berry Plan. "23

Under the Berry Plan, the Army deferred induction

until a doctor had completed his medical specialty training and guaranteed
him assignment within his medical specialty.

Consequently, Levy was

able to delay inevitable military service. His commitment, made without
thought to Vietnam, did not come due until he completed his residency in

1965, during the escalation of U.S. involvement in Vietnam. Like many
other draftees, Levy confronted what he saw as three dreary choices:
flight to Canada, prison for refusing induction, or military service. Levy
would subsequently say that he never considered going to Canada to be
a palatable option and feared prison too much to refuse induction.24
Instead, he entered the Army hoping that the time would pass as

23.

The Berry Plan was established in the 1955 draft amendments.

1955

Amendments to the Universal Military Training and Service Act, Pub. L. No. 84-118, 69
Stat. 223 (codified as amended at scattered sections of37 & 50 U.S.C.). For a discussion
of the "doctor's draftK and of the Berry Plan, see GEORGE
1973, at 153-60 (1993).

Q. FLYNN, THE DRAPT, 1940-

Because of the Berry Plan's success, by 1962 many medical

students were taking their chances on the draft.
24.

William Short & Willa Seidenberg, A Matter of Conscience: Resistance

Within the U.S. Military During the Vietnam War 32-33 (Jan. 1 5 , 1989) (transcript of
unpublished interview with Howard Levy, on file with author) [hereinafter Short &
Seidenberg). Short and Seidenberg have published a condensed version of the interview,
along with condensed interviews with other GI dissenters. See WILLIAM SHORT & WILLA

SEIDP..NBERO, A MATTER OP CONSCIENCE: Gl RESISTANCE DURING THE VIETNAM WAR
1 8 (1992).
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painlessly as possible, but recognizing that his beliefs might eventually
come into conflict with Army command. 25
In the years between medical school and active duty, Levy's political
views had evolved significantly. Once very much a part of the generation
of the 1950s,26 Levy had come to describe himself politically as "liberal
left. " 27 In interviews Levy has suggested various cultural influences
from the fifties and early sixties that may have played a role in this
evolution, most notably the writings of C. Wright Mills, the beats, new
wave cinema, and absurdist or avant-garde theater.28 More important
were the images and ideas of the civil rights movement, coupled with the
25.

Short & Seidenberg,

supra

note 24, at 33; Interview with Dr. Howard B.

Levy, in New York, N.Y. (July 19, 1993) (discussing entering the Anny with the belief
that at some point he might be asked to cross a line that he would be unwilling to cross).

Shortly after his arrival at Fort Jackson, Levy stated in an interview with an Anny
Intelligence Agent that he "question[ed} the present US foreign policy in Vietnam as well
as other areas," and that he could envision unusual circumstances where he might refuse
to obey an order because it was immoral or unethical.
Form 19-24 (Oct. 7, 1965),

in U.S.

Statement of Howard Levy, DA

Anny Intelligence Dossier No. 079300840, at 214,

216 (on flle with author) [hereinafter Levy Army Intelligence File).

Donald Duncan,

writing about the case in the publication Ramparts, notes that the doctor whom Levy was
to replace at Fort Jackson wrote a letter to Levy that allayed Levy's concerns about
working conditions there. However, the doctor subsequently told Levy that he had been
ordered to write the letter. Donald Duncan& J A. C . Dunn, Notes Toward a Definition
of the Unijonn Code ofMilitary Justice, as Particularly Applied to the Person of Captain
Howard Levy, RAMPARTS, July 1967, at 50, 52.
.

26.

His father testified that Levy was interested in basketball and school, rather

than politics, and that he had voted for Eisenhower in 1956. Record at 847-48. He was
probably partly mistaken in his testimony, since Levy was only nineteen at the time, and
the voting age was then twenty-one.

Nevertheless, Levy also described himself as

instinctively politically conservative at that time.

Adamant Against War Duty,
27.

supra

See, e.g.,

Statement of Howard Levy, DA Form 19-24,

note 25, at 215;

Homer Bigart,

N.Y. TIMEs, May 10, 1967, at A22.

see also

Captain

in Levy Army Intelligence File,

Memorandum from Laughlin McDonald to File of Capt.

Howard B. Levy 5 (Dec. 27, 1965),

in Howard Levy Litigation

Files (on flle with ACLU

Southern Regional Office, Atlanta, Ga.) [hereinafter Levy Litigation Files] (noting that
Levy describes himself as "left liberal").

Levy's political evolution raises interesting

questions about the relationship between the politics of sixties activism and the supposedly
conformist culture of the 1950s that are beyond the scope of this Article. For explorations
of this subject see WIN! BREINES, YOUNG, WHITE, AND MISERABLE: GROWING UP

IN THE FIFTIES (1992); TODD GITLIN, THE SIXTIES: YEARS OF HOPE, DAYS OF
11-77 (1987).
28.
Short & Seidenberg, supra note 24, at 13; Bigart, supra note 26, at 22. For

FEMALE
RAOE

a discussion of C. Wright Mills' impact on Levy's generation and American culture, see
MORRIS DICKSTEIN, GATES OF EDEN: AMERICAN CULTURE IN THE SIXTIES 58-61

(1977);
1941-

JOHN PATRICK DIGGINS, THE PROUD DECADES: AMERICA IN WAR AND IN PEACE,

1960, at 249-50 (1988). On the impact of the beats, and of new wave cinema, see
supra, at 3-24, 88; GITLIN, supra note 27, at 28-29, 45-56.

DICKSTEIN,
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reality of poor people's medicine encountered by Levy during his
residency. 29 At Bellevue Hospital in particular, Levy saw the medical
treatment available to the poor. He noted that his patient population was
largely black or Puerto Rican and drew connections between what was
occurring in the South and the experiences of poor nonwhites in the
North.30
As Levy's politics gravitated leftward, the U . S . widened its
involvement in Vietnam. In August 1964, Congress provided President
Johnson with what would prove to be a blank check for escalation, in the
Tonkin Gulf Resolutions.31 As the time for Levy's military service
approached, U.S. troop levels in Vietnam increased dramatically. By
May 1965, U.S. combat strength in South Vietnam was more than
46,500. On July 28 of that year, Johnson publicly announced that he
would immediately increase troop strength from 75,000 to 125,000 , and
secretly agreed to deploy an additional 50,000 troops.32
In the meantime, stirrings of opposition to U.S. policy in Southeast
Asia were beginning to occur. The first nationwide demonstration against
the war, organized by Students for a Democratic Society, drew 25,000
protesters to Washington, D.C., on April 17, 1 965.33 Antiwar teach-ins,
beginning at the University of Michigan and spreading to other campuses,
also marked that spring.34 By late 1964, Levy, having read sporadically
but apparently widely about the war, concluded that the U . S . should
immediately withdraw.35
Opposition to U.S. Vietnam policy was but one reason that the match
of Howard Levy and the Army was unpromising from the start. Levy
29.

James F inn, Personal Test imony: Howard Levy, M.D., in CONSCIENCE AND
161, 163-64 (James Finn ed., 1971) (1969 interv i e w of Levy conducted by
Finn); Short & Seidenberg, supra note 24, at 22-23; Andrew Kopkind, Captain Levy
/.:_Doctor's Plot, in TRIALS OF THE REsiSTANCE 14, 16 {1970).
Short & Seidenberg, supra note 24, at 24.
30.
31.
See Tonkin Gulf Resolution, Pub. L. No. 88-408, 78 Stat. 384 (1964),
repealed by Act of Jan. 12, 1971, Pub. L. No. 91-672, 84 Stat. 2053, 2054; see also
COMMAND

GEORGE C. HERRING, AMERICA'S LONGEST WAR: THE UNITED STATES AND VIETNAM,

1950-1975, at 119-24 (2d ed. 1986); GUENTER LEWY, AMERICA IN VIETNAM 32-36
{paperbacked. 1978); MARILYN B. YOUNG, THE VIETNAM WARS 1945-1990, at 117-23
(1991).
HERRING, supra note 31, at 139; YOUNG, supra note 31, at 160.
32.
33.
GITLIN, supra note 27, at 177-86; YoUNG, supra note 31, at 152; NANCY

ZAROULIS & GERALD SULLIVAN, WHO SPOKE Up? AMERICAN PROTEST AGAINST THE
WAR IN VIETNAM

34.
43-44.
35.

1963-1975, at 38-42 (1984).
at 152; ZAROULIS & SULLIVAN, supra note 33, at 38,

YOUNG, supra note 31,

Finn, supra note 29, at 164.
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was in important ways an atypical soldier, often to the Army's
irritation. 36
Nonetheless, some of the tension between Levy and the Army was
unexceptional within the medical corps. Levy was by his own admission
lacking in matters of military dress and deportment.37 Among military
doctors, however, Levy's failings in these areas were hardly remarkable,
if slightly more pronounced than average. The military, in desperate need
of doctors, and perhaps regarding them as different, tolerated in its
doctors a high degree of deviation from accepted standards of military
dress and manner. 38 Yet a separate standard in these matters, along with
such benefits as conferral of rank and more rapid promotion, did little to

36.

In his closing argument to the court-martial, Levy's civilian defense counsel,

Charles Morgan, Jr., stated: "I think, looking back on it, that each of you knows that Dr.
Levy should never have been in the United States Army . .."
.

would certainly have agreed.

Record at 2569. Levy

In response to William Short and Willa Seidenberg's

question concerning whether he had received orientation as to "who you should salute or
shouldn't salute or that sort of thing," Levy explained:
No, they sort of expected that you pick that up automatically. And the
fu·st time someone [saluted) me I just sort of laughed at them.
it was the funniest goddamn thing I'd ever seen.

I just thought

I said Jesus, why ... I

mean it wasn't that I was discourteous. I just sort of wave[d) to them. And
I didn't salute, of course, people superior to me, but then again I didn't know
who was superior to me. Nor did it interest me to know. So it was sort of
like Woody Allen arriving all of a sudden at Guadalcanal.
Short & Seidenberg, supra note 24, at 36-37.
37.

Finn,

supra

note 29, at 167 ("I was a bit sloppier than even the average

doctor, in truth."); Short & Seidenberg, supra note 24, at 36-37. Donald Duncan wrote
of Levy:
Howard Levy gives the impression of a person who witnessed militarism
close up, became horrified and consciously did everything possible to remain
a civilian. His shoes appear never to have been contaminated by polish. His
belt buckle seems in an advanced stage of gangrene. He invariably forgets to
button at least one pocket. The day he had to stand before the ten field grade
line of officers of his court-martial and hear himself pronounced guilty, he
strolled forward with his right hand in his pocket.

Duncan & Dunn, supra note 25, at 52.

38.
Record at 613 (testimony of Capt. Ivan Mauer); Jon Betwee, Military
Medicine: An Exercise in Conflict ofAllegiance, NEW PHYsiCIAN, July 1974, at 14, 15;
Peter G. Bourne, The Hippocratic RevolJ: The Anny Physician and Vietnam, RAMPARTS,
July 1967, at 57, 58; see also ROBERT SHERRILL, MILITARY JUSTICE IS TO JUSTICE AS
MILITARY MUSIC Is TO MUSIC 108-09, 128 (1970).

Ironically, Levy had much

in

common in this regard with the Special Forces soldiers whom he would eventually refuse
to train. In an article published in 1961 criticizing the Army for failing to recognize the
need to recruit and retain "unconventional guys" to fight unconventional wars, George

Goodman noted that Special Forces soldiers "were always in mild trouble on garrison
duty. Their belt buckles went unshined and they hated parades." GeorgeJ.
W.Goodman,

The Unconventional Warriors, EsQUIRE,

Nov.1961, at 128, 131, 132.
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offset the resentment felt by drafted physicians. At Levy's court-martial,
Lieutenant Colonel Richard Coppedge, Center Surgeon of the John F.
Kennedy Center for Special Warfare from 1962 to 1966, testified that
drafted physicians often resented the military. He noted that those doctors
he spoke to at Fort Jackson about training Special Forces aidmen were
apathetic, and he characterized their apathy as a "passive-aggressive
reaction. "39 The military retained few doctors once they fulfilled their
obligated tour of duty. 40 In addition to the usual. inconveniences of
military service and the reduced earnings endured by drafted physicians,
the low morale of military doctors undoubtedly stemmed from the military
medical bureaucracy's cramping of physician autonomy. The conflict
between military medicine's stated goals of "preserv[ing] the fighting
strength, "41 and providing "the greatest good for the greatest
number, "42 and the doctors' allegiance to individual patients also
contributed to morale problems. Yet another cause of low morale must
have been the doctors' awareness that others of similar social and
educational background had successfully avoided military service.43

39.
Record at 2232.
Betwee, supra note 38, at 15-16. Indeed, with the escalation of the war, the
40.
Army found it difficult to retain even those physicians who had intended to make a career
of military medicine. Many of these doctors sought to resign from the service, sometimes
specifically to stave off service in Vietnam. Peter G. Bourne, supra note 38, at 57. In
letters to his lawyers written while confined at Fort Jackson (upon conviction Levy was
held at Fort Jackson until December 1967, when he was transferred to the United States
Disciplinary Barracks at Leavenworth), Levy urged them to publicize two Fort Jackson
doctors' decisions to resign their commissions to avoid a tour of duty in Vietnam. He
further urged his attorneys to enlist help from within the peace movement to investigate
the f�uency of doctors resigning their commissions to avoid Vietnam service. See Lette r
from Dr. Howard Levy to Charles Morgan, Jr. (Aug. 15, 1967), in Levy Litigation Files,
supra note 27; Letters from Dr. Howard Levy to Charles Morgan, Jr. (Aug. 31, 1967),
in Levy Litigation Files, supra note 27.
Betwee, supra note 38, at 15-16.
41.
Edwin T. Cooke et al., Attitudes of Physicians Entering Military Service, 14
42.
ARCHIVES ENVTL. HEALTH 271, 273, 274-75, 277-78 (1967); see Record at 611
(testimony of Capt. Ivan Mauer).
43.
Peter Bourne writes:
The doctor-draftee enters the service feeling that he has been
discriminated against, a feeling which is not without some justification.
Physicians are still drafted up to age 35, although few other Americans are
drafted after age 26. Doctors are the only group drafted even if they have
children. They are drafted with physical handicaps which would make anyone
else 4F. At the present time, the "Selective Service" is selecting virtually 100
per cent of the country's eligible physicians. This was not the case until the
recent military buildup, with its resulting increased demands for physicians.
It has meant that many 33- and 34-year-old physicians, who have established
practices, are suddenly being drafted into the service.
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However typical Levy's casual approach to such military formalities
as saluting and proper display of his insignia was among military doctors,
his situation was distinctive in other important ways. At his trial, defense
counsel offered evidence in mitigation to show that the Army sent Levy
to Fort Jackson without his having undergone the normal course of basic
training for doctors at Fort Sam Houston in Texas.44 Levy thus missed
the normal socialization process that would have alerted him to military
customs and helped him to internalize military norms. This gap in his
training may have contributed to Levy's tin ear for military customs and
practices. 45
Whether because of a tin ear, or simply indifference, Levy was not
a typical officer. Soon after his arrival at Fort Jackson, Levy refused to
join the Officers' Club, an apparently unprecedented act that caused
considerable upset before the matter was resolved in Levy's favor.46 He

Bourne, supra note 38, at 57. On the class nature of military service and combat service
in the Vietnam War era, see generally CHRISTIAN G. APPY, WORKINO CLASS WAR:

AMERICAN COMBAT SOLDIERS AND VIETNAM (1993), especially chapters 1 and 2;

LAWRENCE M. BASK IR & WILLIAM A. STRAUSS, CHANCE AND CIRCUMSTANCE: THE
DRAFr, THE WAR, AND THE VIETNAM GENERATION 3-28, 39, 47-49 (1978); FLYNN,

supra

note 23, at 193-95; James Fallows,

What Did You Do in the Class War, Daddy?,

WASH. MONTHLY, Oct. 1975, at 5.
44.

Record at 609-10 (testimony of Capt. Ivan Mauer);

of SFC George B. Curry);

see also id.

id.

at 2413-16 (testimony

at 2127, 2228-31 (testimony of Lt. Col. Richard

L. Coppedge) (describing importance of basic training for doctors).
45.

Telephone Interview with Col. Earl V. Brown, Law Officer in Levy Court-

martial (Sept. 24, 1993) (speculating on whether standard indoctrination would have
alerted Levy to military norms and expectations). I am rather skeptical that this training
would have altered events significantly.

Certainly, it would not have changed Levy's

opposition to the war or his beliefs regarding the ethics of training Special Forces aidmen.
Nor would it have dampened Levy's commitment to civil rights or curbed his prickly
individualism. On the other hand, it might have sensitized him to the limits of tolerance
within the military to the effect of averting the charges relating to his statements to Special
Forces trainees and other soldiers. Levy apparently tempered his statements after his first
hospital commander, Col. Grossman, told him to do so, and insisted that had he been
forewarned of the consequences, he would not have made the statements that led to the
charges under Articles 133 and 134. Letter from Dr. Howard Levy to Charles Morgan,
Jr. (July 27, 1967),

in

Levy Litigation Files,

supra

note 27 (abstract of conversation

between Howard Levy and Col. Fancy during Levy's confinement after sentencing at Fort
Jackson).

46.

supra
Interview with Howard Levy by KFPA. 's Denny Smithson (San

CHARLES MOROAN, JR., ONE MAN, ONE VOICE 115-16 (1979); Finn,

note 29, at 168-71;

Francisco radio broadcast, Nov. 16, 1969) (audio tape on file with author) [hereinafter
Smithson].

According to Levy, after he pointed out to his commanding officer, Col.

Grossman, that the club's by-laws made membership voluntary, Grossman replied: "Well
there are certain customs here in the Army, and one of the customs is that officers join
the officers club."

/d.

This theme of the military's unwritten, but widely recognized and

strictly observed rules, and of Levy's breach of those rules, recurs throughout the history
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seemed indifferent to rank and did not differentiate between what he said
to enlisted men and what he said to officers. His willingness to cross the
boundaries of rank was remarked upon too many times in the court
martial testimony to have produced mere indifference among many of his
fellow officers.47

Levy also crossed racial boundaries. On a Saturday morning in July
shortly after Levy had arrived at Fort Jackson, he noticed a newspaper
article that mentioned a campaign to register black voters in nearby
Newberry County, South Carolina. Levy drove to Newberry, found the
offices of the Summer Community Organization and Political Education
("SCOPE") project of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference
("SCLC"), and volunteered. That summer Levy spent his off-duty hours
working in the Newberry County voter registration drive.

After that

project ended, Levy continued his civil rights activity as a volunteer with
the South Carolina Voter Education Project ("VEP"). He also wrote for
and assisted in the publication of

Carolina Contrast,

a newspaper

pubJished by the Voter Education Project.48 Moreover, in his day-to-day

of the Levy case. Indeed, in rejecting Levy's vagueness challenge, the Supreme Court
partly relied on its conclusion that military "customs and usages" gave meaning to
otherwise imprecise standards set forth in U.C.M.J. §§ 133 and 134. Parker v. Levy,
417 U.S. at 746-49, 754. One popular unofficial handbook for officers indicates the
importance of the officers' club and hence the gravity of Levy's breach of military
custom:
The officers' club . . . is the center of social activities for officers and their
families. . . . An officer with permanent station at a post having a club
should become a member at once. To fail to do so will cause the officer and
the adult members of his family to miss the very heart of post social activity
and, if he is married, deny his wife normal social contacts with other Army
wives.
THE MILITARY SERVICE PuBLISHING COMPANY, THE OFFICER'S GUIDE 221 (23d ed.
1957).
47.
See infra notes 220-24 and accompanying text.
For a discussion of Levy's civi
l rights activity, see generally the affidavits
48.
contained in Exhibit C to the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, Levy v. Parker, 316
F. Supp. 473 (M.D. Penn. 1970) (No. 1057), rev'd, 478 F.2d 772 (3d Cir. 1973), rev'd,
417 U.S. 733 (1974); see also Kopkind, supra note 29, at 17-18; Short & Seidenberg,
supra note 24,· at 41-42. Por a discussion of SCOPE, see ADAM FAIRCLOUGH, To
REDEEM THE SOUL OF AMERICA: THE SO!ITHERN CHRISTIAN LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE
AND MARTIN LUTHER KINO, JR. 258-65 (1987); DAVID J . GARROW, BEARING THE
CROSS: MARTIN LUTHER KINO, JR. AND THE SO!ITHERN CHRISTIAN LEADERSHIP
CONFERENCE 415-20, 440-42 (1986).

Por a discussion of the VEP, see STEVEN F.

LAWSON, BLACK BALLOTS: VOTING RIOIITS IN THE SO!ITH, 1944-1969, at 250-87 (1976);

PAT WATTERS & REEsE CLEGHORN, CLIMBING JACOB'S LADDER: THE ARRIVAL OF
NEGROES IN SO!ITHERN POLITICS 44-67 (1967); Charles D. Lowery, Voter Education
Project, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AFRICAN AMERICAN CIVIL RIOIITS 557, 557-58 (Charles
D. Lowery & John F. Marszalek eds. , 1992).
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dealings with black soldiers at Fort Jackson, Levy paid no heed to racial
boundaries. A point of controversy in his court-martial was Levy's
assertion that the court-martial was set in motion to punish him for his
civil rights activities. The relationship among Levy's racial views, his
civil rights activities, and the court-martial is controversial and will be
explored below. 49 Suffice it to say that at the very least this was another
way in which Levy was out of step with the norms of Fort Jackson.
Finally, Levy was not reticent about his opposition to the Vietnam
Having discovered that Army regulations, which would
War.50
sometimes have required medical discharges if strictly adhered to, were
being overlooked or deliberately ignored, he took advantage of such
regulations to provide discharges for soldiers seeking a way out of the
war.51 He also shared his views about the war with those willing (or
perhaps, at times, obliged) to listen, without regard for the listeners' rank.

B. The Green Berets
As head of the dermatology clinic at the U.S. Army Hospital in Fort
Jackson, Levy treated soldiers and their dependents for dermatological
problems and venereal disease. A few months after his arrival, he was
also given the task of providing dermatology instruction to Special Forces
aidmen trainees. While Levy initially gave the required training, he
ultimately concluded that he would not teach aidmen trainees . That
decision eventually led to Levy's refusing an order to train the aidmen
and later, his court-martial.
The Army created Special Forces in 1952 for a Cold .War European
mission. Special Forces members were intended to be specialists who
would both engage in guerilla activities and train indigenous guerrilla
bands well behind communist lines as partisan auxiliaries in a
conventional war between NATO and Warsaw Pact forces in Europe. 52
Of course, the anticipated war in Europe never occurred, but because
of decolonization in Africa and Asia, U.S. defense planners soon

See infra notes 68-97 and accompanying text.
49.
50.
E.g. , Record at 2038 (testimony of Capt. (Chaplain) Joseph H. Feinstein); id.
at 2346 (testimony of Capt. David J . Travis); Kopkind, supra note 29, at 19; Short &
Seidenberg, supra note 24, at 41; Smithson, supra note 46.
51.
CLAUDlA DREIFUS, RADICAL LIFESTYLES 37 (1971); Short & Seidenberg,
supra note 24, at 3 8-39.
52.
LARRY E. CABLE, CONFLICf OF MYTHS: THE DEV ELOPMENT OF AMERICAN
COUNTERINSURGENCY DOCilUNE AND THE VIETNAM WAR 1 42-43 (1986); CHARLES M.
SIMPSON III, INSIDE THE GREEN BERETS: THE FIRST THIRTY YEARS 35-36, 53 (1983);
Donald Duncan, "The Whole Thing Was a Lie!n, RAMPARTS, Feb. 1966, at 12, 14. For
a discussion of the antecedents and early history of Special Forces, see ALFRED H .
PADDOCK, JR., U S ARMY SPECIAL WARFARE: ITS ORIGINS (1982).
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perceived a new threat, and with it a new use for Special Forces. In
response to Soviet Premier Khrushchev's expression of support for
national liberation movements in the colonial world, President Kennedy
told the 1 962 graduating class at West Point that the United States faced
another type of war, new in its intensity, ancient in its
origins-war by guerrillas, subversives, insurgents, assassins;
war by ambush instead of combat; by infiltration, instead of
aggression, seeking victory by eroding and exhausting the
enemy instead of engaging him. It requires . . . a whole new
kind of strategy, a...whoII y different kind of force. 53
As Richard Slotkin writes, the American response to presumed
communist-sponsored wars of national liberation was "to create a mirror
image of the enemy, an American guerrilla fighter, a Green Beret. "54
The Kennedy administration quickly became captivated by the military
doctrine of counterinsurgency. It revitalized Special Forces and, over the
objection of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, restored to them the right to wear
the green beret. ss Proponents of counterinsurgency drew on America's

53.

William P. Yaroorough,

Foreword to SIMPSON, supra note 52, at x (quoting
(1962)); see also

John F. Kennedy, Address to the Graduating Class at West Point

supra note 3 1 , at 76-77.
54.
Richard Slotkin, Gunfighters and Green Berets: The Magnificent Seven and
the Myth of Counter-Insurgency, 44 RADICAL HlST. REv. 65, 74 (1989).
55.
LoREN BARITZ, BACKFIRE.: A HISTORY OF HOW AME.RJCAN CULTURE. LBD
Us INTO VIETNAM AND MADE. Us FIGHT THE WAY WE. DID 107-12 (1985); SIMPSON,
supra note 52, at 65-69; RICHARD SLOTKIN, GUNFIGHTER NATION: THE MYTH OF THE
FRONTIER IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICA 489-504 (1992); YOUNG, supra note 3 1 ,
at 75-78. For a description o f the history o f the green beret, see SIMPSON, supra note 52,
at 29-33.
YOUNG,

The Green Berets , in tum, became popularly associated with Kennedy, "as the
military expression of the President's heroic style." Slotkin,

supra

note

54,

at

74.

Both

the Green Berets and the Peace Corps were seen as expressions of the youthful, heroic,
activist Kennedy foreign policy of meeting the challenge of communist aggression in the
third world by means of a tough-minded but not self-interested counteroffensive.
were seen as symbols of Kennedy's proclaimed "New Frontier . "

The Peace Corps and the Green Berets were two sides of this coin, mirror
images of Kennedy-style heroism.

Both would pride themselves on their

volunteer spirit, and their radical pragmatism-their ability to improvise

techniques on the ground, and to overcome the hidebound regimes of red tape
and bureaucratic restraint.

Both would begin by achieving mastery of the

local rules, mirroring the wiles of the native enemy to defeat that enemy on
his own ground.

For the Peace Corps, this meant a style of work that

required the volunteer to "get his/her hands dirty . "

In the case of the CIA

and Green Berets, "fighting dirty , " fighting "like the Indians," was part of the
original charter.

Both

As Slotkin notes:
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frontier myths about Indian wars,56 the experiences of the Greek Civil
War, the successful campaign against the Hukbalahap insurgency in the
Philippines, a misunderstanding of Mao's writings, and Kennedy's
fascination with tough-minded heroism, technocratic problem solving, and
elite, expert military troops. The proponents advocated an approach to
warfare that emphasized improvisation, ruthlessness, the organization of
indigenous paramilitary forces, and an ability to learn from the techniques
of the enemy.57 Just as James Fenimore Cooper's frontier hero, the
"White man who knows Indians, " knew them well enough to fight by
their methods and with their level of "savagery," and thereby became
Jd.

at

75; see also SLOTKIN, supra,

at

503-04.

Others, including Special Forces and its

advocates, have noted this connection between the Peace Corps and Special Forces, as was

See

exemplified by the Levy court-martial.
describing the Green Berets as

56.

an

969

Record at

(testimony of Robin Moore

"armed and mature peace corps ").

As Richard Slotkin cautions, one must "keep in mind the distinction between

the myth [of Indian war] and the real-world situations and practices to which it refers. "

RICHARD SLOTKIN, THE FATAL ENVIRONMENT: THE MYTH OF THE FRONTIER IN THE
AGE OF INDUSTRIALIZATION

1800-1890,

at

61 (1985).

The literary and film myths of

Indian warfare that fed the doctrine of counterinsurgency and led to the Special Forces'
self-image as modern-day Indian fighters distort reality in many ways.
these myths "flatten" the diversity of North America's Indians.

See

Most notably,

PATRICIA NELSON

LIMERICK, THE LEGACY OF CONQUEST: THE UNBROKEN PAST OF THE AMERICAN WEST

214-18 (1987)

(discussing the traps for the historian writing Indian history).

oversimplify by ignoring variations in time and historical development.

ld.

at

They also

216.

Don

Higginbotham cautions against such an oversimplified view of colonial warfare. He writes
that "neither Europeans nor Indians had an original commitment to total war and . . .
whites, with such tactics as burning crops and villages better understood initially some of
the psychological dimensions of warfare than did their opponents, who . . . were
accustomed to an intertribal form of violence that usually took few lives and was seasonal
and sporadic. " Don Higginbotham,

Appraisal, 44

WM. & MARY

The Early American Way ofWar: Reconnaissance and

Q. 230, 234 (1987).

Higginbotham describes a more
. . . " ld. at 233
in NORTHEAST 89 (Bruce

complex process "of cautious feeling out of each party by the other
(quoting Wilcomb Washburn, SeventeenJh-Century Indian Wars,
G. Trigger ed . ,

1978)).

.

For a discussion of Indian and U.S. methods of warfare that

takes into account the mid-nineteenth century laws of war and cultural differences between

The United States-Dakota War Trials:
REv. 13, 86-88 (1990). As Chomsky shows,

Indians and other Americans, see Carol Chomsky,

A Study in Military Injustice, 43 STAN.

L.

nineteenth-century noncombatants occupied a more ambiguous and less protected status
than their Vietnam War era counterparts.

Chomsky also shows that the U.S. Army was

as likely to attack noncombatants as were its Indian foes.

ld.

For a discussion of the role

of projection in American characterization of the enemy , see

infra

note

333

and

accompanying text. For a discussion, drawing on psychoanalytic theory, of the myths of
frontier warfare and of Indian savagery, see MICHA EL PAUL ROGIN, RONALD REAGAN,
THE MOVIE AND OTHER EPISODES IN POLITICAL DEMONOLOGY

57.

134-51 (1987).

DAVID BURNER & THOMAS R. WEST , THE TORCH IS PASSED: THE KENNEDY

BROTHERS AND AMERICAN L IBERALISM 98-102

(1984); CABLE, supra note 52, at 1 1 3-55;
35-53 (1986);
SLOTKIN, supra note 55, at 441-504; Slotkin , supra note 54.

JOHN HELLMANN, AMERICAN MYTH AND THE LEGACY OF VIETNAM
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"civilization's most effective instrument against savagery," the military
planners assumed that the key to counterinsurgency was "the man who
knows communists. "s8

As Slotkin notes, counterinsurgency advocates

concluded that "following the doctrine of Indian fighting . . . you need
'White savages' to combat 'Red.'"S9

For counterinsurgency warfare

theorists, Vietnam was to be the "laboratory for counterinsurgency
techniques and weapons. "60
Fitfully and at times halfheartedly, U.S. military planners understood
counterinsurgency not simply in military terms, but as a kind of political,
social, and economic warfare.

Again drawing on such examples as

Ramon Magsaysay's (and Colonel Edward Lansdale's) success in the
Phillipines, they theorized that "civic action" was a necessary part of
counterinsurgency warfare.61

According to this doctrine, civic action

served the direct military ends of helping to isolate guerrilla forces from
the popular base of support necessary for their operations, 62 and of
helping to recruit indigenous paramilitary forces (the Civilian Indigenous
Defense Groups, "CIDG, " or "strike force").

Civic action was also a

political measure intended to alleviate those conditions that undermined
support for the ruling government.
The basic Special Forces unit was the twelve-man A-team, which
included two aidmen. 63

The aidmen, like the other A-team members,

were highly trained in unconventional warfare, and were cross-trained in
at least one other military specialty in addition to their medical specialty.
They were primarily combatants, who went on combat missions as often
as their teammates and did not wear a red cross brassard. 64 The aidmen
were expected to provide medical care for the A-team members, for the

58.
59.

SLOTKIN,

60.

YOUNG,

ld.

supra note 55,

at 15-16, 446-47, 459.

at 453.

supra note 3 1 ,

at 82. The nature of the war changed with time as

Gen. William Westmoreland adopted a "war of attrition" strategy, marked by search and
destroy missions.

supra

ld. at 160-66;

note 3 1 , at 150-56.

see also

APPY,

supra

note 43, at 153-57; HERRING ,

While escalation and the change of strategy had some effect

on the Special Forces, they continued primarily to fight a counterinsurgency war. SHELBY

L. STANTON, GREEN BE.RRTS AT WAR: U.S. ARMY SPECIAL FORCES IN SOtrrHE.AST ASIA

1956-1975, at 109-29 (1985).
61.
See CADLE., supra note 52, at 148-55; SIMPSON, supra note 52, at 53-63, 15963; YoUNG, supra note 3 1 , at 82-84, 144-46.
62.
Counterinsurgency theorists were greatly impressed with Mao's maxim:
"Guerrillas are fish, and the people are the water in which they swim. If the temperature
of the water is right, the fish will thrive and multiply. "

BARITZ,

supra

note 55, at 108

(citing ROOE.R HILSMAN, To MOVE. A NATION 413 (1967) (invoking Mao)). This same
principle of counterinsurgency underlay the barbaric and disastrous strategic hamlet
program.

63.
64.

See YOUNG, supra note 3 1 , at 82-86, 144-49.
See STANTON, supra note 60, at 322 (Charts
SlMPSON, supra note 52, at 36-39.

1 & 2).
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South Vietnamese Special Forces (the Luc-Luong Dac-Biet or "LLDB")
with whom they fought, and for the CIDG. They also had a critical civic
action mission, to provide medical care in the villages and hamlets of the
contested countryside, both in an effort to gain entree for the A-team so
that the effort of recruiting a strike force could begin, and in the interest
of the political struggle for the loyalty of the Vietnamese people.6S To
its friends, the medical care provided by the Special Forces aidmen was
perhaps the single most important Special Forces civic action program;
to Levy it was a "prostitution of medicine. "66

C. Army Intelligence: Counterinsurgency at Home61
Shortly after Levy's arrival at Fort Jackson, he became the subject
of an Army Intelligence investigation. The investigation eventually
prompted the Hospital Commander, Colonel Henry F. Fancy, to order
65.
Record at 2023-25 (testimony of Col. Roger A. Juel); id. at 963 (testimony
of Robin Moore); id. at 2321-22 (testimony of Capt. Peter Bourne); see also SIMPSON,

supra note 52, at 36-39. The phrase "Vietnamese people" is a necessary but misleading
shorthand that masks the presence of numerous ethnic groups within the physical
boundaries of Vietnam who were not ethnic Vietnamese. For lack of any better way of
referring to the indigenous peoples living in Vietnam, I will refer to them collectively as
the Vietnamese.
66.
Record at 963 ("[A]ll over the world . . . our medical patrols, special forces,
and others . . . have been one of the greatest weapons we have had against communist
subversion and this is particularly true to Vietnam.") (testimony of Robin Moore); ROBIN
MooRE, THE GRBBN BBRBTS 312-13 (1965); Roy Reed, Anny Doctor Refuses to Train
Guerrillas, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 29, 1966, at A 1 , A6 (quoting Levy).
67.
During the Detroit riots in the summer of 1967, Maj. Gen. William P.
Yarborough, the Army's Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, and the former
Commander of the JFK Special Warfare School, told his staff: "Men, get out your
counterinsurgency manuals. We have an insurgency on our hands." JoAN M. JBNSBN,
Christopher Pyle
ARMY SURVE.ILI.ANCB IN AMERICA, 1775-1980, at 241 (1991).
attributes the same statement to Gen. Yarborough, but places it temporally during the
April 1968 riots resulting from the assassination of Rev. Martin Luther King .
. CHRISTOPHER H. PYLE, MILITARY SURVEILLANCE OF CIVILtAN POLITICS, 1967-1970, at
328 (1986). General Yarborough states that he has been misinterpreted and that he did
not believe that an insurrection was in the offmg. Senior Officers Debriefmg Program:
Conversation Between Lt. Gen. William P. Yarborough, Ret., Col. John R. Neese, and
LTC Houston P. Houser III 34-35 (June 2, 1975) (transcript on file at U.S. Anny Military
Institute Archives, Carlisle Barracks) [hereinafter Gen. Yarborough Interview]. As early
as 1961, J.P. Stone predicted that America's newfound fascination with Special Forces
and counterinsurgency warfare would lead to the implementation of counterinsurgency
techniques against domestic dissent. I. F. STONE, Anti-Guerilla War-The Dazzling New
Military Toothpastefor Social Decay, in IN A TIME OF TORMENT 173, 173-75 (1967); I.F.
STONE, Men Brass Hats Begin to Read Mao Tse-Tung, Beware!, in IN A TIME OF
TORMENT, supra, at 170, 170-73 .
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Levy to train the Special Forces aidmen. It also profoundly affected the
way the defense and some observers framed the case.
According to the defense, the investigation was politically and
racially motivated. The investigation was, they argued, triggered by
Levy's civil rights work, and nurtured by the bigotry of James B. West,
an Army Intelligence agent, who appears ubiquitously through much of
the Intelligence investigation. 68
Suggestive evidence supports the defense's interpretation. Army
Intelligence had long harbored an unhealthy fascination with domestic
civil rights activities, or what it called "Negro Subversion. "69 The
Army was certainly not free of racism, and James West looms darkly in
the investigation. There are curious coincidences of time and place. Two
days after Levy began his civil rights work in Newberry County, Agent
West's home,70 someone made the first notation in Levy's personnel file
suggesting the need for a security investigation.71 While testifying at the
preliminary hearing that preceded the court-martial ,72 Agent West

68.
at 29-158,

For the defense's fullest articulation of these events, see Brief of Petitioner

Levy

(No. 1057) [hereinafter District Court Habeas Brief] .

explanation of this theory, see SHERRlLL,

supra

note 38, at 100-19;

For further

see also

MORGAN,

supra note 46, at 120-25 ; Finn, supra note 29, at 172-73 ; Short & Seidenberg, supra note
24, at 41-44; Smithson, supra note 46.
69.
JENSEN, supra note 67, at 239-41 ; ROY TALBERT, JR., NEGATIVE
INTELLIGENCE: THE ARMY AND THE AMERICAN LEFT, 1917-194 1 , at 1 1 3-34, 243-44,

267-73 (1991); Stephen G. Tompkins, Army

Feared King, Secretly Watched Him, MEM.
In 1917, Spy Target

COM. APPEAL, Mar. 2 1 , 1993, at A 1 , AS; Stephen G. Tompkins,

Was Black America,

MEM. CoM. APPEAL, Mar. 2 1 , 1993, at A7.

"Negro Subversion"

was the name of a ftle opened by Military Intelligence in the summer of 1917. Its first
entry identified

" 'several incidents of where colored men had attempted to make

appointments with white women,'" which it took to be a barometer of "'general unrest
among the colored people."' TALBERT,
70.

supra,

at 1 13 .

West lived in the town o f Prosperity (pop. 757), the third largest community

in Newberry County, and a town in which Levy did civil rights work.
Habeas Brief,

supra note 68,

See District Court

at 37-38. Levy, who spent weekends and most evenings in

Newberry County that summer, used his car, readily identifiable by its New York license
plates and Fort Jackson officer stickers, to drive prospective registrants to the court house
and for other related work.

See Affidavit of Howard Brett Levy, Exhibit C to the Petition
Levy (No. 1057). The governing wisdom

for Writ of Habeas Corpus at 142, 143-44,

among civil rights workers in the South at this time was that an identifiable car, and most
notably one with "foreign" license plates , put one in grave
EAGLES, OIITSIDE AGITATOR:

peril.

See

CHARLES W.

JON DANIELS AND THE CIVlL RIGHTS MOVEMENT IN

ALABAMA 68, 73 (1993); WrLLIAM BRADFORD HUIE, THREE LIVES FOR MISSISSIPPI 1 19,
135 (1965).
71.

The entry on a sheet of paper in Levy's 201 file read:

"Determine whetver

[sic] loyalty investigation should be made 19 July, 1965." Record, vol. 15, at 314-15.
72.

This was the Article 32 investigation. For a brief explanation of the Article

32 investigation, see

infra

note 1 1 8 and accompanying text.
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elusively suggested that Levy's civil rights work had been investigated by
someone within Army Intelligence.73 Further, while the defense never
did establish that West was a Klan member (something they assumed),
there can be l ittle doubt that he was a bigot who was fixated on Levy's
racial views and interactions with blacks.74 West played a major role in
73.

At the Article 32 investigation, during the examination of Agent West by

Levy's lawyer, Charles Morgan, Jr., the following exchange occurred:

Q:

"Did you make any investigation of Capt. Levy relating to his

activities on affairs around South Carolina? "

Col. Severin (the officer presiding over the Article 32 investigation):

"Do

you mean in the city as opposed to out here in the military? "

Q:

(By Mr. Morgan)

A:

"I did not

Q:

"Do you know whether or not someone else did?"

A:

"Non-military, yes."

myself. "

"I cannot answer that. I had better delay answering that until I
can see, because this possibly could be a security matter. I do not
have that.

Q:

I do not know that."

"Well, now, I am not asking you whether or not someone else did
at this point.

I am asking you whether or not you know whether

or not someone else did?"
A:

"Well, I will have to decline t o answer that."

Record, vol. 13, at

74.
Corpus at

520-21

(emphasis added).

See Affidavit of Jack Chatfield , Exhibit C to the Petition for Writ of Habeas

21, 24, Levy

(No.

1057)

(quoting an informant who, on the basis of

conversations with West, concluded that "West is 'one of the worst bigots' he has ever
known."); Letter from Howard Levy to Charles Morgan, Jr.

1

(Dec.

4, 1969), in

Levy

Litigation Files, supra note 27 (recounting conversation in which Joe Cole heard West say
of blacks: "They live like animals .
to Charles Morgan, Jr. (Oct.

Its [sic] unbelievable!"); Letter from Howard Levy

10, 1969), in

Levy Litigation Files,

supra

note

27

(indicating Steve Klein [sic] had heard West refer to blacks as "niggers ," and that Joe
Cole would testify that West told him "every civil rights organization is a commie front"
and that "[blacks] live like pigs. The way they live they deserve it.").

Private Joe Cole

was one of the Fort Jackson 8. For material on the Fort Jackson 8, see FRED HALSTEAD,
GIS SPEAK OUT AGAINST THE WAR: THE CASE OF THE Fr. JACKSON 8

STEVEN SMITH, NOTE.BOOK OF A SIXTIES LAWYER:
SELECfED WRITINGS 57-84

(1992).

(1970);

MICHAEL

AN UNREPENTANT MEMOIR AND

Steve "Klein" may have been Pvt. Steve Kline, one

of the participants in an attempted pray-in for peace at the Ft. Jackson Chapel.

See
supra, at 8 1 ; Douglas Robinson, Two at Fort Jackson Face Court-Martial Over
War Doubts, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 22, 1968, at A10.

SMITH,

In investigating Levy, West conducted interviews seeking information about Levy's
racial views and associations. Most striking of the witness statements taken by West was
that of Sgt. Debenvion Landing.

Landing not only recounted that Levy had on various

occasions (dates and names of individuals had been forgotten) discussed Vietnam behind
closed doors with black patients for extensive periods, but also raised the spectre of
interracial sex. According to Landing's statement: "I have heard Levy express a desire
to 'date' Negro female patients after treating attractive Negro patients in his office, but

19-24 (Oct.
73-74; see also Agent

I never knew him to date one." Statement of Debenvion Landing, DA Form

12, 1966), in

Levy Army Intelligence File,

supra

note

25,

at
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the Levy investigation. He set in motion Colonel Fancy's decision to give
Levy the order to train and alerted Fancy to a G-2 dossier on Levy. At
times West's testimony was evasive to the point of obstruction.75 At
other times, it was utterly incredible.76 The Army's decision to withhold
most of the G-2 dossier from Levy's civilian defense counsel fueled
speculation that it must be concealing embarrassing secrets.

Report, DA Form
at

70-71

341

(Oct.

26, 1966), in

Levy Army Intelligence File, supra note 25,

(West's report elaborating on Landing's statement by identifying a Sp«:(lific

incident and raising smutty implications by placing quotation marks around the word
"date").

At the Article

32

hearing preceding the court-martial, Landing testified that

West had "asked a lot of questions" relating to race and Levy's racial attitudes and had

asked something along the lines of whether Levy had expressed an interest in black
women. Record, vol.

14,

at

635.

West was not the only agent to focus on race and to

elicit statements that described Levy's racial views in negative terms.
of Sgt. William Cain, DA Form

supra note

25,

at

1 84-85

19-24 (Feb. 18, 1966), in

See, e.g., Statement

Levy Army Intelligence File,

(Statement of Sgt. Landing's predecessor in the dermatology

clinic, taken by Agent Lawrence Gysin, but witnessed by Agent West, stating among other
things: "Levy was quite pro-Negro , too [sic) the side of the Negroes when discussing
Civil Rights matters , and appeared to think more of the Negroid [sic) race than the White
race, " and incorrectly describing Levy's conversations with a black soldier who was
brought to the dermatology clinic from the stockade by stating that "[h)e often visited a
young Negro Private who was confined in the Post Stockade . . . although I am unaware
just what their association together was."); Agent Report, DA Form

in

Levy Army Intelligence File, supra note

25,

at

1 86-87

341

(Feb.

18, 1966),

(Report of Agent Henry L.

Durant on interview with David Cooper, Jr., a University of South Carolina law student,
who depicted Levy as a civil rights militant, well connected with the movement in South

Carolina . Cooper related an argument he had with Levy when Cooper referred to non
Southerners involved in the civil rights movement as "maggots" and Levy identified
·

himself as "one of those 'maggots."').

On the unsuccessful defense efforts to connect West to the Klan, see generally
Memorandum by Jack Chatfield: Newberry County (undated),

in

Levy Litigation Files,

supra note 27; Memorandum by Laughlin McDonald: A Summary of Trip to Whitmire,
Newberry, Prosperity, etc. (March 21-24,

75.

1969), in Levy Litigation

Files, supra note 27.

In addition to the testimony quoted supra note 73, see Record, vol.

1 3 , at 516

("Q: Who is your immediate superior in the Columbia office? A: Mr. David Delevergne.
Q: Is he an Army officer? A: Sir, I cannot answer that. I am not at liberty myself to
answer that.").

76.

West testified that he was unaware of the summer of

drive in Newberry County. Record at
that assertion.

2534-35.

1965 voter registration

Others attested to the improbability of

See Affidavit of Franklin B. Ashley, Exhibit C to the Petition for Writ of
19, 20, Levy (No. 1057) ("Suring [sic) the entire summer of 1965, the

Habeas Corpus at

main, almost only, topic of conversation among the white citizenry, were these racial
incidents.

Everyone who had an J.Q. above a moron's level was aware that Newberry

was having its hottest summer. "); Affidavit of Jack Chatfield , Exhibit C to the Petition
for Writ of Habeas Corpus at

2 1 , 25, Levy

(No.

1057);

Exhibit C to the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus at

1057).

Affidavit of Marvin D. Wall,

5 1 , 57-58, 60-61, Levy

(No.
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While it is conceivable that Army Intelligence initiated the
investigation because of Levy's civil rights work, a more mundane
explanation seems likely. Withholding the majority of the intelligence
dossier from Levy's civilian counsel probably reflected the Army's banal
bureaucratic mindset and the FBI's resolution in enforcing the rule against
third-agency release of its documents, rather than indicating a cover
up. n The withheld pages of Levy's intelligence dossier do not describe
his civil rights work, or otherwise indicate a scheme to punish him for his
See Memorandum from Col. Dmitri J. Tadich, Chief, Personnel Security
77.
Division, to Cmdr. Gen., Port Jackson (Jan. 21, 1967), in Levy Anny Intelligence Pile,
supra note 25, at 575; Memo for Record from LTC C.R. Smithson (Feb. 6, 1967), in
Levy Anny Intelligence File, supra note 25, at 389 ("Dossier contains an FBI report and
considerable info relative to complaint investigation of LEVY. In view of '3rd Agency
Rule,' need to protect sources and methods, and the fact that this material has no bearing
on the GCM charges, this material should not be released."); Appellate Exhibit 6, Letter
to Capt. Sanders (Mar. 17, 1967), in Record, vol. 12 (regarding release of Intelligence
Dossier); Appellate Exhibit 6, Letter from Charles Morgan, Jr. to the Comm. Gen. (Apr.
4, 1967), in Record, vol. 12 (requesting the entire dossier); Appellate Exhibit 6, Letter
from Comm. Gen. to Charles Morgan, Jr. (Apr. 1 1 , 1967), in Record, vol. 12
(responding to request for ftles).
The issue of releasing the G2 dossier's remaining pages reemerged in the Levy v.
Parker federal habeas proceeding. Again, Anny Intelligence resisted releasing much of
the material, as did the FBI. See Memorandum from LTC Arnold I. Melnick, Litigation
Div., O TJAG, to Director, Counterintelligenc e & Security, ACSI (Mar. 20, 1970), in
Levy Anny Intelligence File, supra note 25, at 253-54 (requesting review of dossier to
determine releasability of documents, noting government's opposition at a Mar: 16, 1970,
hearing before U.S. District Court Judge Michael H. Sheridan, and indicating that initial
step would probably be in camera review of the contested materials by Judge Sheridan);
Letter from ACSI to TJAG Litigation Division (Mar. 25, 1970) in Levy Army Intelligence
File, supra note 25, at 264-65 (responding to Mar. 20 request and describing procedure
for obtaining permission for release of FBI generated documents); Memorandum to
Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation (Mar. 27, 1970), in U.S. Army Judge Advocate
General Corps, Litigation Division Files [hereinafter JAG Files] (JAG request to FBI for
review of FBI generated documents in the dossier); Notes of Conversation with Kevin
Maroney, Internal Security Division, Dep't of Justice (June 30, 1970), in JAG Files,
supra (probably transcribed by Capt. Michael Katz) ("Spoke to Mr. Maroney . . . . He
received a memo from the FBI in which that agency takes the position that they do not
want to release the ftles even to the judge for in camera inspection. They are 'mad at the
Anny' for allowing those documents to come into play in the court-martial proceedings
to begin with. "); Letter from J. Walter Yeagley, Ass't Att'y. Gen., Internal Security
Division, to Lt. Col. Charles W. Bethany, Jr., Acting Chief, Litigation Division, JAG 3
(July 6, 1970), in JAG Files, supra (stating opposition to release of documents, even to
judge in camera, to avoid establishing any precedent "for unnecessarily involving the FBI
and FBI information in the military prosecutive process in general"). Judge Sheridan
ultimately denied Levy's motion for disclosure of the G2 dossier. Levy v. Parker, 316
F. Supp. 473, 477-80 (M.D. Pa. 1970).
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racial views and civil rights activities.78 Apparently, West did not begin

78.
On February 1 1 , 1993, the Freedom of Information/Privacy Office of the
United States Army Intelligence and Security Command produced 526 pages of its 578page intelligence file on Dr. Levy. The fLie, which was produced redacted, contains both
the G-2 dossier and other materials relating to Levy, mostly generated after the preferral
of charges and court-martial. Portions of the G-2 me that were given to the civilian
defense counsel are an unredacted part of the court-martial record, see, e.g. , Appellate
Exhibit 2, Agent Reports of James B. West, in Record, vol. 12, and for those pages I
consulted both the court-martial record and the Army Intelligence FOIA production. All
but one of the pages that were withheld from the FOIA production (which has been
produced by Army JAG) are FBI documents, including 24 pages of documents in the G-2
me relating to Monthly Review Associates, Studies on the Left, The National Guardian,
New World Review (a journal to which Levy did not subscribe), and the Militant Labor
Forum. My FOIA request to the FBI for those documents, and for all other documents
relating to Dr. Levy, is pending.
For the reasons described supra note 69 and accompanying text, I believe it is
highly probable that Army Intelligence did spy on one or more of the civil rights
organizations Levy worked for in South Carolina, and that the documents produced in that
operation may refer to Levy. Unfortunately, as a result of Senator Ervin's early 1970s
investigation regarding Army surveillance of civilians, the Army Intelligence files from
post World War II were largely destroyed or broken up in a manner that made them
unsearchable. TALBERT, supra note 69, at 273-74, 290. Indeed, the Army Intelligence
files on Levy may have survived that period only because the G2 dossier was at issue in
the Levy case. Not surprisingly, U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command
determined that they could find nothing responsive to my FOIA requests for documents
relating to South Carolina YEP and SCLC-SCOPE, the civil rights organizations with
which Levy worked, and Carolina Contrast, YEP's publication. Letter from Jane B.
Sealock, Chief, Freedom of Information/Privacy Office, U.S. Army Intelligence and
Security Command, to Author (Apr. 28, 1993) (on file with author).
Hoping that Army Intelligence might have shared the fruits of its surveillance with
either the FBI or the South Carolina Law Enforcement Division ("SLED"), I filed FOIA
requests for documents relating to Dr. Levy or to South Carolina YEP, SCOPE-5CLC,
or Carolina Contrast with the FBI and its Columbia, South Carolina, Charlotte, North
Carolina, Atlanta, Georgia, and New York City field offices. I also filed similar requests
under the South CaroJina Freedom of Information Act with SLED. To date, the FBI has
identified approximately 1360 pages of material that is responsive to my request. See
Letter from J. Kevin O'Brien, Chief, Freedom of Information-Privacy Acts Section, FBI,
to Author (Oct. 27, 1993) (on file with author); Letter from J. Kevin O 'Brien to Author
(Nov. 10, 1993) (on file with author); Letter from Joseph P. Schulte, Jr., Special Agent
in Charge, Charlotte, N.C., FBI Field Office, to Author (Nov. 2, 1993) (on file with
author). The FBI has also indicated that certain documents pertaining to SCOPE were
destroyed. Letter from Mollie Johnson Halle, Principal Legal Advisor, Atlanta Field
Office, to Author (June 29, 1993) (on file with author). To date, the Charlotte Field
Office has produced seven redacted pages of documents and withheld two documents in
their entirety. These relate to Levy's antiwar activities after his release from prison. The
remaining documents are still being processed. SLED responded to my FOIA requests
by stating that it found no information in its files relating to Levy or to the civil rights
organizations he aided. Letters from Lt. Michael J. Brown, S.C. Law Enforcement
Division, to Author (June 28, 1993) (on file with author). I have described SLED's
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work at Army Intelligence until after the investigation had been
initiated.79 The documentary evidence does not link West to the
investigation any earlier than February 1 1 , 1966, long after the
investigation had begun.M
Also, the investigation originated from within the G-2 section of Fort
Jackson, not from the Columbia, South Carolina, field office of Army
Intelligence (a separate command). At its inception, the investigation was
both modest in its goals and consistent with governing Army regulations.
The investigation appears to have initially been the product of the nation's
cold war mentality and the Army's lumbering bureaucracy. Once set in
motion, a combination of chance, obsessive anticommunism, and perhaps
the zeal of the local Army Intelligence agents propelled it forward until
it culminated in Levy's court-martial .
By the Army's own rules, Howard Levy did not belong there. On
January 28, 1 965, Levy filled out the Armed Forces Security
Questionnaire ("DD Form 98"), required of all prospective members of
the Army. 81 In a costly act of scrupulousness he noted in the remarks
secti.o n to Part IV that he had attended meetings of the Militant Labor
Forum ("MLF"). He had also contributed to the MLF, and received its
publications. While the Militant Labor Forum was not on the Attorney

response to my request to a number of South Carolina attorneys familiar with SLED's
history of hostility toward civil rights organizations and student and antiwar groups. The
attorneys reacted with amused skepticism, especially to the assertion that SLED had no
records relating to the civil rights organizations.

79.

As described below, the investigation began in August 1965. According to

West's testimony at the Article 32 hearing, he began work as a civilian employee of Anny
Intelligence on November

1 , 1965, and initially had limited duties until he received his
13, at 516, 552-53. To be sure, West's testimony

badge and credentials. Record, vol.

is less than perfectly reliable, and his testimony as to when he became n
i volved in the
Levy investigation is, at best, confused.

Asked when he first heard of Levy, West

responded: "I do not know exactly. I would say December of
date is obviously wrong; perhaps he meant to say December of

1966." ld. at 517. That
1965. Asked later when

he began work on the investigation, West said: "[W]ell, it would have been the summer
of

1965.

You see, I was not assigned to this until November of

1965." ld. at 552.

While West's rather bizarre statement might be understood to mean that he had begun a

freelance investigation of Levy before coming to Anny Intelligence, it is a thin reed on

which to hang a conspiracy theory. It probably signifies nothing more than confusion.

80.

19-24 (Peb. 1 1 , 1966), in Levy
25, at 184-85. Special Agent Gysin took the
ld. at 185. The statement reveals the flavor of the

Statement of Sgt. William Cain, DA Porm

Army Intelligence Pile, supra note
statement, but West witnessed it.

Columbia Field Office's role in the investigation.

In addition to attributing disloyal

stances on Cuba, the Dominican Republic, and Vietnam, to Levy, Cain states: "Levy was
quite pro-Negro, too [sic] the side of the Negroes when discussing Civil Rights matters,
and appeared to think more of the Negroid [sic] race than the White race." ld. at

81.

See Armed Forces Security

Questionnaire, DD Porm

Levy Anny Intelligence Pile, supra note

25, at 197-99.

184.
98 (Jan. 28, 1965), in
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General's list of subversive organizations, and therefore need not have
been mentioned by Levy, Levy noted his involvement because the group
Army
was obviously related to the Socialist Workers Party.82
regulations prohibited the appointment of any applicant who had
"qualified" his DD Form 98, until his case had been investigated and
resolved.83 Levy nevertheless slipped through the cracks,M and the
investigation that should have occurred before he entered the Army began
instead in the summer of 1965.
The earliest inquiries regarding Levy appear to have come from
within the G-2 section at Fort Jackson. Their stated purpose was to
clarify his security status. 8.5 U.S. Army Intelligence Corps Command
("USAINTC") replied that Levy had undergone a national agency check
in 1962 with favorable results. 86 In the meantime new questions arose:
Levy's January DD Form 98 had turned up, and it was inconsistent with
a second form that he had completed shortly after his arrival at Fort
Jackson. 87 On the second form Levy failed to mention his connection
to the Militant Labor Forum. G-2 noticed that the earlier form was
qualified and that there was a disparity between the two versions. They
directed the Columbia Field Office of the 1 1 1 th Army Intelligence Group
to obtain a statement from Levy regarding his DD Form 98s.88
ld. at 198.
82.
AR 604-10 Personnel Security Clearance 1 16(c) (Nov. 4, 1959).
83.
"Slipping through the cracks" may not be the most appropriate metaphor, as
84.
the "cracks" may have been quite large. Selective Service had not yet demonstrated its
disregard of First Amendment values by adopting the policy of removing deferments from
anti-war protesters and reclassifying them as 1-A. See FLYNN , supra note 23, at 183-87,
215-19.
85.
See Request for and Results of Personnel Security Action, DA Form 2748
(Aug. 6, 1965), in Levy Army Intelligence File, supra note 25, at 225-26. The request
was directed by G-2 at Fort Jackson to the U.S. Army Intelligence Corps Command
(USAINTC), at Fort Holabird, Maryland. It requested a records check, rather than an
investigation, for the purpose of granting security clearance, and it explained that Levy's
records were devoid of any evidence of clearance or a national agency check. Shortly
after his arrival at Fort Jackson, Levy was asked to complete another DO Form 98,
because, he recalls being told, the fmt one was missing. Laughlin McDonald,
Memorandum to File of Capt. Howard B. Levy (Dec. 27. 1966), in Levy Litigation Files,
supra note 27. That recollection was consistent with G-2's remarks to USAINTC, and
suggests a benign interpretation of the cryptic July 19 notation in Levy's personnel file.
See supra note 71.
Levy Litigation Files, supra note 27, at 226.
86.
Armed Forces Security Questionnaire, DO Form 98 (July 15, 1965), in Levy
87.
Army Intelligence File, supra note 25, at 202-04.
88.
Record, vol. 15, at 3 1 1 (memorializing Capt. Russell of G-2 and Maj. Gipson
of Personnel Division's discussion regarding discrepancy between the two forms); Request
for Interview (Aug. 18, 1965), in Levy Army Intelligence File, supra note 25, at 122.
The request for an interview was consistent with Army regulations. AR 604-10 1 26.
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In a series of conversations in early October 1965, Levy explained
to an Army Intelligence agent that in late 1964 and early 1965 he had
attended approximately eight public lectures sponsored by the Militant
Labor Forum, where a variety of speakers, most notably Malcolm X, 89
addressed such topics as foreign policy and civil rights.90
The
intelligence agent asked about more than Levy's involvement with the
MLF. He pressed Levy on his political beliefs and learned of the journals
to which Levy subscribed. Levy stated that he was not a pacifist,
although he had pacifistic leanings, and that he questioned U.S. policy in
Vietnam. Foreshadowing future events, Levy also stated that he could
"envision situations in which I could conceivably refuse to obey a military
order given me by a commander. This would be in such a situation in
which I felt that the order was ethically or morally incorrect. "91 He
added that under such unusual circumstances, disobedience would be an
act of greater loyalty than obedience. 92
Fort Jackson G-2 was apparently uncertain about how to proceed
after receiving the agent's report on his interview with Levy. It
recommended against giving Levy security clearance, but rejected the idea
of initiating a "flagging action," a more serious step that would
accompany the beginning of a "complaint type investigation. "93 At
some point, the issue was forwarded to the Intelligence Command of the

89.

Levy undoubtedly heard Malcolm X distance black Americans from the

Vietnam War in his response to a question: "Address myself to Vietnam for two minutes?
It's a shame-that's one second . . . . But they're trapped, they can't get out. You notice
I said 'they . '

They

are trapped ,

they

can't get out."

Vietnam to that in the Congo. Malcolm X,

He also compared U.S. policy in

Two Minutes on Vietnam, in VIETNAM AND

BlACK AMERICA: AN ANTHOLOGY OF PROTEST AND REsiSTANCE 59 (Clyde Taylor ed.,
1973) (responding to question at meeting of Militant Labor Forum, Jan. 7, 1965). The
idea that black Americans had a questionable stake in U.S. involvement in Vietnam would
become critical in the Levy court-martial.
90.

See infra text accompanying notes

197-23 1 .

Statement of Howard B. Levy, DA Form 19-24 (Oct. 7, 1965), in Levy Army

Intelligence File,

supra

note 25, at 214-15.

He stated that failing to qualify his second

Form 98 was an oversight on his part.
91.

ld. at 216.

92.

ld. at 214-16.

93.

Record , vol. 15, at 312-13 (memorializing phone conversation between the

Chief of Personnel Division and Capt. Russell, G-2);
Personnel Division (Nov. 19, 1965));

id.

at 309-10 (Memorandum from

AR 604-1 0 11 25(c), 26(c); AR 600-3 1 , Flag

Control Procedures for Military Personnel in
Investigations or Procedures (May 1969).

National Security Cases and Other

Paragraph 26(c) of Army Regulation 604-1 0

says n o flagging can occur until there i s "sufficient credible derogatory information to
warrant its classification as a complaint type investigation . " AR 604-10 , 26(c). Levy's
file was eventually flagged on May 17, 1966.
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Third U.S. Army.94 The Third Army, in turn, requested that USAINTC
initiate a "limited investigation to determine if a loyalty investiga
tion . . . is warranted. "95
That the defense may have mistaken the Army's usual response to
Vietnam War dissent and unorthodox political beliefs and activity for
aberrant behavior with conspiratorial origins is understandable, given the
secrecy in which the Army cloaked its investigation, the reality of virulent
racism, both within and without the Army, and evidence suggestive of a
'nefarious scheme as described above. The defense had fallen prey to
what David Fischer calls the "fallacy of identity, " the belief that causes
must resemble their effects. 96 Thus, they assumed that events that in
their culmination seemed pathological must have had pathological roots
as well. In assuming that the Army set the court-martial in motion in
Newberry County on the first morning that Levy sought out the SCOPE
office, the defense underestimated both the power and depth of paranoid
anticommunism within the Army (especially within the Intelligence
command) and the Army's perception that Levy's words and deeds posed
a serious threat.
Although the court-martial was probably not instigated by a scheme
to punish Levy for his civil rights work, this should not be understood to
diminish the importance of racism in Levy's story. In the hands of Army
Intelligence, the investigation repeatedly circled back to questions of race
in a way that shaped the accusers' perception of Levy and framed the
Army's characterization of Levy at trial. Moreover, racial animus may
explain why the Columbia field office continued to investigate Levy after
USAINTC had completed its investigation in May 1 966, with the effect
of producing hostile witness statements that may have been necessary to
revivify the investigation.97 In other words, racism helped to frame the
investigation, and may have helped to sustain it, even if it was not the
initial cause. Finally, there can be little doubt that Levy's violating Fort
Jackson's racial norms and otherwise breaching military etiquette reduced
the possibility that his accusers would seek an alternative short of court
martial or would consider compromise.

94.
Here, too, G-2 seems to have adhered to Army Regulations. AR-604-10 1
25(b). Fort Jackson was within the command of the Third U.S. Army.
95.
Request for and Results of Personnel Security Action, DA Form 2748 (Nov.
22, 1965), in Levy Army Intelligence File, supra note 25, at 1 17-18 (investigation
completed May 5, 1966).
96.
DAVID HACKEIT FISCHER, HISTORIANS' FALLACIES: TOWARD A LOGIC OF
HISTORICAL THOUGHT 177-78 (1970).
97.
See infra note 103. For hostile witness statements, see generally Levy Army
Intelligence File, supra note 25, at 98-1 15.
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D. The Refusal to Train
On May

5, 1966, USAINTC had completed its investigation of Levy,

which it forwarded to headquarters of the Third Army.

Its Report of

Investigation noted somewhat inconclusive results.98 The investigation
had unearthed both favorable and unfavorable character references. The
Report of Investigation also noted Levy's attendance at lectures sponsored
by the Militant Labor Forum, his subscription to "several Communist-line
or Socialist publications, " and his failure to identify these associations in
his DD Form

98.99

These acts and associations might, the report stated·,

fall within the criteria for eliminating Levy from military service or for
taking other action under the Army regulation for personnel security
clearance. 100

Matters might have stopped there. The Commanding General of the
Third Army, perhaps disinclined to a hysterical reaction to the material
contained in the Report, or mindful of the potential need to replace Levy
with another doctor, concluded that the investigation had not shown that
Levy "embraces subversive ideology, " and provided "insufficient basis
for elimination from the service.

"101

He recommended retaining Levy

on active duty provided that Levy be ineligible for security clearance, and
apparently the U . S . Army Industrial and Personnel Security Group
("USAPSG") agreed.102

The Personnel Security Division disagreed,

recommending that the case be reprocessed by the USAPSG with a view
toward Levy's elimination from the military.103 The Personnel Security

98.

See Request for and
in Levy Anny

(Nov. 22, 1965),

Results of Personnel Security Action, DA Fonn 2748

Intelligence File, supra note 25, at 1 17-18; Report o f

Investigation, D A Fonn 342 (May 4, 1966), in Levy Anny Intelligence File, supra note

25, at 1 19-20.

ld. at 1 19.
99.
100.
ld. at 1 1 9-20; see AR 604-1 0 Personnel Security Clearance 1 14 (Nov. 4,
1959). The report specifically characterized Levy's conduct and associations as possibly
falling within the Regulation's Criterion 4, paragraph 14(b) ("Membership in, or

affiliation or sympathetic association with" any "subversive" organization), and within
Criterion 3 , paragraph 14(c) ("Any deliberate misrepresentation, falsification, or omission
of material fact").

101.

Letter from Capt. T.M. Ballew, Ass't Adj . Gen., Headquarters, Third United

States Anny , to Chief, U . S . Anny Personnel Security Group (May 23, 1966),

Anny Intelligence File, supra note 25, at 578.

102.

See id.; see also Disposition Fonn,

DA Fonn 2496 (Aug. 1 , 1966),

in

Levy

in Levy

Anny Intelligence File, supra note 25, at 386 (discussing Letter from Headquarters, Third
Anny (May 23, 1966), and the recommendation of the USAPSG).
document is not contained in the Levy Anny Intelligence File.

The USAPSG

The USAPSG's role as

the next actor beyond the "Major Commander" is described at AR 604-10

103.

See

Deposition Fonn, DA Fonn 2496 (Aug. 1 , 1966),

Intelligence File, supra note 25, at 386.

in

1 27.
Levy Anny

In addition to the materials o f the investigation

·
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Division prevailed in its position, and the Adjutant General of the Army
directed the Commanding General of the Third Army to reconsider his
recommendation. 104 The Third Army reopened the investigation. tos
The information subsequently obtained would lead to Levy's court
martial .
By early October, Army Intelligence resumed its investigation, now
focusing on aidman training and Levy's statements about politics and the
war. 106 Sometime during the week of October 2, Army Intelligence
Agent James West interviewed Colonel Henry F. Fancy, Levy's Hospital
Commander, regarding Levy's performance of duties. His questioning
alerted Fancy to the possibility that Levy was not training Special Forces
aidmen. 107
Upon investigation, which included, at Agent West's
suggestion, a trip to the G-2 Office at Fort Jackson on October 7, Colonel
Fancy decided to give Levy a direct verbal and written order to train the
aidmen. 108 On October 1 1 , Fancy gave the order, and Levy refused it,
explaining that he objected on ethical grounds.109

completed in May, 1966, the Personnel Security Division had in its possession a
supplemental report prepared by the Columbia Field Office of the l l lth Intelligence
Group, which contained the first indication of Levy's refusal to train Special Forces
aidmen .

Id. (referring to Levy's statements about Vietnam and U.S. policy in the

Caribbean and to Levy's refusal to train the aidmen); Letter from LTC Andrew J. Nolte,
Acting Commander, Headquarters , l l l th Intelligence Corps Group, Fort McPherson,

Georgia, to Comdr. Gen . , U . S . Army Intelligence Command (June 27, 1966}, in Levy

Army Intelligence File, supra note 25, at 93; Summary of Information, DA Form 568
(June 23, 1966}, in Levy Army Intelligence File, supra note 24, at 94-97.

There is no

indication as to why and on what authority the Columbia Field Office continued its
investigation after it had been completed by USAINTC.
104.
1966},

in

Letter from the Adj . Gen. to Comdr. Gen., Third U.S. Army (Aug. 22,

Levy Army Intelligence File, supra note 25, at 92 (written "BY ORDER OF

THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY").
105.

Letter from Headquarters, Third U . S . Army to Comdr. Gen., U.S. Army

Training Center, Fort Jackson (Dec. 1 3 , 1966),

in

Levy Army Intelligence File, supra

note 25, at 576.
106.

The shift in focus was doubtless prompted by the Columbia Field Office's

supplemental report.
resumed.
4, 1966},

DA Form 341 is the earliest indication that the investigation had

Appellate Exhibit 2, Agent Report of Interview with LTC Jackie Jacob (Oct.

in

Record, vol. 12, at 40.

For an indication of the focus of the investigation,

see Record, vol. 1 3 , at 513-70 (Article 32 Hearing Testimony of Agent James B. West) .
107.

Record at 252 (testimony of Col. Henry F. Fancy).

According to Col.

Fancy's testimony, his first meeting with Agent West occurred on October 6. Col. Fancy
stated that he had already heard something about problems with Levy's training the
aidmen but had not bothered to investigate. West's visit generated a new-found sense of
urgency on Col. Fancy's part.

Record at 252-53 .

108.

Col. Fancy testified that he decided to take "strong corrective action" on

109.

See Prosecution Exhibit 2, Letter Order from Col.

October 7, based on his own investigations and trip to G-2.

Record at 252, 255.
Fancy and Enclosure (Oct.
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E.

The Decision to Court-Martial

The then-current rotation of aidmen trainees was scheduled to last
until late November. Colonel Fancy informed Levy that he would have
training critiques prepared at the middle and end of the rotation.110 In
late November, Fancy concluded that Levy had defied his order to train
the aidmen. He then initiated the process for imposing the mildest
available sanction, non-judicial punishment under Article 1 5 of the
UCMJ .1 11 On December 14, 1966, Fancy submitted the paperwork for
an Article 15 punishment to the Staff Judge Advocate at Fort Jackson.112
Fancy was then contacted by G-2 at Fort Jackson and invited to look at
the completed Intelligence dossier.113 Fancy found the dossier to be
alarming. After reading it, and consulting with the Staff Judge Advocate
and the Commanding General of Fort Jackson, Fancy withdrew the
Article 15 paperwork and upgraded the charges to the level of a general
court-martial. 11 4
Colonel Fancy set the court-martial process in motion when he
preferred two charges on December 23, 1966, and forwarded them to the
Commanding General of Fort Jackson on December 28. 115 The initial
charges stated violations of Article 90 of the UCMJ, for Levy's refusal
Upon
to train, 1 16 and Article 134, for his various statements. 1 17
completion of an Article 32 investigation, the military's rough equivalent

11 , 1966), in Record, vol. 10; Record at 232-33 (testimony of C ol. Henry F. Fancy).
110.
See Prosecution Exhibit 4, Memorandum from Col. Fancy to C apt. Levy
(N ov . 4, 1966) (entitled Mid-Term Critique, Special Forces Aidmen), in Record, vol. 10.
111.
U .C.M .J. art. 15, 10 U .S.C. § 815 (1988). Col. Fancy des cribes his
decision to institute an Article 15 sanction in the Record at 257-59.
Record, vol. 14, at 90-91 (Article 32 testimony of Col. Ches ter Davis).
112.
Record at 259-60; M emorandum from Col. Dmitri J. Tadich, Chief,
113.
Personnel Security Division, to Comdr. Gen., Fort Jackson (Jan. 21, 1967), in Levy
Anny Intelligence File, supra note 25, at 575.
114.
Record at 259-61 (testimony of C ol. Henry F. Fancy).
Appellate Exhibit 4, Charge Sheet, in Record, vol. 1 1. The Charge Sheet
115.
is the rough equivalent of an indictment or information. Among other things, it identifies
the accused and contains the charges, specifi cations, and formal preferral, the sworn
s ignature of the accuser that he or she believes the charges to be true based on knowledge
of the facts or inves tigation. The charge identifies the allegedly violated code section.
The s pecification is a statement of facts constituting the violation. See 1 FRANCIS A.
GILLIGAN & FREDERIC I. LEDERER, COURT-MARTIAL PROCEDURE §§ 6-10.00 to 20.00
(1991). Colonel Fancy forwarded the charges to M aj . Gen. Gines Perez, the Comander
General of the U nited States Ann y Training Center, Fort J ackson, who had the statutory
power to convene a general court- martial. See U.C.M .J. art. 22(a), 10 U.S.C. § 822(a).
116.
See Appellate Exhibit 4, Charge Sheet, in Record, vol. 11. The specification
under this charge is reproduced in Appendix I, infra.
117.
/d. The specification under this charge is reproduced in Appendix I, infra.
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of a preliminary hearing, 11 8 Colonel Fancy preferred an additional
charge under Article 133 ("Additional Charge I"). This charge was
recommended by the investigating officer, and stemmed from Levy's
statements, which were alleged to constitute. conduct unbecoming an
officer and a gentleman. 119
Colonel Fancy preferred two final charges ("Additional Charge II"
and "Additional Charge III " or, collectively, "the letter charges") under
Articles 133 and 134, on February 8.120 These charges related to a
letter, critical of U.S. policy in Vietnam and elsewhere, that Levy sent in
September 1965 to Army Sergeant Geoffrey Hancock, Jr. , who was
stationed in Vietnam. 121
In addition to his appointed military counsel , Levy sought civilian
counsel . At the suggestion of the South Carol ina Voter Education Project
field director, Levy contacted Charles Morgan, Jr., director of the
American Civil Liberties Union's Southern Regional Office. Morgan was
initially skeptical. He asked his associate, Laughlin McDonald, who was
heading home to nearby Winnsboro, South Carolina, for Christmas, to
interview Levy. On McDonald's recommendation, Morgan agreed to take
the case. 122
Fort Jackson authorities rebuffed the defense's initial efforts to find
a compromise that would avert a court-martial. 123 The handful of

1 18.

See

U.C.M.J. art.

hearing is quite rough.

32, 10 U . S . C . § 832.

The analogy to a preliminary

One of the important functions of the Article

afford the defense an opportunity to engage in pretrial discovery.

32 hearing is to

For a discussion of

32 investigations, see GILLIGAN & LEDERER, supra note 1 15, at 325-56.
1 19.
Appellate Exhibit 5, Charge Sheet, in Record , vol. 12. The specification
under this charge is reproduced in Appendix I , infra. The Article 32 investigating
officer's recommendation is found at Appellate Exhibit 4, Investigating Officer's Report,
(Feb . 1 , 1967) in Record, vol. 1 1 .
120.
Appellate Exhibit 5 , Charge Sheet, in Record , vol. 12. The specification for
Article

Additional Charges II and JJJ are reproduced in Appendix I,

infra.

The Hancock Jetter is discussed in the Record at

755-81 (testimony of SFC
1058-68 (testimony of William Treanor). The Jetter is
found in Prosecution Exhibits 5 and 5A, in Record, vol. 1 1 , and is reproduced in
121 .

Geoffrey Hancock, Jr.), and at
Appendix II,

122.

infra.
MORGAN,

supra note 25;

supra

note

46, at 122-23; Interview with Dr. Howard B. Levy,

Memorandum from Laughlin McDonald to File of Capt. Howard B . Levy

27, 1965), in Levy Litigation Files , supra note 27.
123.
Finn, supra note 29, at 178; Short & Seidenberg, supra note 24, at 49;
Interview with Dr. Howard B. Levy, supra note 25. The Army would subsequently turn
(Dec.

down Levy's application for conscientious objector status. That application was doomed
to be denied, because Levy claimed his status as a selective conscientious objector.

See

1049 (Jan. 8, 1967), in Levy Litigation
Files , supra note 27; Letter from the Adj . Gen. to Capt. Howard Levy (May 2, 1967),
in Levy Litigation Files, supra note 27 (denying request) . While the Supreme Court had
Request for Conscientious Objection, DA Form

870

WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW

previous court-martials of GI dissenters had garnered little media
attention. Thus, neither the local authorities nor the Pentagon had yet
recognized how much using the bludgeon of a court-martial would cost
in adverse publicity and further stimulation of GI dissent. 124 Levy's
final effort to avert court-martial failed . Levy had brought a class action
suit, seeking both to enjoin the court-martial and to have a special three
judge court declare Articles 133 and 1 34 unconstitutionally vague and
overbroad, and prosecution under either Article or under Article 90 to

not yet foreclosed the possibility of exemption from military service on the basis of
selective objection to war, draft boards and courts widely assumed that selective c.o. 's
were not entitled to exemption.

See FLYNN, supra note 23,

at 179. In 1971, the Supreme

Court declared that there was no statutory or constitutional exemption for selective
conscientious objectors .

denied,

Gillette v. United States , 401 U.S. 437, 463 (1971),

reh'g

402 U.S. 934 (1971).

124.

Second Lieutenant Henry Howe, in all likelihood the first GI dissenter

prosecuted by the military, participated in an antiwar rally in November 1965. While off
duty and out of uniform, he carried a sign stating on one side, "End Johnson's Facist [sic]
Aggression in Viet-Nam," and on the other, "Let's Have More Than a Choice Between
Petty, Ignorant Facists [sic] in 1968." He was convicted of violating UCMJ Articles 133
and 88 (the latter of which prohibits the use of contemptuous words by a commissioned
officer against the President and various other public officials).

See

United States v.

Howe, 17 C.M.A. 165, 37 C.M.R. 429, 431-32 (1967). Howe's case received minimal
press coverage.

Brass, in

See

Terry H. Anderson,

The GI Movement and the Response from the

GIVE PEACE A CHANCE: EXPLORING THB VIETNAM ANTIWAR MOVEMENT 93

Officer Is Found Guilty in Protest,
see also
Franklin Whitehouse, A . C.L.U. Will Aid Anny War Critic, N.Y. TIMBs, Jan. 17, 1966,
at AS; Army Critic ofJohnson Free, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 25, 1966, at A47; Anny Reduces
Sentence of Officer in War Protest, N.Y. TIMBs, Jan. 29, 1966, at A3 (other brief
(Melvin Small & William D . Hoover eds . , 1992);

N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 23, 1965, at A22 (short piece reporting Howe's conviction);

discussions of the case).

The Fort Hood 3, Pvts. Dennis Mora, James Johnson, and

David Samas, the first soldiers to refuse orders to Vietnam, received more press coverage
than Howe.

They announced their refusal at a press conference arranged by the Fifth

See Martin Arnold , 3 Soldiers Hold News Conference
to Announce They Won 't Go to Vietnam, N.Y. TIMES, July 1 , 1966, at A13. However,
Avenue Peace Parade Committee.

while their news conference and arrest received substantial media coverage, their courts
martial were only passingly mentioned, despite efforts to raise the question of the war's
legality in their defense.

See, e.g.,

A nny Opens Trialfor Vietnam Foe,
Convictions of 3 Soldiers Approved by First Anny,

Ronald Sullivan ,

N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 7, 1966, at A4;

N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 8, 1966, at A32. For a discussion of the Fort Hood 3 news conference
and the group's impact on the antiwar movement, see CHARLES DEBENBDBTTI, AN
AMERICAN ORDEAL:

THE ANTIWAR MOVEMENT OF THE VIETNAM ERA, 155 (1 990);

ZAROULIS & SULLIVAN ,

supra

note 33, at 86-88.

The defendants' and government's

briefs on the illegality or legality of the war are on flle with the author. The cases of
Howard Petrick and Andy Stapp, occurring about the same time as the Levy court-martial,
also received scant attention in the

New York T1mes.

For a discussion of changes in the military's approach to Gl dissent over the course
of the war, see Anderson, supra note 124, at 98-102, 112-115; Short & Seidenberg, supra
note 24, at 52.
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punish political affiliation or private expression of political opm10n
similarly unconstitutional.125 On the eve of the court-martial, a split
panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit, persuaded that Levy had not shown irreparable injury, denied
Levy's application for a stay of the court-martial proceedings and petition
for a writ of mandamus ordering the district court to convene a three
judge court. 126
II.

THE COURT-MARTIAL

A. The Participants
The court-martial began on May 10, 1967, in a small, crowded
frame building at Fort Jackson. Prosecuting the case were two outsiders
to Fort Jackson, Captain Richard M. Shusterman and his Assistant Trial
Counsel, Captain Blair Shick.127 Shusterman, nearing the end of his
125.
See Complaint of Capt. Howard Brett Levy at 19-2 1 , Levy v. McNamara,
Civ. No. 953-67 (D.D.C. May 3, 1967), petition for writ of mandamus and application
for stay denied sub nom. Levy v. Corcoran, 389 F.2d 929, 930 (D.C. Cir.), application
for stay denied, 387 U.S. 915, cert. denied, 389 U.S. 960 (1967).
126.
Corcoran, 389 P.2d at 930-3 1. There is some indication that the panel,
which heard argument on the morning of May 9, 1967, may have initially decided in
Levy's favor, and then changed its vote later in the day. See Handwritten Notes of LTC
Robinson (May 9, 1967), in JAG Files, supra note 77 (noting original message that
mandamus had been granted and subsequent notation cancelling original message). Of the
three panel members, Judge Harold Leventhal expressed the greatest doubt about the
position he was adopting, and almost certainly would have been the swing judge.
Corcoran, 389 F.2d at 930-3 1 . Levy may have been the victim of poor timing. The
decision reflected the historic reluctance of courts to interfere in the business of the
military, a reluctance that would erode somewhat by decade's end. See Interview with
Judge Royce Lamberth, in Washington, D.C. (Apr. 29, 1993). In 1972, Judge Lamberth,
then Capt. Lamberth of the Litigation Division of the U.S. Army Judge Advocate General
Corps, argued the Levy case on behalf of the United States Army before the United States
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. But just as Levy's case may have arisen too early
for a different outcome, it may have arisen too late. In concluding that Levy was not
facing irreparable constitutional harm because the military justice system had shown its
inclination "to apply to men in the military service the protection of pertinent Supreme
Court decisions based on constitutional grounds," Corcoran, 389 F.2d at 93 1 , both Judge
Tamm and Judge Levanthal relied on the United States Court of Military Appeals' then
two-week-old decision in United States v. Tempia, 37 C.M.R. 249 (1967) (holding
Miranda principles applicable to court-martial proceedings).
127.
The military refers to the prosecutor as Trial Counsel, to the military defense
lawyer as Appointed Counsel, and to any civilian defense lawyer as Individual Counsel.
Shusterman asked for the authority to pick his Assistant Trial Counsel and selected Shick,
whom he knew from University of Pennsylvania School of Law where Shick had been a
class ahead of him. Shick was stationed at Port Gordon, but w�s teaching in the Military
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stint in the Army JAG Corps, had earned a reputation as a talented trial
lawyer that went beyond the boundaries of Fort Gordon, Georgia, where
he was stationed. 128 Seizing upon the fact that Shusterman, like Levy,
was Jewish, many journalists and others who discussed the case concluded
that the Army must have picked Shusterman to be Trial Counsel in an
effort to deflect comparisons with the Dreyfus affair. That view,
however, ascribes to the local commander (or to whoever made the
decision not to staff the case from within Fort Jackson) greater prescience
about the symbolic value of the case than was likely at so early a stage. 129
Police School, and was not in the JAG Corps . So far as Shusterman knew, Shick had no
previous trial experience. Telephone Interview with Richard Shusterman (Aug. 23, 1993).

128.

See

U.S. Army Officer Efficiency Report, DA Form 67-5 (Sept. 22, 1966)

(on file with author) (glowing efficiency rating of Richard Shusterman) ; Letter from Judge
George W. Latimer to Maj . Gen. Walter B . Richardson, U.S. Army School Training
Center, Fort Gordon, Ga. (Aug. 5, 1966) (on file with author) (commending Shusterman's
prosecution of Capt. Stephen J. Borys); Interview with Judge Royce Lamberth , supra note

126 (stating recollection that Shusterman had a good reputation); Telephone Interview with
Col. Earl V . Brown, supra note 45 (describing Shusterman as one of the best prosecutors
that he had seen) .

The Borys court-martial was the retrial of a fairly notorious case

involving charges of rape, sodomy! larceny, and robbery and raising Fourth, Fifth, and
Sixth Amendment issues. It ended in a successful conviction of Borys the summer before
Shusterman was sent to Fort Jackson for Levy's court-martial.

See

United States v.

Borys, 39 C.M.R. 608 (1968).

129.

See JOSEPH DI MONA, GREAT
supra note 46, at 1 14; SHERRILL, supra
note 38, at 98-99; Duncan & Dunn, supra note 25, at 50, 52; Kopkind, supra note 29,
at 22; Elinor Langer, The Court-Martial of Captain Levy: Medical Ethics v. Military Law,
156 SCIENCE 1346, 1347 (1967); Nicholas von Hoffman, The Conviction of Captain Levy,
NEW REPUBLIC, June 17, 1967, at 9, 10; Nicholas von Hoffman, The Troubled World of
Captain Levy, WASH. PosT, May 2 1 , 1967, at A3 (all drawing on the Dreyfus image, and
At any rate, if that was the goal, they failed.

COURT-MARTIAL CASES 224 (1972); MORGAN,

some accusing the Army of appointing Shusterman as Trial Counsel to defuse that image).
If the Army did deliberately seek out a Jewish prosecutor, it did so at the risk of trading
the imagery of the Dreyfus affair for the imagery of the Rosenberg case, where many
believed that the Rosenbergs, as Jews, received especially harsh treatment from a Jewish
judge and a Jewish prosecutor.

See

RONALD RADOSH & JOYCE MILTON,

THE

ROSENBERG FILE: A SEARCH FOR THE TRUTH 288 {1983) (quoting Vincent Lebonitte,jury
foreman, saying: "I felt good that this was strictly a Jewish show.

Jew.

It was Jew against

It wasn't the Christians hanging the Jews . " ) .
Although I doubt that Shusterman was appointed Trial Counsel because h e

was

Jewish, the decision to reach beyond Fort Jackson to appoint Trial Counsel was an
uncommon occurrence, beyond the power of the local commander without either the
consent of the commanding general of Fort Gordon or the authority of so .eone up the
chain of command.

It indicates that even at this early stage, both the local commander

and others were treating the case as an unusual one.

Conversation with Professor Paul

Giannelli, Case Western Reserve University School of law (undated).

But see Telephone

Interview with Col. Robert H. Ivey (ret.), Former Staff Judge Advocate, Fort Gordon
(July 27, 1993) (stating that he had loaned JAG officers to another command on other
occasions).

Neither Col. Ivey nor his executive officer at Fort Gordon, Col. B . J .
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The Staff Judge Advocate of Fort Jackson appointed Captain Charles
M. Sanders, Jr., as defense counsel and Captain Walter H . Jones, Jr., as
assistant defense counsel. 130 The principal role in Levy's defense,
however, was played by his lead civilian counsel, Charles Morgan, Jr.
Morgan, who has been described by Samuel Walker as "the only other
charismatic figure in ACLU history besides Roger Baldwin," had returned
to his native South in 1 964 to open the ACLU's Southern Regional Office
in Atlanta.13 1 Coming to the ACLU after working briefly at the
American Association of University Professors and then at the NAACP
Legal Defense Fund, Morgan already had achieved a historic Supreme
Court victory in Reynolds v. Sims,132 and brought with him a docket of
civil rights cases from his private practice. While his efforts at the
Atlanta office focused most notably on voting rights and jury
discrimination, Morgan had already taken on one Vietnam War-related
case: representing Julian Bond in his effort to be seated in the Georgia
state legislature. In addition, he would soon mount a challenge to the
induction of blacks by the virtually all-white draft boards of South
Carolina and Georgia. 133 Morgan was assisted by Laughlin McDonald

Shuman, recalls why Shusterman was appointed Trial Counsel.
with Col. B . J . Shuman (July 22, 1993).

ld. ;

Telephone Interview

I have found no documents relating to the

appointment, and I have been unable to trace either the Fort Jackson Staff Judge Advocate
serving at the time of the Levy case, or his executive officer.

Shusterman insisted on

using Blair Shick, whom he knew from law school, rather than a lawyer from the Fort
Jackson Staff Judge Advocate's Office, as Assistant Trial Counsel.

See

Telephone

Interview with Richard Shusterman, supra note 127.
130.

See Court-Martial Appointing Order No. 6, in Record , vol. 2; Court-Martial
in Record, vol. 2. On defense attorney Charles
se.e Kopkind, supra note 29, at 27-28.

Appointing Order No. 1 1 (May 2, 1967),
Sanders ,
131.

SAMUEL WALKER, IN DEFENSE OF AMERICAN LIBERTIES:

THE ACLU 268 (1990); cf Nicholas von Hoffman,

Civilian Lawyers, WASH.

A HISTORY OF

Court-martial Can Be Very Tryingfor

POST, May 29, 1967, at A3 ("Morgan works for the American

Civil Liberties Union, a very restrained , constitutional and Brooks Brothers-ish outfit, but
he's colorful all the same.").

Morgan had been driven out of Birmingham, Alabama,

after giving a speech to the Young Men's Business Club condemning the previous day's
bombing of Birmingham's Sixteenth Street Baptist Church, in which four children died,
and arguing that the community as a whole was responsible for the killings.

See CHARLES
see

MORGAN, JR., A TIME TO SPPAK (1964) (describing Birmingham and these events);

also

HOWELL RAINES, MY SOUL IS RESTED:

MOVEMENT DAYS IN THE DEEP SOUTH

REMEMBERED 179-85 (Penguin ed. 1983) (interviews of Charles Morgan and Chris
McNair).
For Morgan's discussion of Reynolds and the
supra note 46, at 60-70.
133.
WALKER, supra note 1 3 1 , at 268-71 ; see generally MORGAN, supra note 46.
Morgan discusses the events leading up to Bond v . Floyd, 385 U.S. 116 (1967). See
MORGAN, supra note 46, at 150-6 1 . The challenge to the racially discriminatory draft
boards arose in Sellers v. McNamara, 398 F.2d 893 (5th Cir. 1968), cert. denied sub
132.

377 U.S. 533 (1964).

reapportionment cases , see MORGAN,
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from the Atlanta office, and, for part of the trial, by Alan Levine,
Eleanor Holmes Norton, and two non-lawyer New York Civil Liberties
Union staff members, Ira Glasser and Ramona Ripston.134
The members of a military court-martial, the panel of court members
that hears and decides the case, have certain powers that most civilian
juries lack. Most notably, the court-martial, not the military judge, has
the power to sentence the defendant upon conviction.m Nevertheless,
at the time of Levy's court-martial, the UCMJ provided for a "law
officer, " who served many functions analogous to those of a civil ian court
judge.136

The law officer presiding over Levy's court-martial was

Colonel Earl V. Brown. Brown, a 1941 West Point graduate, returned
to school after World War D to obtain a law degree. He entered the JAG
Corps in

1953 and was sent to Korea as legal adviser to the prisoner
There, he also served as defense counsel for two soldiers

exchange.

accused of collaborating with the enemy.

Brown, who was nearing the

end of his military career, was the executive officer of the United States
Army Judiciary, and it was widely assumed that Brown had been chosen
to ensure against any Army misstep . 137
Levy faced a court-martial that was as mil itary as he was not, and it
is only with a touch of irony that one would suggest that this was a jury
of Levy's peers. Levy's court-martial consisted of ten officers of superior

nom.

Sellers v. Laird, 395 U.S. 950 (1969).

MORGAN,
134.
135.

For Morgan's discussion of

supra note 46, at 163-66.
WALKER, supra note 1 3 1 , at 272.
See 1 GIT..LIGAN & LEDERER, supra

note 1 15 , at 516.

Sellers,

see

Under the current

rules, a court-martial defendant may request a trial by judge alone, in which case
sentencing power resides in the military judge. R.C.M.
of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C.
136.

§ 903(a)(2); see Uniform Code

§§ 804, 815, 817.

The 1968 amendments to the UCMJ changed the title and some of the

functions of the law officer, who became the "military judge."
1968, art. 16,

judge, see 1 GILLIGAN & LEDERER,
137.

supra note

1 15 .

As the officer with administrative control over the Army's law officers,

Brown exercised his authority to appoint himself to the case.
Col. Earl V. Brown,

supra

Captain Levy, WASH. POST,
note 27.

Telephone Interview with

The Troubled World of
Levy 'Judge Ran a Relaxed Court ',
(undated), in Levy Litigation Files,

note 45; Nicholas von Hoffman,
May 2 1 , 1967, at A31;

N . Y . TiMES, June 4, 1967, at A12; Court Martial

supra

Military Justice Act of

§ 8 1 6 , Pub. L. No. 90-632. For a discussion of the role of the military

Colonel Brown 's rank as Executive Officer, U.S. Army Judiciary, is

noted on the court papers in Levy 's action in the D . C . District Court action .
Complaint of Captain Howard Breu Levy,

McNamara

(No. 953-67).

See, e.g.,

News accounts of

the court-martial generally referred to Brown as the Army's "senior" or "top" law officer.

E.g. , Duncan & Dunn, supra note 25, at 54; Kopkind, supra note 29, at 22; Levy 'Judge
Ran a Relaxed Court, ' supra; see also MORGAN, supra note 46, at 1 3 1 .
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rank: two colonels, four lieutenant colonels, and four majors. 138 All ten
were dependent on the convening authority, Major General Gines Perez,
for advancement in their careers. 139 Presiding over the court-martial
was Colonel John S . Baskin, a South Carolinian whose wife presided over

the Fort Jackson Officers' Wives Club. 140

Eight members were white.

The one black and one Japanese-American on the court-martial were both
majors. Eight were Southerners, including five South Carolinians. 141
Two were West Point graduates, and one had graduated from the Citadel.
Two had attended the counterinsurgency course at the U . S . Army Special
Warfare School.
years.

The panel members had served an average of

19.3

Major Nishimoto, the court member with the least service, was

soon to mark the ninth anniversary of his commission.

Four members

had served in Vietnam, and one had lost an eye there while rescuing two
Gls from a friendly minefield.

None were doctors, nurses, or other

health workers.

None were draftees, enlisted personnel, or non-career
officers. And none were Jews.142

138.

UCMJ Article 25(d)(1) states:

"When it can be avoided, no member of an

armed force may be tried by a court-martial any member of which is junior to him in rank
or grade."

10 U . S . C .

§ 825(d)(1); see also MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL , 4<: (1951)

[hereinafter M.C.M.] ("An officer may be tried only by a court-martial composed of
officers . " ) .
139.

For a discussion of the command influence problem in the military justice

system, see Luther C. West,

Command Influence, in CONSCIENCE AND COMMAND 73, 73History of Command Influence on the

135 (James Finn ed . , 1971); Luther C. West, A

Military Judicial System,

18 UCLA L. REV. 1 (1970).

Reforms of the military justice

system have mitigated the problem of command influence, but they have not completely
eliminated it as an issue.

For a recent decision of the Supreme Court rejecting a

challenge to the military justice system grounded in the issue of command influence, see
752 (1994). More recently, unlawful command
.
influence by the Chief of Naval Operations, Adm. Frank B. Kelso II, was a basis for

Weiss v. United States , 1 1 4 S. Ct

dismissing the last remaining charges against Navy personnel arising out of the 1991
Tailhook Symposium.

See 140 CONO. REC. H460-63 , H474-75 (daily ed.

Feb. 10, 1 994)

(statement of Rep. Schroeder, putting into the record Capt. Vest's decision in

United
States v. Miller).
140.
Mrs. Baskin Leads Slate ofJackson OWC, ARMY TIMES, May 10, 1967, at
W3. TheManualfor Courts-Martial provided that the senior member of the court-martial
serve as its President. M . C . M . , supra note 138, , 40.
·

141.

The other two panel members were from California and West Virginia.

Record at 1 5 ; MORGAN, supra note 46, at 130; Kopkind, supra note 29, at
.
22; Court Martial (undated), in Levy Litigation Files, supra note 27. Nicholas von
142.

Hoffman, covering the case for the

Washington Post, wrote,

"There are a Negro and an

Oriental on the court-martial, but every officer still looks the same, mouths turned down
at the corners like tragic masks, upside-down suspension bridges, grim arches. • A row
of ten Toby mugs,' Homer Bigart of the
Hoffman,

New York Times called them . " Nicholas von
The Troubled World of Captain Levy, WASH POST, May 2 1 , 1967, at A3 .
.
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After voir dire of the court-martial panel, the court-martial was
recessed for a one-and-one-half day hearing on defense motions. The law
officer denied all defense motions, including objections to the composition
of the court-martial; 1 43 challenges on due process and other grounds to
various court-martial procedures;144 attempts to gain access to various
documents thought necessary for the defense; 145 motions to dismiss the
charges on various grounds; 146 and challenges to the constitutionality of
the court-martial system and of UCMJ Articles 133 and 134. 1 47
B. 1he Prosecution Case: Levy on Trial
A prosecutor's story, the interpretation of events that she attempts to
persuade the decisionmaker to adopt, is grounded in the legal elements of
the offenses with which the accused is charged. In the ideal-type
unambiguous case, it might have something of a connect-the-dots feel to
it, as the prosecutor takes the decisionmaker step by step through the
143.
Record at 36-38 (objection to exclusion of doctors and soldiers of the same
or lower rank from court-martial panel); id. at 38-41 (objection to composition of court
martial on grounds of command influence); id. at 42-44 (objection to procedure for
challenges for cause to court-martial); id. at 1 3 8-44 (motion to dismiss on grounds of
exclusion of women from court-martial); id. at 144-45 (motion to dismiss court-martial
on grounds that commanding general selected the court-martial).
ld. at 38-41 (objection to oath administered by Trial Counsel to court-martial
144.
members and to Trial Counsel's role in administering the oath); id. at 45-47 (objection
to Staff Judge Advocate's role because of command influence problems); id. at 47-5 1
(objection to exclusion of the press at the Article 32 hearing); id. at 51-56 (objection to
method of obtaining defense witnesses giving Trial Counsel control over the subpoenaing
of defense witnesses); id. at 102-04 (motion for severance of the charges).
145.
ld. at 81-89, 125 (motion for access to G-2 dossier); id. at 201-02 (motion
to produce questionnaires sent by Trial Counsel to various Levy patients).
146.
In addition to the other motions described above, and the constitutional
challenges noted infra note 147, see Record at 69-81 (motion to dismiss on grounds that
prosecution was politically motivated); id. at 89-94 (motion to dismiss Additional Charges
II & III or to reopen Article 32 hearing with regard to those charges because of
evidentiary deficiencies at the original Article 32 hearing); id. at 94-102 (motion to
dismiss Additional Charges II & III as cumulative); id. at 104-12 (motion to dismiss
Article 134 charges for failure to show elements of offense); id. at 1 12-15 (motion to
dismiss Charge II as preempted by 1 8 U .S.C. § 2387); id. at 1 15-22 (motion to dismiss
Additional Charge lii as grounded in an asserted violation of 18 U .S.C. § 2387, which
is inapplicable to military personnel); id. at 1 30-36 (motion to dismiss on grounds of
failure to disclose portions of Levy's G-2 dossier).
147.
ld. at 136-37 (motion for trial by jury on Sixth Amendment grounds); id. at
145-79 , 208 (motion to dismiss Articles 133 and 134 charges on vagueness and
overbreadth grounds).

Court-Martial of Dr. Howard B. Levy

1994:839

877

elements of the offense and, using an internally consistent story, connects
the accused with each element. 1 48
The Army did not have an ideal-type unambiguous case against
Levy. Most notably, Levy's intentions, conduct, and statements were
subject to conflicting interpretations. How one interpreted Levy's intent,
statements, and acts reflected, in turn, one's characterization of Levy
himself. The prosecution attempted to tell a story that removed any
ambiguities regarding Levy, his intent, and the harmful character of his
conduct.
According to the prosecution and its witnesses, Levy was immature
and unable to conform to the Army's norms. Consequently, he was given
to defiance for defiance's sake, but a more important cause of his conduct
was his excessively passionate and extreme politics.

Succumbing to his

antiwar zealousness, he sought to undermine the war effort by defiantly
disregarding his own duty and by subverting the performance of others.
In so doing, he endangered the Army and its soldiers and betrayed his
obligations to and the trust of each .
The prosecution's case regarding the Article 90 or order charge was
relatively straightforward .

To make out a violation of Article

90, the

prosecution had to show that Levy received a command from his superior
officer, and that knowing of the command and that it emanated from his
superior officer, Levy willfully disobeyed it. 149

Most facts underlying

this part of the prosecution's case were not in dispute.

Levy did not

dispute that Colonel Fancy had given the order to train, that he told
Colonel Fancy that he would not obey it, and that he had, in fact,
continued to refuse to train Special Forces soldiers.150 Not surprisingly,
the prosecution focused first on the order charge. Its presentation of that
case was a thorough, careful, and rather mechanical recitation of the
events leading to the order and Levy's refusal to obey it. Anticipating a
defense that the order was given with the expectation of its refusal for the
sole purpose of enhancing

148.

See

punishment, 151

the prosecution

elicited

W. LANCE BENNBTI & MARTHA S. FELDMAN, RECONSTRUCTING

REALITY IN THE COURTROOM: JUSTICE AND JUDGMENT IN AMERICAN CULTURE 94-98

(1981). Given a trial's rules of the road, the storytelling is never likely to be so linear

as the "connect the dots" metaphor suggests .

149.

M . C . M . , supra note 138, , 169b; Record at 2590 (instructions to court-

martial).

150.

The defense, nonetheless, did insist on instructing the court-martial as to the

Article 90 charge for the Jesser included offense of dereliction of duty, an offense that
would not require a finding of willful disobedience of the order.

151.

Record at 2514-15.

The 1951 Manual for Courts-Martial states: "Disobedience of an order which

has for its sole object the attainment of some private end, or which is given for the sole
purpose of increasing the penalty for an offense which it is expected the accused may
commit, is not punishable under this article. "

M . C . M . , supra note 138, , 169b.

878

WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW

Colonel Fancy's testimony that "[i]t was [his] personal feeling and hope"
that Levy would comply. 152
The prosecution faced a more ambiguous case with regard to the
General Articles charges. The law officer instructed that to find Levy
guilty of violating Article 134 the court-martial must find first that he
publicly made the statements in question and that the statements were
disloyal. In addition, the court-martial had to find that Levy made the
charged statements with the "design to promote disloyalty and disaffection
among the troops"; and that the statements had the "clear and reasonable
tendency" to promote disloyalty and disaffection "to the prejudice of good
order and discipline in the armed forces. " 153 Additional Charge n, the
Article 133 charge involving the Hancock letter, similarly required a
finding of intent to impair or interfere with Hancock's performance of his
duty, as well as the probability that the letter would have the intended
harmful result. 154
The prosecution would have little difficulty showing that Levy had
said more or less what he was accused of saying. Their challenge, aside
from the legal issues regarding the extent of First Amendment protection
of Levy's statements and the statutory vagueness of the General Articles,
would be to show bad intent, and the statements' dangerousness or
probability of causing harm. The prosecution had reason to doubt that it
could demonstrate intent and the harmful tendency of the statements, and
Shusterman privately held grave doubts as to whether Levy had ever
intended to make anyone disloyal. 1 55 Most of the statements fell into

152.
153.

Record at

244-45.

Record at 2593-94. The law officer's instruction regarding Additional Charge

III similarly required a finding that Levy had sent Hancock a letter with the intent to
impair his loyalty, morale, and discipline, and with the likely effect of so impairing
Hancock's loyalty . /d. at

2601-02.

The instruction was confusing as to whether it

required determination of wa clear and present danger, " the then-prevailing standard in
prosecutions involving speech.

Despite first defining the standard as "a clear and

reasonable tendency to promote disloyalty and disaffection," seemingly a less demanding
standard , Colonel Brown subsequently instructed the court-martial that the statements'
prejudicial nature was an essential element of the offense, and that to find this they had
to find "that these statements presented a clear and present danger of creating disloyalty ,

disaffection, insubordination, refusal of orders, or mutiny among the troops . " ld. at 2595.

154.

Record at 2599-600. The instruction on Additional Charge I, the Article

133

charge relating to the oral statements made by Levy to Special Forces soldiers and others,
did not include a finding of specific intent.

It did require a fmding that the statements

were "intemperate, contemptuous, defamatory, provoking, and/or disloyal. " /d. at 2598.

It also required a finding that the conduct was "unbecoming an officer and gentleman."

Id.

155.

Telephone Interview with

Richard

M.

Shusterman, supra note

127.

Shusterman also had strong reservations on First Amendment grounds about the General
Articles charges . He had no similar reservations regarding the Article

90 charge.
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one of three categories: hostile or insulting statements directed at Special
Forces soldiers;156 criticism of U . S . foreign policy or involvement in
Vietnam; 1 57 and statements that blacks, as victims of discrimination,
As Levy's lawyers would argue,
should not fight in Vietnam. 158
throwing Special Forces soldiers out of his clinic while calling them
"liars," "thieves, " and "murderers" hardly seemed like a plausible

strategy for persuading them to disaffect and become disloyal. 159 While
Levy's other statements were susceptible to a variety of interpretations,

ranging from counsel to disobey orders, to vigorous debate with no
expectation that it would alter anyone's behavior, the circumstances
militated against the view that Levy had a design to undermine the war
effort by counseling mutiny. As the defense would repeatedly point out,
out of the thousands of soldiers and patients Levy had encountered, the
prosecution succeeded in finding only a handful of soldiers who had heard
Levy make statements against the war or regarding black soldiers serving
00
in Vietnam, and none had become disloyal. 1
The prosecution sought to resolve the ambiguities of Levy's behavior
by emphasizing those statements that indicated a motive, political passion,
and anti-American

extremism,

and hence suggested

intent.

The

prosecution built its case partially on the testimony of various Green
6
Berets who recalled the invective that Levy directed at them. 1 1 Perhaps
most helpful to its effort to supply intent by constructing Levy as a radical
extremist was Levy's letter to Sergeant Geoffrey Hancock, Jr . 162

156.
For example, "I hope when you get to Vietnam something happens to you and
you are injured. " Additional Charge I, quoted in Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. at 739 n.6;
see also supra note 9 (from Charge In.
157.
See, e.g., supra note 7; Additional Charge lll, (paraphrasing Letter from
Howard Levy to Sgt. Geoffrey Hancock, Jr., 2, 5 (Sept. 10, 1965) (hereinafter Hancock
Letter]: "The only question that remains, is essentially 1 ) were we merely naive and
therefore did we make unintentional mistakes or 2) does the U.S. foreign policy represent
a diabolical evil. As you would guess, I opt for the second proposition. . . . Are the
North Viet Namese worse off than the South Viet Namese? I doubt it . . . . "). The
Hancock Letter is found at Prosecution Exhibits 5 & 5A, in Record, vol. 10. It has been
reproduced in Appendix II, infra.
158.
See, e.g. , supra note 8. The one statement included in the specifications that
does not fit any of these categories is: "The Hospital Commander has given me an order
to train special forces personnel, which order I have refused and will not obey."
Additional Charge I. For the full text of the specifications, see Appendix I, infra.
Record at 2568.
159.
ld. at 2567-68.
160.
E.g. , id. at 643 (testimony of Sp5c Wayne M . Barrows); id. at 676
161.
(testimony of Sp4c Clifton H. Davis); id. at 712-13 (testimony of Richard W. Gillum).
162.
The Hancock letter was the basis for the letter charges, Additional Charge
II and Additional Charge lll.
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Levy wrote to Hancock at the behest of his friend and civil rights co
worker, William Treanor. Treanor met and befriended Hancock in the
Army, where they served in the same Intelligence unit. Their friendship
continued

after

Treanor

correspondence.

left

the

Army,

In the summer of

and

they

maintained

a

1 965, Hancock, who was then

stationed in Vietnam, wrote to Treanor complaining of antiwar protests
·

in the U . S . and the lack of domestic support for the U . S . war effort.
Treanor showed Hancock's letter to Levy and suggested that he write a
reply, which Treanor enclosed with a short letter of his own. 163
The letter charges, arguably duplicative of the other Article
Article

133 and
134 charges, were a particularly problematic part of the

prosecution's case. The letter nowhere invited Hancock to disobey orders
or otherwise neglect his duty, although it was critical of U.S. involvement
in Vietnam, and by explicit extension, critical of Hancock's personal role.

Instead, it invited further dialogue. 164

It was sent in the context of a

friendly correspondence between Treanor and Hancock after Hancock had
raised the subject of antiwar protests.

Treanor expected that it might

generate a dialogue that would bring Levy and Hancock to a greater
understanding of each other's position. 1 6s The letter made Hancock
angry, but not disloyal.

He in turn showed the letter to several other

soldiers with whom he was stationed. Most importantly, at least for the
"conduct unbecoming" charge, it did not clearly indicate that Levy was
an Army officer and left Hancock with the misimpression that Levy was
66
a civilian doctor in the Army's employ. 1
The letter charges were sufficiently fraught with difficulty for the
prosecution that the court-martial found that Levy did not have the
specific intent to impair or interfere with Hancock's performance of

163.

Record at

1058-61 (testimony of William Treanor). Treanor testified that "I

thought . . . it is [sic] important that people with different points of view discuss it with
each other. " ld. at

1065. In response to the question whether he was trying to create a

situation where Levy and Hancock could express their disagreements with one another,
he answered:

"Their disagreements and their agreements.

If they developed their ideas

on the war to each other, I thought it would be to a better understanding between two
people I know to be very concerned about world affairs . "

164.

of the points I have raised .
your present situation."

165.
166.

ld.

Levy closed the letter by writing: "I would appreciate your views on some
In any event let me wish you good luck & safe conduct in

Hancock Letter, supra note

157, at 8.

ld. at 760-64 (testimony of Sgt. Geoffrey Hancock, Jr.).
Record at

1058-6 1 , 1064-66 (testimony of William Treanor). According to
133 charge, the fact that listeners

Col. Brown's instruction regarding the other Article

knew Levy was an officer constituted one of the offense's elements, although that element
was omitted in the instruction on the letter charge.

/d.

at

2598-600.
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duties. 167 But the letter itself, which the prosecution read to the court
martial, was inflammatory and helped create an image of Levy necessary
for his conviction on the other Article 133 and 134 charges}68 Levy
identified himself in the letter as "one of those 'people back in the states•
who actually opposes our efforts [in Vietnam] & would refuse to serve
there if I were so assigned. .. The latter clause meant little to Hancock,
given his assumption that Levy was a civilian. 169 The same phrase
spoke loudly to the court-martial. Levy argued that U.S. involvement in
Vietnam could be understood only in the context of U . S . cold war era
foreign policy, which he described as "a diabolical evil, .. orchestrated by
"the big business-military complex . .. That foreign policy, he argued, was
marked by consistent support for right-wing alternatives to popular left
liberal liberation movements to further the interests of U.S. companies
and American investors.110
Levy's comments on liberation movements in developing countries,
on U . S . allies, and on communist regimes such as Cuba and North
Vietnam were even more likely to disquiet the court-martial. He
described the press as the handmaiden of the U.S. government, ready to
find communist subversion in any liberation movement that conflicted
with U.S. interests. American intervention in the Dominican Republic
and its support for tyrants in places such as the Congo could not be
justified on the grounds of containment of communism, because the
communist threat in these places was more imagined (or manufactured)
than real. 171 But Levy did not rest his argument on dismissing a
communist challenge. Instead, he argued that we must accept the fact that
some people will choose communism and that in some contexts their
choice will be rational:
What if the majority of a people decide that Communism is
good for them. Do we, does anybody have a right to deny
them their choice. We might . . . try to prove that our way is
better but by any stretch of any moral principal can we deny
them the choice. Is communism worse than a U.S. oriented
government? The fastest growing economy in Latin America is
Cuba. Everybody reads & writes in Cuba. Everybody has

167.

The court-martial found Levy guilty of the lesser included offenses of writing

the letter with "culpable negligence" for the impairment of Hancock's performance of his
duty.

/d.

at 2618. The prosecution then sought to dismiss the charges on the ground that

the court-martial's fmdings were tantamount to

168.
169.
170.
171.

/d.

at 756.

/d.
/d.

at 2-3, 6.

an

Hancock Letter, supra note 157, at 1 .
at 4 .

acquittal.

/d.

at 2619.
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medical care. Was this true with the previously American
backed governments? Not on your life. . . . Are the North
Vietnamese worse off than the South Vietnamese?

I doubt it.
If they are why do so many back the Viet Cong? Guerilla

terrorism? Unlikely. The truth is that the North has instituted
land reform, schools, & medical facilities . . . . Why hasn't it
happened in the South & why do you insist that it will happen.
It hasn't in any of our other colonies . . . .
Geoffrey who are you fighting for?

Do you know? . . .

You, no doubt, know about the terror the whites have inflicted
upon Negroes in our country.

Aren't you guilty of the same

thing with regard the Vietnamese?

A dead woman is a dead

woman in Alabama & in Viet Nam. To destroy a child's life in
Viet Nam equals a destroyed l ife in Harlem.

For what cause?

Democracy? Diem, Trujillo, Batista, Chiang Kai Shek, Franco,
Tshombe -Bullshit?172
Finally, as the last paragraph quoted above indicates, Levy linked
U . S . involvement in Vietnam to the oppression of blacks and poor whites
in the U . S .

Not only were the two situations parallel in result, but they

were results of the same cause.

He wrote: "The same people who

suppress Negroes & poor whites here are doing it all over again all over
the world & your [sic] helping them. "173 The same paternalist attitudes,
coupled with the profit motive, underlay domestic and foreign policy
toward " [un]sophisticated" peoples. 1 74
·

Levy's Jetter to Geoffrey Hancock did more than just define him as

a political extremist before the court-martial.

It violated the Army's

construction of the Vietnamese. Nations prepare their citizens and armies
prepare their soldiers for war by demonizing and dehumanizing the
enemy.

In earlier wars, the U . S . had similarly fashioned the enemy in
racist terms as something alien and subhuman. m Indeed, many of the

pejoratives applied to the Vietnamese were recycled from earlier Asian
wars. 1 76

Yet, soldiers in Vietnam, unlike soldiers in most prior

172.
Id. at 4-7.
173.
Id. at 6.
174.
Id. at 6-7.
See generally JoHN W. DOWER, WAR WITHOUT MERCY: RACE AND POWER
175.
IN THE PACIFIC WAR (1986) (discussing the demonization of the Japanese enemy by
Americans and of the American enemy by the Japanese during World War II).
176.
David Desser, "Charlie Don '1 Surf": Race and Cullure in Vietnam War Films,
in INVENTING VIETNAM: THE WAR IN FILM AND TELEVISION 8 1 , 96-97 (Michael
Anderegg ed . , 1991). In fact, U.S. Marines ftrst used the term "gook" to refer to
Nicaraguans during the U.S. intervention in Nicaragua in 1912. LT. COL. GARY D.
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American wars, had trouble distinguishing between friend and foe. 177
It is not surprising that soldiers called all Vietnamese "gooks," "slopes,"
"slants, " or "zips" in a setting where it was difficult to tell hostile from
friendly civilians, where the civilian population resented and feared the
Americans instead of welcoming them as liberators, and where the official
and unofficial rules of engagement and the emphasis on maximizing body
counts created an atmosphere where anything that moved or anyone who
was dead was often deemed the enemy . 178
Indeed, Christian Appy
writes that many American soldiers held greater respect for the enemy
than for Vietnamese civilians. 179
American conceptualizations of the Vietnamese fell along two
extremes.

Most typically, they were the alien Other.

Drawing on the

racial imagery and mythology of America's past experience with "savage
war," Americans called themselves "cowboys" and talked of Vietnam as
"Indian Country. "

180

The language and metaphors of cowboys and

Indians flowed freely in Vietnam.

In regard to this posturing and the

invocation of Old West imagery to depict the Vietnamese enemy and
name ground and air operations and outposts, 1 81 Richard Drinnon has
noted that: "It was as if Cowboys and Indians were the only game the
American invaders knew. "182

At other times, Americans made their

characterizations of the Vietnamese as subhuman more explicit.

To

SOLIS, MARINES AND M ll..ITARY LAW IN VIETNAM: TRIAL BY FIRE 138 (1989). The
tenn was almost certainly a corruption o f the pejorative wgoo-goos," by which American
soldiers referred to Filipinos at the turn of the century.

See DOWER, supra note 175,

at

151-52, 162.
177.

On the difficulty of distinguishing civilians from insurgents during the

U.S

war in the Philippines after the Spanish-American War, and the consequent loss of civilian

DoWER, supra note 175, at 1 5 1 .

life, see

APPY, supra note 4 3 , at 106-07;

178.

Healing in Vietnam, in CRIMES OF WAR 430,
179.

APPY, supra note 43, at 295-96.

180.

See RICHARD DRINNON, FACING

HATING

see also

Gordon S . Livingston, M . D . ,

433 (Richard A. Falk et a!. eds . , 1971).

WEST: THE METAPHYSICS OF INDIAN
AND EMPIRE-BUll.D
. INO 447-48 (1980); SLOTKIN, supra note 55, at 494-96, 523-

25, 546-47. Henry Kissinger would describe himself as the "Lone Ranger of American
foreign policy. "

ld.

at 754 n .3 1 . This image of cowboys and Indians was not reserved

for Vietnam. The CIA referred to its mercenaries employed against Cuba as "cowboys."

DRINNON, supra, at 434-35. The concept of wsavage war" is discussed infra note 3 1 8 and
accompanying text.
181.

Examples include "Prairie," "Sam Houston," "Hickory , " "Davy Crocket,"

"Daniel Boone," and for that matter, "Crazy Horse."
been a popular name.

See DRINNON, supra note

"Dodge City " seems also to have

180, at 443;

SLOTKIN, supra note 55,

at 524-25. Dodge City was also the name of a Montagnard outpost in John Wayne's THE

GREEN BERETS (Warner Bros. 1968).
182.
See DRINNON, supra note 180, at 450 n.*.
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General William Westmoreland, they were "termites " ; 1 83 to the soldiers
at My Lai, "ants. " 184

Still other characterizations made Vietnam and the Vietnamese so
alien that they were unnameable and unknowable, or that they became
American soldiers gave voice to this sense that the war
invisible. 1 85
"belong[ed] to an unearthly place" when they spoke of the U.S. as "The
1
World. " 86 Lieutenant Calley expressed the further reaches of this logic
when he said: "We weren't in My Lai to kill human beings, really. We
were there to kill

ideology

that is carried by-I don't know.

Pawns.

Blobs. Pieces of flesh; and I wasn't in Mylai [sic] to destroy intelligent
men. I was there to destroy an intangible idea. " 1 87
At the other extreme was a different assumption that rendered real
Vietnamese just as invisible: the assumption that the Vietnamese, indeed,

that everyone, wanted to be like Americans. 188 Expressing this idea, a

Full Metal Jacket
trying to get out. "1 89

colonel in the movie
an American

says: "Inside every gook there is
One sees an example of this

unwillingness to see the Vietnamese as Vietnamese in the practice of
renaming Vietnamese admitted to U . S . military hospitals with English
nicknames in place of "perfectly adequate, pronounceable Vietnamese
name[s] . " 190 Similarly, Lyndon Johnson could imagine buying peace

ld. at 448-49. Westmoreland's statement originally appeared in Lloyd
How the Generals View the War Now, NEWSWEEK, Mar. 27, 1967, at 28-29.
184.
DRINNON, supra note 180, at 45 1 .
See generally Desser, supra note 176; Cynthia J. Fuchs, All the Animals
185.
Come out at Night: Vietnam Meets Noir in Taxi Driver, in INVENTING VIETNAM: THE
183.

Norman,

WAR

IN FILM AND TELEVISION 33-55 (Michael Anderegg ed., 1991).

Desser quotes

several Vietnam novels that express this idea of an invisible enemy, including: MARK
BAKER, NAM: THE VIETNAM WAR IN THE WORDS OF THE MEN AND WOMEN WHO
FOUGHT THERE

1 1 1 (1981) ("I could deal with a man. That meant my talent against his

for survival, but how do you deal with him when he ain't even there? "); PHILIP CAPliTO,
A RUMOR OF WAR

55 (1977) (" ITlhere was no enemy to fire at, there was nothing to

retaliate against. . . .
note

Phantoms, I thought, we're fighting phantoms."); Desser,

supra

176, at 93-94. The enemy's invisibility often was reality for U.S. troops in Vietnam.

Mines, by most estimates, accounted for one-fifth to one-fourth of all U.S. casualties, and

supra note 43, at 169-73.
APPY, supra note 43, at 250. Appy writes that "'(w)hen I get back to The

even in firefights the enemy often went unseen. APPY,

186.

World . . . . ' was a standard conversational opening."

187.

LIEliTENANT CALLEY: HIS OWN STORY

supra note 180,
188.

at

/d.

103 (1971), quoted in DRINNON,

456 (emphasis in original) .
supra note 176, at 83. In making this argument, Desser draws on

Desser,

arguments made by Loren Baritz.

See LOREN BARITZ,

BACKFIRE: A HISTORY OP How

AMERICAN CULTURE LED Us INTO VIETNAM AND MADE Us FIGHT THE WAY WE DID

(1985).
189.
FULL METAL JACKET (Warner Bros. 1987), quoted in Desser, supra note
176, at 83.
190.
Livingston, supra note 178, at 433.
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from the NLF and North Vietnamese by bringing the Great Society and

the TVA to Vietnam.191

Levy's letter defied both of these ways of imagining the Vietnamese.
General Westmoreland would later pronounce that "[t]he Oriental doesn't
put the same high price on life as does the Westerner. Life is plentiful,
life is cheap in the Orient. As the philosophy of the Orient expresses it,
life is not important. "192 Levy, by contrast, wrote to Sergeant Hancock
that "[a] dead woman is a dead woman in Alabama & in Viet Nam. To
destroy a child's life in Viet Nam equals a destroyed life in Harlem. "193
In so writing, Levy demanded that Hancock see the pain and the death
that the U . S . brought to Vietnam and insisted on the humanity of the
Vietnamese. t')4

And if the Vietnamese were no less human than

Americans, could the Hippocratic Oath's command to "abstain from
whatever is deleterious and mischievous" apply any less to them?195
Thus, Levy's refusal to train, and his insistence that his conduct was
grounded in medical ethics also repudiated the characterization of the

191.

Lyndon B. Johnson, American Policy in Viet-Nam: Remarks at Johns

Hopkins University, Baltimore, Md. (Apr. 7, 1965),

in THE VIET-NAM READER 343, 348

(Marcus G. Raskin & Bernard B. Fall eds . , 2d ed. 1967) ("For our part I will ask the
Congress to join in a billion dollar American investment in this effort as soon as it is
underway. . . . And there is much to be done. The vast Mekong River can provide food
and water and power on a scale to dwarf even our own T.V.A. "). Americans erroneously
believed themselves to be operating in Vietnam on a blank slate, that there was no
indigenous political culture. As Larry Cable shows, U.S. military doctrine of the period
rejected the possibility of an "organic and unsponsored insurgency. " CABLE,

supra note

52, at 145. Rather, "Any seemingly domestic in�urgent movement was either externally
sponsored or was soon captured by an external sponsor."

/d.

at 5 .

In the apparent

absence o f a pre-existing indigenous political culture, the process of "nation-building"
became one of Americanization. Slotkin ,
192.

supra note 54,

at 84.

HEARTS AND MINDS (Touchstone/WarnerBros. 1975), quoted in APPY, supra

note 43, at 254.

For a discussion of how this idea is represented in the 1978 movie

Tell the Spartans

(AVCO-Embassy), see Desser,

supra note 176,

at 9 1 -92.

Go

Americans

expressed assumptions about Vietnamese valuation of Vietnamese lives in the amounts
paid as solacium payments for the accidental deaths of Vietnamese civilians.

According

to Eric Herter, an Anny private assigned to USAID, the going rate was $35 for an adult,
and $14.40 for a child under fifteen.

See

]AMES W. GIBSON, THE PERPECT WAR:

TECHNOWAR IN VIETNAM 3 1 0 (1986).

supra note

193.

Hancock Letter,

194.

Richard Drinnon discusses how Graham Greene develops this theme of the

157, at 7.

inability to see beyond abstraction to real wounds and real death in Greene's novel, THE
QUIET AMERICAN (1955). The novel was modeled on Col. Edward Lansdale, an architect
of U.S. counterinsurgency in the Philippines and in Vietnam. DRINNON, supra note 180,
at 416-18, 427-28.
195.

See Oath of Hippocrates, in

(Jay Katz ed., 1972).
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Vietnamese exemplified by Westmoreland's statement, and asserted the
equal preciousness of Vietnamese and American lives.
The Hancock letter also rejected the second common construction of
the Vietnamese: the unexamined assumption that they wanted to be
Americans.

Levy asked Hancock to consider the possibility that the

Vietnamese would choose not to be like us, and to accept their decision
to embrace that which we rejected.196

His letter assumed the common

humanity of Vietnamese and Americans, but it also recognized (and
accepted) their differences, and in so doing spoke heresy about the
American character and the American mission.
The prosecution did not explicitly develop the theme of Levy's
heretical construction of the Vietnamese, although it not only read the
letter to the court-martial, but also began closing argument with it. 197
The prosecution did, however, paint a picture of Levy as a dangerous
violator of boundaries of rank and race by focusing
conversations with black enlisted men.

on Levy's

Specifically, the prosecution

elicited testimony from five black soldiers concerning conversations that
Levy had with them about race and Vietnam.

Their testimony, and the

cast put on it by the prosecution, evoked frightening images of mutinous

black soldiers and the white "outside agitator. "198

The gist of the testimony was that Levy told these soldiers that he did
not understand why blacks would fight in freedom's name abroad, when
they had not won the struggle for freedom at home. Levy also stated that
were he black he would not fight in Vietnam. Levy was not the first to
express these ideas.

Various civil rights activists and leaders had

similarly l inked the civil rights struggle with struggles of people of color
worldwide.

Various civil rights activists and leaders had also said that

blacks should not fight for the freedom in Vietnam that they did not enjoy
at home. However, at the time, this probably remained a minority view

In addition to the passage beginning "[w]hat if the majority of a people decide

196.

that Communism is good for them . . . . " quoted above, Levy wrote, "Geoffrey these
people may not be sophisticated (American style), but their [sic] grown men & women
who have a right to live & choose their own government." Hancock Letter , supra note

157, at 8.
197.

Racial imagery regarding the Vietnamese would nevertheless play an

important role in the court-martial.

See infra notes

320-33 and accompanying text; supra

notes 175-96 and accompanying text.
This imagery was not lost on Donald Duncan, who wrote: "Many of us at the

198.
trial

were

Levy .

.

horrified

at

the

incipient

racism contained in the lago-like-portrayal of

. as a sinister figure who sulked about preying on the weaknesses of

disadvantaged people in order to subvert and disaffect them . " Duncan, supra note 52, at
52.
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199.

and in the civil rights community. 199

887
Of course, these

The earliest movement statement linking civil rights and opposition to the

Vietnam War was a leaflet circulated in McComb, Mississippi, under the heading "HBRE
ARE FIVE reasons why Negroes should not be in any war fighting for America." The text
was then published in the Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party of McComb Newsletter
in July 1965, to the chagrin of the MFDP executive committee.

The leaflet, which was

prompted by the death in Vietnam of John Shaw, a black McComb native, concluded by
stating:
We can write and ask our sons if they know what they are fighting for. If he
answers Freedom, tell him that's what we are fighting for here in Mississippi.
And if he says Democracy, tell him the truth-we don't know anything about
Communism, Socialism and all that, but we do know that Negroes have
caught hell right here under this American Democracy.

The War on Vietnam: A McComb, Mississippi, Protest, in

BLACK PROTEST: HISTORY,

DOCUMENTS, AND ANALYSES 1619 TO THE PREsENT 415, 416 (Joanne Grant ed., 1st ed.
1968).

For a discussion of the McComb MFDP leaflet, see MICHAEL FERBER &

STAUGHTON LYND, THE REsiSTANCE 3 1-33 (1971). The Student Nonviolent Coordinating
Committee ("SNCC"), which was closely related to the MFDP, also was a source of early
opposition to the war.

Robert Moses of SNCC, speaking at an August 1964 memorial

meeting for James Chaney, Michael Schwerner, and Andrew Goodman, the three civil
rights workers murdered in Neshoba County, Mississippi, specifically linked escalation

of the war and the federal government's failure to enforce civil rights and to protect black

Mississippians . Moses also spoke at the April 1965 antiwar demonstration in Washington.

ld.

at 29-30;

ZAROULIS & SULLIVAN,

DECLARATIONS OF INDEPENDENCE:
(1990).

supra

note 33, at 4 1 ;

HOWARD ZINN,

CROSS-EXAMINING AMERICAN IDEOLOGY 129-30

In January 1966, SNCC released a statement expressing "sympathy with and

support" for draft refusers, and like the McComb leaflet, linked the civil rights struggle
with the struggle for freedom "of the colored people in . . . other countries. "

The

statement partly paralleled the structure and themes of the Hancock letter in stating:
The murder of Samuel Younge [a SNCC worker who was shot when he

attempted to use a "white" restroom) in Tuskegee, Alabama is no different
from the murder of people in Vietnam . . . . In each case, the U.S.
government bears a great part of the responsibility for these deaths.
Samuel Younge was murdered because U.S. law is not being enforced.

Vietnamese are being murdered because the United States is pursuing an
aggressive policy in violation of international law.

Statement on Vietnam (Jan. 6, 1966), in BLACK PROTEST,

supra,

at 416-17;

see

CLAYBORNE CARSON, lN STRUOOLH: SNCC AND THE BLACK AWAKENING OF THE 1960s,

at 186-89 (1981);

see also Interview with

Dr. Howard B. Levy, supra note 25 (describing

SNCC poster captioned "Uncle Sam Wants You, Nigger"). When SNCC communications
director Julian Bond refused to disavow the statement, he was denied his seat in the
Georgia House of Representatives , which he had won the previous November. Bond was
ultimately seated in January 1967, after the U.S. Supreme Court ruled in his favor. Bond
v. Floyd , 385 U . S . 1 1 6 (1 966);

supra note 46,

see also

GARROW,

supra note 48,

at 458-59 ; MORGAN,

at 150-61. By the summer of 1967, seventeen SNCC staff members had

been indicted for refusing induction. FERBER & LYND,
of SNCC and the Vietnam War, see generally CARSON,

supra, at 127. For a discussion
supra, at 183-89.

Martin Luther King's public criticism of the war and calls for negotiations began in

1965. It was, at first, couched hesitantly. His speech of April 4, 1967, at the Riverside

888

WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW

critical voices came mostly from outside the Army.200

Church, given at the invitation of Clergy and Layman Concerned About Vietnam, was his
most important statement on the war, his act to "break the betrayal of my own silences"
on the war.

King explicitly connected the civil rights and poor people's struggles with

the need to oppose the war and offered "five concrete things" that the U.S. should do
immediately to extricate itself from the war. GARROW, supra note 48, at 541-77 passim;

YoUNO,

supra note 3 1 ,

Martin Luther King, Jr.,

at 198-200.

For the text of the Riverside Church address, see

Beyond Vietnam, in VIETNAM AND BLACK AMERicA, supra note

89, at 79-98. For additional criticisms of the war from within the civil rights movement,
see Robert S. Browne,

The Freedom Movement and the War in Vietnam, in VIETNAM AND

BLACK AMERICA , supra note 89, at 61-78, and generally the essays and poems collected
therein.
A highly influential critic of the war was boxing's heavyweight champion,
Muhammad Ali, who was stripped of his title and convicted for refusing induction into
the armed forces. Ali's conviction was ultimately reversed by the U.S. Supreme Court.
Clay, AKA, Ali v. United States , 403 U.S. 698 (1971).

For discussions of the Ali case,

see ALICE. LYND, WE. WON'T Go 226-34 (1968) (containing partial transcript of the
administrative appeal concerning Ali's draft classification); MORGAN,
162-82 (discussing Morgan's involvement in the case) .
influence, especially among black Americans, see Ain 't

1972), in

supra

note 46, at

For a discussion of Ali's

Gonna Shuffle No More (1964-

EYES ON THE PRizE II: AMERICA AT THE. RACtAL CROSSROADS-1965 TO 1985

(Blackside, 1989).
For differing views on the extent of black opposition to the war from 1965 to 1967,
compare FE.RBE.R & LYND,

supra,

at 30 ("By August 1965 every civil rights group was

under pressure from below to take a stand on the war.") with GARROW,

supra note 48,

at 551-56 (discussing opposition within and without the civil rights community to King's
stance on Vietnam) and Interview with Dr. Howard B. Levy,

supra note 25

(noting that

most of the people in the communities where he worked supported the war, and that the
black civil rights workers who testified on his behalf at the court-martial did so despite
their disagreement with him on the war, and despite the risks they incurred by testifying).
200.

Private First Class James Johnson, a black soldier and one of the Fort Hood

3, would , however, tie his opposition to the war to the civil rights struggle:
Now there is a direct relationship between the peace movement and the civil
rights movement. The South Vietnamese are fighting for representation, like
we ourselves . . . . Therefore the Negro in Vietnam is just helping to defeat
what his black brother is fighting for in the United States.

When the Negro

soldier returns , he still will not be able to ride in Mississippi or walk down
a certain street in Alabama. There will still be proportionately twice as many
Negroes as whites in Vietnam. Those Negroes that die for their country still
cannot be assured of a burial place that their family feels is suitable for them.

Speech by PFC James Johnson, in THE. S IXTIES PAPERS:

DOCUMENTS OF A REBELLIOUS

GE.NE.RATION 308-09 (Judith C. & Stewart E . Albert eds. , 1984). Shortly after the Levy

court-martial, two black Marines, Lance Cpl. William Harvey and Pvt. George Daniels ,

were convicted of violating Article 134 for telling other Marines that Vietnam was a white
man's war in which black men should not participate, and for urging their fellow Marines
to seek a meeting with their commander to discuss the issue. They were sentenced to six
and ten years respectively; the sentences were later reduced to three and four years.
United States v. Harvey, 19 C.M.A. 539, 42 C.M.R. 141 (1970); United States v .
Daniels , 19 C.M.A. 529, 4 2 C.M.R. 131 (1970).

The Harvey and Daniels cases are
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The testimony of Specialist Wayne Barrows, a black Green Beret
who received dermatology training before Levy's decision not to train,
marked the transition from the order charge portion to the General
Articles charges portion of the prosecution case.

Barrows' testimony is

typical of testimony that the prosecution elicited from other soldiers.201
He described a conversation in which Levy pressed him on his reasons for
joining Special Forces and spoke contemptuously of them.202 He added
that Levy was critical of U.S. involvement in Vietnam. Turning to the
question of black soldiers and Vietnam, the following colloquy occurred:
A:

"He told me the colored American is discriminated
against in the United States and America.

H e also

told me that myself being a colored American should
not fight in Vietnam because

I am discriminated

against in the United States. "

Q:

"What was your reaction to that?"

discussed in PETER BARNES, PAWNS:
(1972); Edward F. Shennan ,

supra note 29,

at 42.

UNDER FIRE:

A STUDY OF

THE PLIGfiT OF THE CITIZEN-SOLDIER 177-79

Justice in the Military, in

CONSCIENCE AND COMMAND,

For a discussion of these cases focusing on the First Amendment

issue and sympathetic to the military 's position , see JOSEPH W. BISHOP, J R . , JUSTICE

M D..ITARY LAW 152-54, 160 (1974).

By 1969, one survey showed that nearly two-thirds of black enlisted men in Vietnam
(and one--quarter of black officers and senior non-commissioned officers) thought that
"their fight is in the U . S . "

Almost a third of the black enlisted men thought the U.S.

should withdraw immediately because it had no business being in Vietnam. Wallace Terry
II,

Bringing the War Home, in

VIETNAM AND BLACK AMERICA ,

204-05. Horace Coleman captures these sentiments in his poem,

Learns How to Fty,

supra note 89, at 200,
A Downed Black Pilot

in his closing lines: "Next time/1'11 wait and see if they've

declared/war on me-or just America." Horace Coleman, A

Downed Black Pilot Learns
How to Fty, in CARRYING THE DARKNESS: THE POETRY OF THE VIETNAM WAR 75 (W. D .
Ehrhart ed., 1985).

The history of the GI antiwar movement is terribly underwritten . This oversight is

especially pronounced in the case of black GI resistance. For a brief discussion of black

GI resistance, see David Cortright, Black Gl Resistance During the Vietnam War, 2
VIETNAM GENERATION 51 (1990).
201.

The testimony was atypical in one important way. Of the five, Barrows was

the only witness who testified that Levy expressly said Barrows should not fight in
Vietnam. The others testified somewhat more ambiguously that Levy had said that were
he a Negro he would refuse to go to Vietnam.
H . Davis);

id.

Record at 677 (testimony of Spc. Clifton

at 685 (testimony of Spc. James E. Jackson); id. at 695 (testimony of Sgt.

John R. Ware; ambiguous testimony or a garbled transcription); id. at 739, 741 (testimony
of Pfc. Eddie L. Cordy).
202.

According to Barrows, Levy said that Special Forces were "trained as killers

and rapers of women. "

Record at 643.

890

WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW
A:

"Well, sir. I told him where I was brought up I never
knew any - never seen any discrimination?"

Q:

"Did h e ever tell you what h e would do i f h e were a
colored soldier?"

A:

"He told me that if he was a colored soldier he would
refuse to fight, sir. "203

In addition to talking to black soldiers about the disparity between
America's asserted aims in Vietnam and the condition of blacks in the
United States, Levy talked to some soldiers about discrimination within
the Army.

Specialist Clifton Davis, a black Green Beret, testified that

Levy told him that blacks were assigned the hardest duty i n Vietnam and
suffered most of the casualties.204
Other soldiers also testified against Levy, relating his caustic
comments about Special Forces and U . S . involvement in Vietnam.
the prosecution quickly passed over that testimony

in

But

its closing

argument, and emphasized instead Levy's conversations with a handful of
black soldiers. That the case against Levy would be cast this way is not

203.
204.

Id.
Jd.

at
at

644.
676; see also

id. at

685

(testimony of Spc. James Jackson).

purported statement was grossly exaggerated, but not groundless.

Levy's

Martin Luther King,

in his Riverside Church speech , put it more temperately when he said that the war was
not only "devastating the hopes of the poor at home," but also "sending their sons and

their brothers and their husbands to fight and to die in extraordinarily high proportions
relative to the rest of the population . " King,
months of

1966,

black soldiers accounted for

supra note 199, at 8 1 . During the first 1 1
22.4% o f all Army troops killed in action

in Vietnam , almost double the proportion of black draft-age males in the total U.S.

population. JOHN H . FRANKLIN & ALFRED A. MOSS, JR., FROM SLAVERY TO FREEDOM:
A HISTORY OF NEGRO AMERICANS

491

(6th ed.

1988).

At the beginning of

1967,

black

soldiers had accounted for 20.6% of the combat dead. In response to the adverse publicity
from civil rights leaders , the Defense Department made a conscious decision to reduce the
proportion of black casualties, and by the war's end, the overall figure was proportionate

·to the percentage of black draft-age males.
DAVID PARKS, GI DIARY

86-88 (1968)

APPY, supra note 43, at 20-21; see also

(describing being assigned to dangerous forward

observerjob in his mortar platoon by a racist sergeant who reserved that job for black and
Puerto Rican soldiers).
There was much to Levy's assertion that blacks were discriminated against generally
in the Army and in Vietnam.

Studies of the military justice system showed that blacks

were more likely to be convicted than whites , and that black soldiers were punished much
more harshly than their white counterparts for similar offenses.

supra note 43,

at

138-39.

BASKIR & STRAUSS,
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surprising given the tone the military intelligence investigation had taken
in the hands of the Columbia Field Office of the 1 1 1 th Military
Intell igence Group. Once the intelligence investigation of Levy became
fixed within a matrix of race, it was almost inevitable that the prosecution
would remain within the same perimeters.

Moreover, the prosecution

may have recognized that without Levy's comments to black soldiers the
Army did not have much of a case, at least for those charges that required
a showing of a design to create disloyalty or to impair another soldier's
Calling a Special Forces trainee a
performance of his duty.205
"murderer[] of women and children"206 may be intemperate, but it is an
implausible strategy for making political converts or for causing disloyalty
or disaffection. Yet the prosecution focused on Levy's comments about
service in Vietnam directed to black soldiers, not white ones.207 In so
doing, the prosecution tapped into longstanding racial fears and evoked
powerful images of insurrectionary armed blacks and of the white race
It is a testament both to the Army Intelligence investigation's

agitator.

powerful impact on the case and to how deeply rooted the images evoked
were within the collective unconsciousness of white America that men of
unquestionable decency on racial matters framed the case as they did
while other equally decent observers failed to voice any criticism.208

205.

Additional Charge I, which involved conduct unbecoming an officer and a

gentleman (UCMJ Article

133),

may be satisfied not only by disloyal statements, but by

"[i]ntemperate, "defamatory," "provoking, " "contemptuous , " and "disrespectful" ones.

See Appendix I, infra.
206.
Record at 700 (testimony of Spc. Warren Gerig).
207.
ld. at 732-33 (testimony of Spc. Daryl E. Radebaugh).
208.
There is no reason to question Richard Shusterman's recollection

that he

found offensive the racism, anti-semitism, and bigotry of all sorts that he saw both in the
Army and in civilian society.

127.

note

See Telephone Interview with Richard Shusterman , supra

Andrew Kopkind confused Shusterman's zealous advocacy for his client with

a flight from moral choice under the camouflage of deference to institutional authority.
He mistakenly assumed that Shusterman had resolved all doubts about the case in the

See Kopkind, supra note 29, at 22-23. But
see Telephone Interview with Richard Shusterman, supra note 127 (recalling reservations
regarding the Article 133 and 134 charges both because of First Amendment concerns and
name of "military necessity and good order . "

because of uncertainty as to whether the factual foundation for finding intent existed). Yet
even

in

this

uncharitable

portrayal

of

Shusterman

as

a

product

of

1950s

conformism-"Shusterman is Levy before Bellevue"-Kopkind nowhere suggests bigotry
on his part.

Kopkind, supra note

29,

at

23.

Yet, the prosecution's presentation of Levy as a white predator evoked racial fears
and racist stereotypes . While the racist character o f the prosecution's case was either lost
on or ignored by the mainstream press, it was noted by Levy and his entourage. Let�er
from Dr. Howard Levy to Charles Morgan, Jr. (July
supra note

25,

at

50.

27 (recounting conversation with

27, 1967), in

Levy Litigation Files,

Col. Herbert) ; Duncan & Dunn, supra note
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John Blassingame has identified two slave characters that pervade
antebellum Southern literature: Sambo and Nat. 209 Southern writers
attributed to Sambo, by far the most prevalent character, such
stereotypical traits as indolence, childishness, docility, and musicality. In
an effort both to rebut critics of slavery and to relieve their own anxieties,
they also described him as faithful and loyal to the point of self-sacrifice
on behalf of his master.210

Yet this stereotype could not hide or

alleviate the slaveholders• endemic fear that Sambo was really Nat, a
bold, treacherous, bloodthirsty rebel who might murder them in their
sleep.

Southern whites sought to reconcile these two images, and to

reassure themselves by insisting that contented, docile, loyal slaves
became rebellious only when incited by fanatical or opportunistic
1
outsiders. 21
Since colonial times, the prospect of black soldiers has raised
nightmarish fantasies of bloody racial insurrection for some whites.
Those images and more general doubts about the loyalty of black soldiers
endured well into the twentieth century.

They continued to spark fears

and, at times, attacks on black soldiers.

At the time of Levy's · court

martial, this imagery had become far more potent because of the vivid
images of race riots in American cities and expectations of another long
hot summer in 1967. Paradoxically, these frightening images of dedicated
insurrectionary black soldiers competed with stereotypes of black soldiers'
incompetence or cowardice.212

209.

JOHNW. BLASSINOAMB, THESLAVE COMMUNITY: Pi..ANTATIONLIPE IN THE

ANTEBELLUM SOUTH 132-53

(1972).

Blassingame identifies a third slave character, Jack,

who appears far less frequently in this literature.

210.

ld.

at

133-34.

Blassingame writes: "The epitome of devotion, Sambo often fought and died

heroically while trying to save his master's life. Yet, Sambo had no thought of freedom;

ld. at 134.
211.
]d. at 142; see also HERBERT APTHEKER , AMERICAN NEORO SI..AVB REVOLTS
105-13 (lnt'l Publishers Co. 1963) (1943) (discussing tendency to attribute insurrections
to abolitionist "incendiaries "); KENNETH M . STAMPP, THE PEcULIAR INSTITtrriON:
SLAVERY IN THE ANTE-BELLUM SOtrrH 137-38 (1956); cj Alex Lichtenstein, "That
Disposition to Theft, with Which They Have Been BrandedH: Moral Economy, Slave
Management, and the Law, 21 J . Soc. HIST. 413, 426-27 (1988) (describing planter views

that was an empty boon compared to serving his master."

regarding the disruptive consequences of slaves trading or associating with "white people
of unexceptional character").

212.

ARTHUR C. COLE, THE IRREPRESSIBLE CONFLICT 1 850-1865, at 341 (1934)

(noting that fear of blackjacobins alternated with assertions of black cowardice); DIOOINS,

supra note 28, at 29; ROBERT V. HAYNES, A NIGHT OF VIOLENCE: THE HOUSTON RIOT
OF 1917, at 57, 65 (1976); JENSEN, supra note 67, at 1 85-86; Benjamin Quarles , The
Colonial Militia and Negro Manpower, in BLACK MOSAIC: ESSAYS IN AFRO-AMERICAN
HISTORY AND HISTORIOGRAPHY25, 25-34 (1988) ("Slave or free, Negroes were excluded
from the militia, save as noncombatants or in unusual emergencies .

This policy of

semiexclusion became so prevalent as to constitute a basic tenet of American military
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The extent of concern about the loyalty and reliability of black
soldiers can be seen in the amount of reassuring discussion that was
The military also
dedicated to the issue in popular magazines.213
expressly addressed popular concerns through no less prominent a
spokesman than General William Westmoreland.

In late April 1967,

President Johnson brought General Westmoreland, then the commander
of U.S. forces in Vietnam, back to the U .S . for a series of appearances
to bolster domestic support for the war. After addressing an Associated
Press luncheon in New York, Westmoreland traveled to Columbia, South
Carolina, the location of his mother's home and Fort Jackson.214
Addressing the South Carolina General Assembly barely three weeks after
Martin Luther King's Riverside Church

speech

condemning U.S.

involvement in Vietnam, and fifteen days before Levy's court-martial was

to begin, Westmoreland praised the courage, skill, and loyalty of black
'
servicemen in Vietnam.21

tradition."); S LOTKIN,

supra note 55, at 1 1 4-15; Stephen G. Tompkins, Anny Feared
King, Secretly Watched Him, MEM. COM. APPEAL, Mar. 2 1 , 1993, at A l , AS; Stephen
G. Tompkins, In 1917, Spy Target Was Black America, MEM. CoM. APPEAL, Mar. 2 1 ,
1993, a t A7.

See, e.g., Simeon Booker, Negroes in Vietnam: "We, Too, Are Americans, "
Special Issue: The Black Soldier, EBONY, Aug. 1968;
Democracy in the Foxhole, TIME, May 26, 1967, at 1 5 , reprinted abridged as The
Negro's Bright Badge of Courage, READERS DIG . , Aug. 1967, at 59, 59 ("In Vietnam our
213.

EBONY, Nov. 1965, at 89;

Negro troops are proving that there is no color in war; merit is the only measure of a
man.");

Only One Cowr,

NEWSWEEK, Dec. 6, 1965, at 42.

These articles tended to

advance, in addition to a reassuring message about the quality and loyalty of black
soldiers , a

pro-civil-rights message.

Drawing on the melting-pot imagery of the formula

World War II combat film, these articles often o ffered the hope that shared combat
experience would help to overcome racial antagonism.

214.

At the AP luncheon, Westmoreland said that he, and the soldiers in Vietnam,

were "dismayed . . . by recent unpatriotic acts here at home."

Text of Westmoreland's
Address at A . P. Meeting and His Replies to Questions, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 25, 1967, at
A14; see also Peter Kihss, Westmoreland Decries Protests, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 25, 1967,
at A l .

General Westmoreland did not specify to which "unpatriotic acts" he

was

referring, but he subsequently wrote that his comments were prompted by an American
flag burning in Central Park.

GENERAL WILLIAM C. WESTMORELAND, A SOLDIER

REPoRTS 225-26 (1976).

215.

Westmoreland Hails Negro G./. ,

N.Y. TrMES, Apr. 27, 1967, at A10.

Westmoreland's message and motivation were more complicated than simply attempting
to reassure a nation historically wary of black soldiers .

He had, after all, chosen to

deliver his inclusive message about black soldiers to the all-white South Carolina
Legislature, and in so doing gave voice to the progressive potential within the military's

relationship to the black soldier. The day was replete with racial symbolism. Along with
his address to the General Assembly, and his receipt of an honorary doctor of laws degree
from the University of South Carolina, Westmoreland visited long-time family friend
James

Byrnes, the arch-segregationist former governor of South

Carolina.

/d.

Westmoreland would repeat his praise for black Gls in an address to a joint session of
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Within this context of racial fears, Captain Shusterman used his
closing argument to construct an image of Levy as a predatory
subversive. Levy, he argued, sought out vulnerable soldiers, found their
weaknesses, and exploited their feel ings of racial injury in his project to
sabotage the war effort. Indeed, this was true even of Sergeant Hancock,
who, as a white soldier married to a black woman, had experienced
discrimination. Hancock was especially "sensitive to" and "susceptible
to" Levy's comparisons of the terror inflicted on American blacks and on
the Vietnamese, as well as to Levy's suggestion that Hancock's talents
were misdirected from the civil rights struggle.216
Even more
susceptible to this appeal, however, were the black soldiers with whom
Levy spoke.
Turning from Hancock to these soldiers, Shusterman said: "The
same appeal, the turning of a just cause into an illegal purpose is seen in
Captain Levy's direct contact with a whole group of American Negro
soldiers who came to him either as students anxious to learn or as
patients. " 217 Shusterman's framed Levy's conversations with black
soldiers not as incidental conversations, or as genuine expressions of
friendship and interest, but as cynical misuses of a just cause and an
attempt to manipulate vulnerable prey. Repeatedly, the closing argument
played on images of Levy stimulating and then preying on the injured
sensibilities of black soldiers in order to subvert them. In speaking of
Specialist Barrows, Shusterman described Levy's modus operandi:
He walked into the office and Captain Levy approached him.
How? First, he questioned him about his background, learning
the same types of indicia of interest that he knew or thought he
knew at the time he wrote the [Hancock] letter. "Where are
you from? What kind of education do you have? Wouldn't you
like to better your life? Haven't you felt discrimination?" The
same questioning until he found in this man that type of appeal,
that type of area where an appeal would be effective.218
Similarly, he said of Specialist Davis: "Here was a man who . . .
casually dropped the thought that he had worked with SNICK [sic] . . . .

Congress two days later. Tom Wicker, Westmoreland Tells Congress U.S. Will Prevail,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 29, 1967, at A l , A10.
216.
Record at 2554-56. Rather than saying that Treanor told Levy about
Hancock, Shusterman says four times that Levy Mfound out" pertinent facts about
Hancock. He thereby characterizes Levy as active in discovering Hancock's supposed
susceptibility to a civil rights appeal. ld.
217.
ld. at 2556.
Jd. at 2557.
218.
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Captain Levy picked that up. Here is his weakness, his sensitivity.
.,,
will get him for my cause . 219
The prosecution described these black

soldiers

as

'I

especially

"susceptible" or "sensitive" to Levy's appeal, a characterization that
would resonate with the U.S. Army Board of Review, which affirmed
Levy's conviction.220 It argued that these soldiers were easy marks for
manipulation because of their youth and inexperience, their limited
education and (in some cases) limited intelligence, and their feelings of
racial injury.221

It also highlighted the disparity between Levy's rank

and the witnesses' . The prosecution suggested that crossing boundaries
of rank and race implied a malign purpose. For example, the prosecution
characterized Levy's patient, Private Eddie Cordy, as "not particularly
bright," and said: "Surely Captain Levy wasn't interested in an abstract
debate with this young man. "222
friendship was feigned.

The implication is clear.

His

Why would someone like Levy bother to talk

with someone like Cordy, unless in pursuit of some ulterior motive?
Cordy, however, understood the relationship quite differently:
Well, you know, he was different from everybody else, you
know. Around an officer, I was still new in the Army, see, and
around an officer, you know I assumed the at attention manner
and everything, but he made me feel that-he would talk to you

219.

ld. at 2558.

Here, as elsewhere in the closing argument, Shusterman uses

a testimonial voice without distinguishing betwee!l actual testimony (or close paraphrase
of testimony) and interpretive gloss.

220.

ld. (" [H]ere is a man who is susceptible.");

sensitivity.");

id.

id.

(" [H)ere is his weakness, his

at 2559 ("an individual not particularly bright, somewhat slow, a man

who might be particularly susceptible");
susceptible to having his morale affected.

id.

at 2560 ("Surely this young man was

Here was a man who had gone AWOL . . . a

man not particularly bright, a man particularly sensitive to the appeal that Captain Levy
directed to him.").

In affirming Levy's conviction and sentence, the U . S . Anny Board

of Review echoed this characterization stating: "The statements . . . were directed to
individuals of the enlisted grades, mostly Negro, and many of whom emotionally and
educationally were susceptible to being influenced. " United States v . Levy, 39 C.M.R.

672, 677 (1968).
221.

See, e.g. , Record at 2558 ("Here is a man at the very early stage of his Anny

career; here is a man who is susceptible."); id. at 2559 ("And through the testimony of
these witnesses you will recall, these are people for the most part with high school
educations, some of them with less.

You saw Specialist Jackson, an individual not

particularly bright, somewhat slow, a man who might be particularly susceptible to this
type of feeling.").

222.

Jd. at 2560.
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like another EM or something.

I considered him as sort of a

friend and everyth ing.223
In his closing argument, Shusterman repeatedly described Levy as
these soldiers' "teacher" and "officer. "224

He intimated that they

looked to Levy for guidance and for help, but that Levy betrayed their
trust. Recognizing their vulnerability and their need for guidance, Levy
attempted to manipulate them for his own purposes.
This image of Levy as a subverter of the military culture, as a
violator of the boundaries of race and rank, and as a deceptive and

223.
/d. at 739. Levy's manner with enlisted men did violate the unwritten
protocol of the military, and struck both officers and enlisted men as unusual. In addition
to Pvt. Cordy's testimony, see id. at 695 (testimony of Sgt. John Ware) ("Initially, I
thought it rather strange that a man in his position would be talking about things of such
complexity to a Private [Ware's rank at the time] . It struck me as being rather
peculiar."). Levy's rank also affected how his comments were heard. Some witnesses
indicated that they took Levy's comments more seriously than they would have had they
come from a fellow enlisted man.
E.g. , id. at 743 (testimony of Pfc. Cordy).
Nevertheless, the witnesses also indicated that they were nor overawed by Levy's rank.
Levy did not cause any witnesses to be disloyal or impair their performance of duties.
Several of the witnesses testified to arguing with Levy vigorously. See, e.g. , id. at 71215 (testimony of Richard Gillum, noting, however, that he restrained himself slightly
because of Levy's rank). Rabbi Feinstein testified that "essentially Doctor Levy has not
incorporated into his personality the philosophy that one speaks differently depending on
their rank. . . . When he says something to a Private he's not saying it as Captain to
Private, but as man to man, the same way he says it to me or to a Colonel or anyone
else." /d. at 2041-42. Rabbi Feinstein attributed this absence of consciousness of rank
to the peculiar status of military doctors, who (like military chaplains) hold rank without
command. /d.
No doubt the prosecution emphasized the disparity of rank in part to bolster its case
on the Article 133 charges ("conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman"). The
testimony relating to this issue and the emphasis given to it by the prosecution suggests
that for those socialized to the mores of the military, Levy's casual familiarity with
enlisted men and his willingness to discuss forbidden subjects with them struck at the core
of Article 133, notwithstanding its vagueness. In discussing the case, Richard Shusterman
contends that Levy's speech was more egregious because it was directed to enlisted men,
and that such talk, officer to officer or enlisted man to enlisted man, might have been
tolerated. Telephone Interview with Richard Shusterman, supra note 127.
224.
E.g. , Record at 2557 ("Captain Levy was [Barrows'] teacher. A man who
is an officer he is expected to live up to."). This imagery of Levy as a teacher and an
example for young troops may have had especial potency because Fort Jackson was one
of the Army's basic training camps. Six of the court-martial members were attached to
training brigades at Fort Jackson, and another was the Director of Training of the Third
Army Drill Sergeants School. See Court Martial (undated), in Levy Litigation Files,
supra note 27. At the time of the court-martial, Fort Jackson processed nearly 90,000
recruits annually. Pat D. Kaye, Anliwar Protest Cancelled (Feb. 22, 1968}, in Levy
Litigation Files, supra note 27 (clipping from unidentified newspaper}.
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ruthless manipulator of vulnerable, young, mostly black soldiers, echoed
recurring images in American, and especially southern, culture of the
"outside agitator." These images reached back as far as the portrayal of
the abolitionists by slavery's apologists, and the portrayal of Radical
Republicans and "carpetbaggers" by the Redeemers.225

More recently,

these images had been used to denigrate Communist Party activism among
blacks, including Party involvement in the Scottsboro case, and to explain
the civil rights movement.226

As the court-martial approached, this

imagery was given full play in the press. Various columnists claimed to
see in Martin Luther King's opposition to the war the manipulating hand
of either communists or of "well-heeled whites," who, in either case,
were exploiting blacks as the shock troops of the anti-war movement.227

225.
See sources cited supra note 2 1 1 .
MARK NAISON, COMMUNISTS IN HARLEM DURING THE DEPRESSION, at xv
226.
xvii (1983); CARSON, supra note 199, at 1 80-85; EAGLES, supra note 70, at 258-6 1 ;
HUIE, supra note 70, at 130-3 1 . I n one survey conducted in December 1963, 3 9 % of
Northerners and 52% of Southerners surveyed agreed with the statement that '"Others'
are really behind the Negro protest movement, while 21 % of Northerners and 27% of
Southerners thought that those "others" were communists. Paul B. Sheatsley, lW!ite
Altitudes Toward the Negro, 95 DAEDALUS 217, 231 (1 966). A Gallup poll in November
of 1965 showed that 48% of those questioned thought that there was "a lot" of communist
involvement in the civil rights movement and another 27% thought there was some
communist involvement. Gallup Poll (Nov. 19, 1965), cited in CARSON, supra note 199,
at 183. In Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigation Comm'n, 372 U.S. 539, 540-43
(1963), the U.S. Supreme Court struck down the contempt conviction of the NAACP
Miami branch president for refusing to divulge membership information to a legislative
committee. The purported state n
i terest was to determine whether 1 4 people previously
identified with the Communist Party or related organizations were NAACP Miami branch
members. See also I.A. NEWBY, JIM CROW'S DEFENSE: ANTI-NEGRO THOUGHT IN
AMERICA 160-61 , 170-73 (1965) (discussing "outside agitator" figure in early twentieth
century southern thought).
227.
For a discussion of the characterization of King's Riverside Church speech
as the product of communist manipulation, see GARROW, supra note 48, at 554-55, 57677. The statement about "well-heeled whites" is from Kenneth Crawford, Let the Negro
Do It, NEWSWEEK, May 8, 1967, at 46. In that particularly scurrilous piece, Crawford
wrote:
Negro activists have volunteered to spearhead the overt resistance
movement. But they are to get covert financial support from well-heeled
whites who disapprove of the war but prefer to have somebody else carry the
banner. If the movement evokes a violent reaction, it will be the Negro and
the cause of civil rights that suffer. The whites will remain safe behind their
moneybag revetments.

Without doubting the sincerity of King's explanation that his
commitment to nonviolence requires him to oppose the war, it is obvious that
less idealistic considerations entered into his decision to divert the "spirit" of
the civil-rights movement into a new channel. And it seems to be working.
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In a trial evoking images of the white race agitator and charging
Levy with attempting to promote disloyalty, Oedipal projections were
inevitable. Levy was at once the rebellious son and the bad father
portrayed in the Oedipal myth.228 His rebellion against the Army, its
war effort, its hierarchy of rank, its political and social axioms, and its
first principle of command and obedience, is plain. Usually, that
rebellion was cast as the product of antiwar sentiments gone amuck, but
at times the prosecution seemed to frame it as unreasoned rebelliousness
flowing simply from the need to defy a father figure.229
Because of his casual social relations with blacks and his "design"
to plant the seeds of rebellion among black soldiers, Levy was again the
rebellious son: a dangerous race traitor.230 But as an officer bent on
It has tapped new sources, or retapped old sources, of the money any public

ld.

cause must have.
Crawford saw rich whites , fearing that their sons would have to go to war,

revivifying King and Stokely Carmichael , who were willing pawns because they
recognized that the civil rights movement was being furthered. Crawford also suggested
the possibility that Robert Kennedy was behind King's Riverside Church speech . ld.

228.

Cj. NORMAN COHN, WARRANf FOR GENOCIDE: THE MYTH OF THE JEWISH

WORLD-CONSPIRACY AND THE PROTOCOLS OF THE ELDERS OP ZION 25&-68 (1967)
(examining the Oedipal projections of the "bad son and bad father" fantasy underlying
the myth of a Jewish world-conspiracy).
In his closing argument, Shusterman said of Levy's refusal to train:

229.

There was the testimony of Lieutenant Wasserman, a personal friend of
Captain Levy . . . . He found out about the order, and Captain Levy said, "I
had an order from Colonel Fancy, but I am not going to do it."
defiance.

"Why not, Captain Levy?

After all, you will get yourself in trouble."
do it."

Why, any explanation?

Willful

You know, Howard, why not do it?

No.

"I don't care; I'm not going to

Defiance of authority. . . . The

testimony of Dr. Mauer to the same effect, a personal friend of Dr. Levy,
encouraging him to do this training . . . Dr. Levy to Dr. Mauer, "No, I won't
do it."

Any explanation? No.

Record at 2564.

Defiance of authority.

The decision of the U . S . Army Board of Review, aff11t11ing the court

martial conviction and sentence similarly speaks of unearned rebellion:
The record of trial in this case . . . depicts a thirty-year-old man of better than

average background and advantages , who agreed to serve his country for two
years if he would be permitted first to obtain a medical degree, but who, when
called upon to fulfill his bargain, failed miserably.

United States v. Levy, 39 C.M.R. 672, 675 (1968).

230.

Cf EAGLES, supra note 70, at 260.

Eagles writes of the shooting of two

white civil rights workers in Lowndes County , Alabama:
[Tom] Coleman did not shoot Ruby Sales or Joyce Bailey. Although he
probably could not have fired at any woman, white or black, Coleman also
knew that the two whites posed a much greater threat.
Morrisroe because they were white men.

He shot Daniels and

They o ffended him the most.

In

Coleman's view . . . they had grievously betrayed their race doubly by siding
with the blacks and by associating publicly with black women.

Traitorous
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manipulating those to whom he owed leadership, he was also the bad
father, ready to sacrifice his young to whom he owed fatherly guidance.
From the comfort and safety of the dermatology clinic, he tried to
ruthlessly misue black soldiers in turning them into the shock troops of
his antiwar efforts.

Notably, Levy shared his views about the war with

officers as well as enlisted men, but he was prosecuted only for his
statements to enlisted men. 231
C. 1he

Defense Case: Putting the War on Trial

The Vietnam War was never at the center of the prosecution's case,
but it was always present as a backdrop. Vietnam was a place where the
skill and courage of young soldiers such as Hancock, Cordy, and Barrows
would b e tested, and it was therefore important that Levy nurture, not
undermine, that skill and courage. 232
nature of the war went unquestioned .

In the prosecution's case, the
Its legality was assumed and, at

any rate, nonjusticiable, and thus beside the point.233
Defense counsel mimicked the prosecution's case by framing an
alternative image of Levy. They offered a counter-story of a consummate
civilian and doctor, who should not have been expected to adhere to, or
even to have recognized, unwritten military norms.

The defense

portrayed a victim of Army persecution prompted by a dislike of his
unconventional convictions.234 This comprised an attempt to weaken the
prosecution's case by casting doubt on the prosecution's construction of
Levy. Unl ike the prosecution, however, the defense counsel also moved

whites threatened white don;Jinance more than insubordinate blacks because
they represented a breach in white solidarity.
231.

E.g. , Record at 2038 (testimony of Capt. (Chaplain) Joseph H . Feinstein) ;

id. at 2346 (testimony of Capt. David J . Travis).
232.

Record at 2555-56, 2557, 2561-62.

233.

Anticipating a defense that the war was illegal under international and U.S.

Jaw, the prosecution prepared briefs arguing both the legality of the war and Levy's Jack

See Telephone Interview with Richard Shusterman, supra
.
note 127; Government Brief on the Question of the Legality of the Viet Nam War Under

of standing to raise the issue.

United States Constitutional Process [unsubmitted] . United States v. Levy, 39 C.M.R. 672
(1968),

appeal denied,

No. 2 1 ,641 (C.M.A. Jan. 6, 1969) (on file with author).

The

defense did not raise the issue in the manner expected by the prosecution, and the
prosecution apparently never submitted the briefs , which, at any rate, did not become a
part of the appellate record.
234.

MORGAN,

supra note 46,

at 1 3 1 . The defense characterization of Levy had

a lasting impact on both Col. Brown's and Richard Shusterman's understanding of events,
although neither would characterize his prosecution as the product of a political vendetta .

See Telephone Interview with Col. Earl V .
with Richard Shustern1an, supra note 1 27.

Brown,

supra

note 45; Telephone Interview
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the war to the center of the case. They attempted to frame the case so
that the war and the Army were on trial.
The defense faced several problems as it forged its strategy. First,
the court-martial panel would at best be baffled by, and almost certainly
hostile to, Levy and his beliefs. Second, the defense case rested on
arguments that were unprecedented in a military justice setting. Defense
counsel would have to convince the law officer that the defenses were
cognizable before they could become the bases for the stories that the
court-martial heard. Third, unlike the prosecution, which basically had
to tell one story that pulled together the different charges under a single,
unified theory of Levy's motives and acts, the defense had a less tidy
case. It would tell several stories to appeal to multiple audiences.
In addition to the legal arguments that the defense would make with
an eye to the reviewing courts, the defense also would address itself to
Colonel Brown, the law officer, and to the court-martial, within the
constraints imposed by the law officer. The defense was also aware that
the court-martial was a political event with a larger audience. The public
might, through the prism of the trial, come to view Levy, the Army, and
the war differently. While it is not clear how this awareness actually
affected the defense's courtroom conduct-indeed, it may have checked
any inclination to politicize the trial too overtly-outside the courtroom,
the defense aggressively attempted to influence the public's understanding
of the case. 235
The defense framed a strategy that would put the war on trial in two
ways. First, it offered a defense of truth to counter the charges arising
from Levy's statements to the Green Berets. Second, the defense sought
to portray the order to train the aidmen as unlawful because it was
inconsistent with Levy's understanding of medical ethics.

235.

Dr. Levy has said that he never doubted that the court-martial would convict

him; his only concern was with the political impact of the trial.

Morgan, however,

believed that he could win an acquittal and, at any rate, recognized the need both to build
a record for appeal and to minimize the sentence.

Further, Levy credits Morgan with

being astute and skillful in his dealings with the press, and states that because Morgan 's

mastery in that area was quickly clear to him, Morgan successfully curbed some of Levy's
instincts to push the political message too hard.

Levy also notes that Morgan quickly

helped him to recognize that he w�uld win the political battle only if the public believed
that he was trying to win the court battle.

Interview with Dr. Howard B. Levy,

supra

note 25. For Morgan 's statement that he was attempting to "build constitutional defenses
for appeal and cut the sentence, " see MORGAN,

supra note 46,

at 1 3 1 .
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TRUTH AND THE NUREMBERG DEFENSE

New York Tzmes v. Sullivan'ZJ6

Garrison v.

and

as legal support for the concept of truth as a defense,

Levy's counsel sought to show that Special Forces were "killers of
peasants and murderers of women and children. "'138

Morgan first

introduced the truth defense rather casually in his cross-examination of
Special Forces aidman Specialist Wayne Barrows.

difficulty that he would face was apparent. '139

From the start the

After taking Barrows

through a long list of weapons to determine which ones he had been
trained to use, 240 Morgan established that Barrows had been trained to
use a 105 millimeter howitzer. When Morgan asked Barrows to describe
"what the

105

[millimeter] howitzer does, "

prosecution's objection on relevance grounds.

Brown sustained the
In arguing relevance,

Morgan said: "The man testified that Dr. Levy told hiin that special
forces were killers of women and children.
what the

105

howitzer does . "

I'm trying to demonstrate

In again sustaining the prosecution's

objection, Brown stated that while Levy's subjective belief might be
relevant, the objective truth of his statements was not.241

236.
237.
238.

In an out-of-

376 u.s. 254 (1964).
379 u.s. 64 (1964).
Levy's asserted defense stretched the meaning of

Sullivan

and

Garrison.

Unlike those cases, which dealt with libel , the Article 134 prosecutions were basically for
incitement, and nothing in

Sullivan

or

Garrison

suggested that incitement could not be

prosecuted if it relied on truthful statements for its effect.

The

Article

133

prosecutions raised a somewhat different issue, and Morgan's argument that truth-telling
about public issues could never be "dishonorable" or "conduct unbecoming" ought to have
been taken more seriously.

Finally , some of the particular offenses charged in the

specifications for Additional Charge I included the making of "defamatory" statements .
Regarding those offenses, the argumentthat

Garrison should govern , while debatable, was

quite strong.

239.

An indication of the defense's casual preparation for this part of the case can

be seen in Morgan's statement:

"We raised the defense of truth on the statements . . .

I think that is explicit in this kind
I think the court could almost take judicial notice of that." Record at

that special forces were killers of women and children .
of warfare, and

949. By then Brown had rejected the truth defense, but he also indicated that he thought
that Levy's statements implied more than just that civilians get killed in modem wars.

Jd. The defense also sought to subpoena Col. Francis J . Kelly, the Commander of Special
Forces in Vietnam. The value of this strategy, aside from the political impact of putting
Kelly on the stand, was that he would have had knowledge relevant to both the truth and
medical ethics defenses.

240.

Brown denied the request.

Jd.

at 835.

Morgan was establishing the cross-training of Green Beret aidmen to bolster

both the truth defense and the medical ethics defense by showing that the aidmen were
primarily combat soldiers.

241.

Record at 651. The prosecution immediately sought an out-of-court hearing

on the relevance of Levy's subjective beliefs, arguing that they were similarly not a
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court hearing on the first morning of the defense's case, Brown again
ruled that the objective truth of Levy's statements was not a defense to the
speech charges. He further stated that neither Levy's subjective belief
that the statements were true, nor his belief that the order was unlawful,
was a defense, but that either might be adduced in mitigation of his
sentence. 242

Then, unexpectedly, the case took a remarkable turn. In the course
of his ruling, Brown, having just stated that the order to train was
presumptively legal, began to talk of Nuremberg:
Now the defense has intimated that the special forces aidmen are
being used in Vietnam in a way contrary to medical ethics. My
research on the subject discloses that perhaps the Nuremberg
Trials and the various post war treaties of the United States have
evolved a rule that a soldier must disobey an order demanding
that he commit war crimes, or genocide, or something to that
nature. However, I have heard no evidence that even remotely
suggests that the special forces of the United States Army have
been trained to commit war crimes, and until I do, I must reject
this defense. 243
Perhaps Brown meant nothing more by

his

injection of the

Nuremberg principles than to explain why evidence of Levy's subjective
belief that Special Forces were being trained to commit war crimes would
be admissible in mitigation of sentencing.244

But Brown had thought a

lot about Nuremberg. As a law instructor at West Point in the late 1940s,
he had often discussed the implications of the Nuremberg and Tokyo war
crimes trials with his students and colleagues.

Nuremberg245

The movie

had made a lasting impression on him.

Judgment at

He had read a

number of law review articles about the Nuremberg trials. He had doubts
about the wisdom, if not about the legality, of the Vietnam War.

And

defense to either the order or the speech charges. Brown accepted the prosecution's briefs

and deferred a ruling on the issue until the beginning of the defense case. /d. at 654-62.

During the defense's cross-examination of Spc. James Jackson, who wa.s not a Green
Beret, the prosecution raised no objections when Morgan adduced Jackson's testimony that
he had killed a woman in Vietnam and had seen a child killed there.

242.
243.
244.
2�5.

ld. at 874-76.

/d.
/d.

/d.

at 875.
This is the point Brown immediately went on to make.

(Roxlom Films 1961).

at 686-87.
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Brown was worried about how he might be judged if he foreclosed any
ventilation of the issues that Levy raised.246
As Morgan pondered how he could go about proving a Nuremberg
defense, Shusterman and Brown debated the boundaries of the Nuremberg
principles, until Brown stated that if the aidmen were being "trained to
commit war crimes, then I think a doctor would be morally bound to
refuse" to train them. 247 Shusterman objected: "There has been not
even an intimation of that in this case," and Brown agreed that "the issue
· has not been raised. "248 Morgan took the plunge: "It is about to be I
'
think. "249
Morgan would later write: "We were fresh out of defenses. "250
Brown had denied Levy his truth defense, and had expressed doubt that
Levy's concerns about medical ethics were relevant for any purpose
beyond sentence mitigation. 251 Before the trial, the defense rejected the
Nuremberg defense as "infeasible" and likely to antagonize the court
martial. 252 Now it asked for an extra day to prepare the defense.
Matching Morgan's matter-of-fact tone, Brown granted the request.253

246.

Telephone Interview with Col. Earl V. Brown,

also to have been an element of calling the defense's bluff.

247.

·

Record at

878.

supra note 45. There seems
See Record at 948-49.

Brown quite consciously described this as a moral duty,

leaving the legal question ambiguous .

248.
ld. at 879.
ld.
249.
250.
MORGAN, supra note 46, at 135.
251.
Record at 874-75.
252.
MORGAN, supra note 46, at 136. Interview with Dr. Howard B. Levy, supra
note 25. Captain Sanders considered the possibilities of challenging the legality of the war
or of Special Forces conduct in Vietnam in a memorandum to Morgan.

Sanders

concluded :
Of course, it taxes credibility too severely to believe that such defenses ,

even if the facts on which they are based are proved true beyond a shadow of
a doubt, would ever be recognized in a military court. But the reasons are far
more of practical expedience than of theory.

The Nurenberg [sic] Trials

demonstrated the necessity that the courts at least admit that such defenses
should exist, regardless of whether the judge would ever have the courage,
shall I say the word, to hold that the prosecution of a particular war is illegal
and that, therefore, a soldier may refuse to obey orders designed to further
that war or that because certain individuals or groups in the military forces
have committed war crimes, that an officer could refuse to train other persons
who are members of the group.
Memorandum from Capt. Charles M . Sanders to Charles Morgan, Jr. 6 (Apr.

in

supra note 27.
Record at 893; see also id. at 950.

4, 1967),

Levy Litigation Files,

253.

Morgan had previously asked for a recess

until the following Tuesday, to allow him. to gather his witnesses, including one coming
from Vietnam . After the Nuremberg issue was raised, Brown agreed to extend that recess
until Wednesday, giving the defense a week to prepare.
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New York Daily News

reporter Anthony Burton captured some of the

madness of the moment in writing with deadpan understatement that
Morgan "must return to court next Wednesday with any witnesses or
evidence he can find. Prosecutors at the Nurnberg [sic] war crimes trials
had longer. "254 Finally, Brown indicated that he wanted to assess the
war-crimes testimony out of the hearing of the court-martial .

The

Nuremberg defense would go to the court-martial only if the defense
made a prima facie showing that Special Forces policy was to commit war
crimes.255
While the defense was delighted that Brown had introduced the
Nuremberg defense, they also recognized how narrowly he had bounded
it by requiring a showing "that the special forces of the United States
Brown
Army have been trained to commit war crimes. "256
characterized the defense position as saying that U . S . involvement in
Vietnam "is wrong, immoral, and illegal, "257 but he did not intend to
entertain claims of this sort.

His statement that "I know of no court,

civilian or military, that is going to sit in judgment on the President's
exercise of his power in disposing the troops of the United States, "258
resolved all doubts as to the imposed limitations on the defense.

Later,

Brown added that he was "almost ready to take judicial notice" that the
aidmen were not committing war crimes. 259 Thus, the limited scope of
Levy's Nuremberg defense resulted from the restrictions of time and
subject matter placed on his counsel by the law officer and not, as Donald
Duncan and Andrew Kopkind would later surmise, from restrictions
placed on the defense by the ACLU Board.200

254.
Anthony Burton, Levy Asks Peace Unitsfor "War Crime Data, N.Y. DAILY
May 19, 1967, at 10.
Record at 880-81.
255.
/d. at 875.
256.
/d. at 876.
257.
258.
/d. at 875-76.
/d. at 947.
259.
260.
Duncan & Dunn, supra note 25, at 56; Kopkind, supra note 29, at 25-27.
The case did create an uproar within the ACLU, and Vietnam would remain a divisive
issue within the ACLU beyond the Levy case. WALKER, supra note 1 3 1 , at 271-72, 27987; Report Prepared by Edward Ennis, ACLU General Counsel, on United Stales v. Levy
(May 29, 1967), in Levy Litigation Files, supra note 27; Memorandum from "The
Office" to the Board of Directors, ACLU (June 1 , 1967), in Levy Litigation Files, supra
note 27; Minutes, Executive Committee Meeting, ACLU (May 26, 19''7), in Levy
Litigation Files, supra note 27. Despite the dissension over whether the ACLU ought to
directly represent clients like Levy in cases that raised controversial non-civil liberties
issues, and over whether the ACLU should issue a statement distancing itself from Levy's
defense on the non-free-speech issues, the Board accepted its obligation not to bring these
issues to the public consciousness while the court-martial was in progress, for fear that
it would jeopardize the defense. The documents in the ACLU file show considerable
•

NEWS,
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Levy

The defense was unprepared for the challenge of building a
Nuremberg defense because they had ruled it out early on and did not
anticipate that Brown would thrust it upon them. As Laughlin McDonald
and Charles Sanders prepared to go to Fort Bragg to study Special Forces
training manuals, Morgan appealed to critics of the war to come forward
261

The next few days produced feverish
with war-crime evidence.
activity as the defense sought out potential witnesses, mostly from the
antiwar movement and the press. They were deluged by documents and
offers to testify.

Rumors abounded that Jean-Paul Sartre, Bertrand

Russell, Mary McCarthy, Martin Luther King, and high officials in the
NLF might testify.262

In the end, given Brown's constraints on the

Nuremberg defense, few of the offers were material .
the response, Morgan issued a press release on May

Overwhelmed by

23,

clarifying that

despite Levy's opposition to the war, the testimony that the defense
intended to offer would relate only to "the role of Special Forces in [land]
warfare. "263
When the out-of-court hearing reconvened on the morning of May

24, the defense had found three witnesses.

Two of them, Donald Duncan

and Robin Moore, arguably knew as much about Special Forces in
Vietnam as anyone outside the military, the Defense Department, and the
CIA.264

Duncan was a former Special Forces Sergeant, who became

uneasiness within the organization about the Levy case, but do not support the contention
that the ACLU interfered with or narrowed the Nuremberg defense. According to Levy,
the dissension within the ACLU had no influence on how the Nuremberg defense was
presented .

"fl1hat's not what happened with Nuremberg. . . . There's no way Chuck

could've held me back had we had more of an opening [from Brown]. . . . There's no

supra note 25.
Captain's Trial Opened
1967, at A2; Anthony Burton, Levy Asks

way he would've been held back . " Interview with Dr. Howard B. Levy,
261.

MORGAN, supra note 46, at 137-38; Homer Bigart,

to 'War Crime' Evidence, N.Y. TIMES, May 18,
Peace Units for "War Crime " Data, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, May 1 9 , 1967, at 10.
262.
Kopkind, supra note 29, at 25; Burton , supra note 254, at 10. None of these
officials testified.

Sartre sent a supporting telegram, and Russell sent a crate of

documents from the International War Crimes Tribunal that he had convened in Stockholm
that May, but the documents arrived too late to be incorporated into the Nuremberg
defense. MORGAN,

supra note 46,

at 138-39.

Statement by Charles Morgan, Jr. 1 (May 23, 1967),

in Levy Litigation Files,
supra note 27; Captain Asserts the Green Berets Are His Target, Not U.S. Policy, N.Y.
263.

TIMES, May 24, 1967, at A3.
264.

'

For discussions of the relationship between Special Forces and the CIA in

Vietnam, see generally DONALD DUNCAN, THE NEW LEOIONS {1967); ROBIN MOORE,

THE GREEN BERETS (1965); JEFF STEIN, A MURDER IN WARTIME:

THE UNTOLD SPY

STORY THAT CHANGED THE COURSE OF THE VIETNAM WAR {1992); WESTMORELAND,

supra

note 214, at 106-09;

see also Record at 959

(testimony of Robert L. Moore, Jr.,

better known as Robin Moore); id. at 996 (testimony of Capt. Peter G . Bourne);
1013 (testimony of Donald W. Duncan).

id.

at
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disaffected while serving in Vietnam and resigned from the Army.
Writing of his experience in the leftist and antiwar journal

Rampans,

he

declared that the U . S . justifications for involvement in Vietnam as support
of ' "the. aspirations and desires of the Vietnamese people,' was a lie,"
since "the vast majority of the people were pro-Viet Cong and anti
Saigon. "265 Duncan became the military editor of Rampans, and at the
time of the court-martial he was awaiting publication of his book,

New Legions,

1he

which dealt with U . S . involvement in Vietnam, Duncan's

experiences in Special Forces, and the effects of militarism on American
society. 266 Duncan had turned down a request to testify on behalf of the
Fort Hood 3 at their court-martial, and was reluctant to testify for
Levy. 'lf>?

According to Morgan, Duncan was eventually persuaded to

testify by various supporters within the peace movement.268
The idea of using Robin Moore as a witness apparently came from
Duncan, who accurately predicted that Moore would unwittingly be an
excellent defense witness.269

In

1962, Moore, a public relations

director of the Sheraton Hotels, convinced a military aide to Vice
President Johnson to help him get permission to undergo Special Forces
training and to visit several Green Beret encampments in Vietnam.

His

1he Green Berets .Z10 Like Duncan,
out, 1he Country Team, and Morgan

research culminated in a bestseller,
Moore had a new book coming

lured Moore through his publisher, who "shrewdly inferred that the trial
was a talk show where competing books might be reviewed or
discussed . " 271
The defense did not need to lure their third witness, Captain Peter
Bourne, an Army psychiatrist about to leave the service. While stationed
in Vietnam, Bourne had studied the effect of combat stress on Green

Beret A-team members. 272

Upon first reading about the case, Dr.

Bourne wrote to Levy, hinting that he would like to help with his
defense.273

265.
266.
267.
notes),

in

268.
269.

Though anxious about the trustworthiness of this "so

supra note 52, at 21-22.
See DUNCAN, supra note 264.
Duncan ,

Conversation with Stanley Faulkner, Counsel for the Fort Hood
Levy Litigation Files ,
MORGAN,

3 (undated

supra note 27.

supra note 46,

at

140.

Conversation with Donald Duncan (undated notes),

in Levy Litigation Files,

supra note 27.
270.
MOORE, supra note 264. Moore describes how he came to write the book
1-5; see also Record at 956-57 (testimony of Robin Moore); Kopkind , supra note

at id. at

29, at 25.
271.
272.
273.

supra note 46, at 140.
G. BOURNE, M . D . , MEN, STRESS, AND VIETNAM 103-25 (1970).
Record at 1001 (testimony of Capt. Peter G. Bourne); Interview with Dr.
Howard B. Levy, supra note 25.
MORGAN,

PETER
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smooth and so slick" expert on Special Forces who had fallen into their
laps, the defense brought Bourne to Fort Jackson to bolster the medical
When Nuremberg entered the case, Bourne's
defense. 274

ethics

knowledge of Special Forces in Vietnam made him an obvious choice as
a witness.

The defense's hoped-for fourth witness, Associated Press

correspondent Malcolm Browne, did not materialize.275
In addition to the witnesses' testimony, the defense submitted
Duncan's

Rampans

article and Moore's book.276

Columbia University

industrial engineering professor Seymour Melman,

who had been

collecting newspaper accounts reporting U . S . violations of the law of land
warfare in Vietnam, worked with Ramona Ripston of the New York Civil
Liberties Union to organize more than 4,000 such articles to be submitted
as exhibits .m

These articles included accounts of Special Forces

violations of the law of war, but were by no means limited to instances
involving Special Forces.

They were proffered to establish Levy's

knowledge of a pattern of war crimes and to stretch the confines of
Brown's narrow framing of the Nuremberg defense by placing Special
Forces conduct in the larger context of U . S . military policy in Vietnam.
With these materials, the defense submitted a brief prepared with the help
of Richard Barnet of the Institute of Policy Studies, and Princeton
international law professor Richard Falk, a leading critic of the war's
legality. 278 The brief outlined relevant provisions of the law of war and
provided Levy's proof on the war crimes issue.279
The defense also

274.
"So . . . this guy's a Green Beret, comes out of the clear blue sky; that seems
too good, somehow."
Interview with Dr. Howard B. Levy, supra note 25.
Notwithstanding their anxiety, the defense recognized that they had to take a chance on
Bourne. ld. ("I mean, the guy writes to you with those credentials, we weren't going to
tum our back on him.").
275.
Witness Lists for Out-of-Court Nuremberg Hearing (undated notes), in Levy
Litigation Files, supra note 27. Browne authored THE NEW FACE OP WAR (1965).
276.
Moore claimed that the book, with the exception of the last chapter, recounted
actual events, but that for a variety of reasons he had decided to present them in the genre
of fiction. He writes: "You will find in these pages many things that you will find hard
to believe. Believe them. They happened this way. I changed details and names, but I
did not change the basic truth. " MOORE, supra note 264, at 1 1 . Peter Bourne testified
at the court-martial that he had either witnessed or heard about events similar to those
described in Moore's book. The Pentagon was furious with Moore after the book's
publication, charging numerous breaches of security. HELLMANN , supra note 57, at 5354.
277.
M ORGAN , supra note 46 at 139. Melman's compilation of newspaper articles
was subsequently published. See IN THE NAME OP AMERICA (Seymour Melman ed.,
1968).
278.
Appellate Exhibit 19, Memorandum on the Law of War and Defendant's
Offer of Proof of War Crimes, in Record, vol. 16.
279.
/d.
,
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submitted a list of thirty-eight people to be subpoenaed should Brown
determine that a prima facie case existed, permitting the Nuremberg issue
to go to the court-martial. These were mostly "reporters, photographers,
doctors, and members or former members of the armed forces," who,
according to the defense, had witnessed the commission of war
crimes.280 To Shusterman's dismay, Morgan also requested permission
to take depositions in Vietnam.281
The defense hinged its showing of war crimes on the Army's
manual,

The Law of Land Warjare,282

published

"to

provide

authoritative guidance to military personnel on the customary and treaty
law applicable to the conduct of warfare on land. "283

The testimony

and documentary evidence showed specific violations of several laws of
war described in

The Law of Land Warfare,

committed either b y Special

Forces or by their Vietnamese counterparts (the LLDB, and strike forces),
whom the Special Forces trained and advised and with whom they
fought. 284

The violations they described included assassinations and

placing a "price on the enemy's head , " mutilation of the dead, forcible
removal and resettlement of civilians, wanton destruction of civilian
homes and property, torture and summary execution of prisoners, and
impressment of civilians.
Arguably, using weapons that caused
unnecessary suffering, such as the M- 1 6 rifle and white phosphorous, also
constituted violations.

.

What is remarkable about the Nuremberg hearing, beyond its having
occurred at all, are the diverging interpretations of what occurred and
what was shown.

Ira Glasser, the Associate Director of the New York

Civil Liberties Union, certainly a partisan, but nevertheless thoughtful and

280.
281.

/d.

at

15.

Shusterman had a young child, and his wife was sick and pregnant. He did

not relish the prospect of going to Vietnam for depositions.
Richard Shusterman, supra note

Telephone Interview with

127. Morgan specifically mentioned wanting to take the

deposition of Col. Francis J. Kelly, Commander of Special Forces in Vietnam.
at

Record

1047. Brown had previously denied Morgan's request to subpoena Kelly. /d. at 835.
282.
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, THE LAW OF LAND WARFARE (1956)

(hereinafter THE LAW OF LAND WARFARE} ;
note

see also IN THE NAME OF

AMERICA,

supra

277, at 45-54 (reproducing table of contents and selections from the Anny Field

Manual).

283.
284.

THE LAW OF LAND WARFARE, supra note

282, 1 1 .

Nothing in this discussion should be understood to imply that one side had

a monopoly on war crimes in Vietnam. It is important that we not forget that the PLAF
and North Vietnamese also committed atrocities, as did the other forces in Vietnam.
Staughton Lynd,

The War Crimes Tribunal: A Dissent,

LmERATION, Dec.

Cf.

1967-Jan.

1968, at 76-79 (criticizing the Russell International War Crimes Tribunal for refusing to
investigate the war crimes committed by both sides). Suffice it to say that the law of war
does not recognize a defense of "the other side was doing it too , " and as a nonnative
matter, the argument that the enemy's war crimes licensed our own is gossamer-fine.
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general! y careful in his discussion of the Nuremberg defense (and of other
aspects of the case), concluded that the defense proved several violations
of the law of war.285

Time

A perhaps equally partisan but less thoughtful

article proclaimed that "[t]o the surprise of almost no one, [the

Nuremberg defense] failed dismally," having produced no evidence of
Green Beret crimes.286

Brown, conceding only a bit more than

Time,

ruled that " [w]hile there have been perhaps instances of needless brutality
in this struggle in Vietnam about which the accused may have learned
. . . there is no evidence that would render this order to train aidmen
illegal on the grounds that eventually these men would become engaged
in war crimes. "287
Perhaps such polarized interpretations were inevitable, given the
national rift over the war and the symbolic potency of the Nuremberg
principles.

Certainly, given the setting, the limitations placed on the

defense, the difficulty of finding people who would confess to committing
war crimes, and the infeasibility of developing the case in a week,
Brown's ruling hardly seems surprising.

Yet, even if the outcome was

preordained,

outcome

the

expression

of

that

and

the

differing

interpretations of what the defense showed owed much to the old frontier
myth of the Indian fighter and the new frontier myth of the Green Beret.
Having initially chosen not to challenge the legality of the war, the
defense had l ittle time to craft its story in preparation for the Nuremberg
hearing. It did, nonetheless, have a story to tell. Now cast in the role of
prosecutor, the defense had to show a pattern of Special Forces violations
of the law of war. It did so by emphasizing the image of Special Forces
as ruthless pragmatists, rule-breakers, and dirty fighters . In other words,
the defense portrayed the Special Forces as modern-day Indian fighters,
whose success resulted from their willingness to adopt the methods
ascribed to the enemy and to ignore the restraints of "impractical"
civilized authority, far removed from the real war.
double-edged, however.

This image was

Juxtaposed against the law of war, the image

exposed a dark underbelly of the counterinsurgency doctrine, and the
casualness with which it discarded as soft-hearted and impractical the

285.

Ira Glasser, Judgment at Fort Jackson: The Court-Martial of Howard B.

Levy , 4 LAW IN TRANSITION Q. 123, 145-46 (1968).

Glasser was one of the people

dispatched by the New York Civil Liberties Union to assist the defense. MORGAN, supra
note 46, at 139 n, * .

A non-lawyer, Glasser wrote the best analysis of the applicability

of the law of land warfare to the acts described at the Nuremberg hearing, notwithstanding
his occasional factual misstatements.
286.

Men at War, TIME, June 2,

1967, at 15-16. The following week,

that Levy "appeared more often stricken by confusion than conscience."

Charged,
287.

TIME, June 9, 1967, at 33.
Record at 1049.

Tune added
Guilty as
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l imited achievements of international law in curbing some of the worst
barbarities of war. Yet it was precisely this disregard for the rules, along
with cunning and extraordinary skill, that rendered first the Indian fighter
and the gunfighter and then the Green Beret cultural icons and heroes.
Morgan readily established the theme of Special Forces as flouting
the ordinary rules of war.

Asked "[i]s there any way to fight Guerrilla

warfare by the rules?," Robin Moore responded: "Not that I know of.
I have never seen it work yet. "288 Removing any doubt as to the
meaning of Moore's statement, Morgan elicited Moore's assertion that
assassination "is an integral part of guerrilla warfare. "289

Morgan

amplified this theme in the following exchange with Donald Duncan:

Q:
A:

"Can you teach guerrilla warfare without teaching the
application of terror?"

"I can't-1 can't see how it i s done, and this i s the
thing we used to talk about at the warfare school at
Fort Bragg.

We at that time used to state that we

were trained in all the aspects of guerrilla warfare
. . . and assassination and terror, and the application
of these things are an

integral

part of guerilla

warfare. "290
Some of the testimony regarding violations of the law of war were
destined to fall on deaf ears given our high tolerance for the shocking in
a post-Dresd.en, post-Hiroshima world.291 Some of the rules do seem
antiquated, intended, as Guenter Lewy argues, "for very different
weapons in a very different world. "292 Thus, while both the Hague

288.
ld. at 968.
289.
ld.
290.
ld. at 1 024. References to Special Forces links to the CIA in Vietnam may
have further enhanced this characterization of Special Forces. See id. at 959 (testimony
of Robin Moore); id. at 996 (testimony of Capt. Peter G. Bourne).
291.
The Vietnam War nevertheless produced its share of shocking images, such
as those of a terrified girl burned by napalm and running naked to escape the fighting near
An Loc; of General Nguyen Ngoc Loan, head of the South Vietnamese National Police,
summarily executing a handcuffed People's Liberation Armed Forces suspect in Saigon
during the Tet offensive; and of the ravine full of dead bodies at My Lai. Film images of
American casualties, both of the returning dead, and, perhaps more horrifically, of news
broadcast images from the field of battle of the wounded, played a major role in
ultimately turning popular opinion against the war.
292.
LEWY, supra note 3 1 , at 224. I do not mean to suggest that war was in any
sense more civil and less brutish in some bygone era.
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prohibit weapons that

cause unnecessary suffering, the defense could not have been surprised
that Brown did not see war crimes in American use of either the M-16
rifle,295 when other "legal" weapons were just as capable of ripping a
body apart, or in using white phosphorous,296 when other weapons
destroyed property just as extensively or caused equal agony to their
Testimony that the Special Forces forcibly relocated civilians

victims.

and destroyed their villages and crops had no greater impact on
Brown.297
Other testimony described acts that could not so easily be dismissed
as the unfortunate results of military necessity.

293.

The Law ofLand Warfare

Hague Convention, Oct. 1 8 , 1907, annex. no. IV , art. 23(e),

reproduced in

1 THE CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE, THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE
HAGUE PEACE CONFERENCE 627 (Oxford University Press edition, 1907).
294.

THE LAW OF LAND WARFARE,

295.

The arguments aboutthe M-16 rifle stem from its high-velocity bullets, which

supra note 282,

1 34.

sometimes explode upon impact and pivot or "tumble" through the body.

The bullets

cause a wound similar to those caused by "dum-dum" expanding bullets, expressly

See Record at 960 (testimony of Robin Moore
id.
Peter Bourne regarding tumbling effect of M-16 bullet); id.

prohibited by the 1899 Hague Convention.

that he had seen photographs of people hit in the heel by an M-16 round and killed) ;
at 1005 (testimony of Capt.

at 1018-19 (testimony o f Donald Duncan : "I have seen this little bullet actually take off
a man's leg, with one bullet . . . I hit a man in the chest with one of these bullets at very
.

short range and he just had no chest left. ");
note 277, at 271-73.

see also IN

THE NAME OF AMERICA ,

supra

Arthur Danto has noted the paradox that "[t]he M-16 rifle, our

routine infantry issue, has been ruled out on humane grounds for use against big game in
all fifty states." Arthur Danto,

On Moral Codes and Modern War, in WAR,

MORALITY,

AND THE MILITARY PROFESSION 481-82 (Malham M. Wakin ed., 1979).
296.

White phosphorous, an incendiary weapon, was used to mark targets and

provide smoke screens, but was also used to bum houses and huts, often together with
napalm. LEWY,

supra note 3 1 ,

at 243. In addition to the physical destruction caused by

white phosphorous, fragments of it that lodged in the body would continue to burn
(because it could burn almost anaerobically) until they were extracted.
1021 (testimony of Donald Duncan);

id.

See

Record at

at 961 (testimony of Robin Moore); IN THE

NAME OF AMERICA,

supra note 277, at 271

(quoting a Journal of the

Association

relating the problem

of continuing tissue destruction until all

article

phosphorous is extracted) .

The

Law of Land Warfare

American Medical

permitted the use of incendiaries

under some circumstances, but not their indiscriminate use.

See

LEWY,

supra note 3 1 ,

at 247.

See Record at 966 (testimony of Robin Moore); id. at 993-94, 999, 1008-09
see also IN THE NAME OF AMERICA , supra note
1 3 1 -52, 305-4 1 . But see Record at 970 (cross-examination testimony of Robin

297.

(testimony of Capt. Peter G. Bourne);
277, at

Moore, stating that strike forces often voluntarily move themselves and their families into
camps for protection).

Contra Appy, supra note 43, at 226-27, 288-89

of relocation to refugee camps) .
WARFARE,

supra

(on voluntariness

These acts were implicated in THE LAW OF LAND

note 282, 11 56, 58, 281, 504(j), as well as in provisions of the 1907

Hague Convention and the 1949 Geneva Convention.
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prohibits "putting a price on an enemy's head , " and mutilating the
dead.298 Both Moore and Duncan testified that it was common practice
to pay a bounty to the strike forces for their kills; to ensure that the
bounty was earned, the practice was to pay only for the number of ears
delivered by the strikers?}'} While mutilation of the dead (or the dying)
began as a way of keeping a tally, it was often used to terrify the enemy
or as an outlet for sadism. 300

The Law of Land Warfare

also prohibits the assassination of enemy

soldiers or civilians.301 Duncan and Moore both described assassination
as an integral part of Special Forces guerrilla-warfare training.302
Asked about assassination teams, Moore indicated that their targets were
often the political, not military leadership of the enemy: "If you have a
political chief, say in Vietnam, and you know that . . . he is damaging
our effort, it only makes sense to assassinate him if possible. "303 Asked
about Special Forces' role in training these teams, Moore replied:
know o f an instance where special forces are giving this advice.

"I

Thank

God they are, because, the Vietnamese do a pretty botched up job of it
left to their own advice. "304

298.

THE LAW OF LAND WARFARE, supra note 282, ,, 3 1 , 504(c).

299.

Record at 965 (testimony of Robin Moore);

id.

at 1036 (testimony of Donald

Duncan); MooRE, supra note 264, at 35-37 (offer of bounty and display o f collection of
ears);

id.

300.

at 136-37 (payment for kidnapping of PLAF officer) .
Record at 964 (testimony of Robin Moore) (describing significance of

decapitation to Buddhists) ; id. at 1036 (testimony of Donald Duncan); see also IN THE
NAME OF AMERICA, supra note 277, at 61-66.

One incident that Duncan discussed with

the defense but did not describe at trial involved a Vietnamese officer who, frustrated with
an unsuccessful interrogation, cut out the gall bladder of a prisoner (to be worn later as
an amulet) as two Green Berets looked on.

DUNCAN, supra note 264, at 1 80-82; Notes

on Testimony of Donald Duncan and Dr. Peter Bourne (undated), in Levy Litigation
Files, supra note 27.
301.

THE LAW OF LAND WARFARE, supra note 282,

302.

Record at 957 (testimony of Robin Moore);

id.

1

31.

at 1012 (testimony of Donald

Duncan); MOORE, supra note 264, at 5-6.
303.

Record at 968. By 1965, Special Forces was involved in the predecessor of

the CIA's Phoenix program, which was an effort to "neutralize" the "Viet Cong
n
i frastructure" ("VCI") and which would result in the killing of 20,000 supposed
members of the VCI from 1968 to mid-1971. See YOUNG, supra note 3 1 , at 212-13. See
generally STEIN, supra note 264.

The defense could not have anticipated the ultimate

scope of that "counter terror" program.

They did have some inkling, however, that

Special Forces-sponsdred assassinations were not uncommon.
Donald Duncan (undated notes),

in

See Conversation with

Levy Litigation Files , supra note 27 ("Appel [sic],

R.W., Jr. [referring to N. Y. Times correspondent R.W. Apple, Jr.] The best kept secret

in Vietnam-SF trained assassination teams to work w/ pacification teams to kill
uncooperative village chiefs.").
304.

Id.

Record at 968-69 . Moore added that "[i]t is a necessity of winning a war . "

For additional enthusiastic discussion o f assassination teams, see id. a t 978 (testimony
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At its most riveting, the Nuremberg testimony focused on the
mistreatment and murder of unarmed suspects and prisoners. Donald
Duncan testified that while he was accompanying a strike force patrol, the
strike force, under the pretext of capturing "Viet Cong suspects," forced
civilians to carry the patrol's supplies and equipment and abused them
psychologically and physically. When these civilians were no longer
needed for their labor, they were no longer deemed to be suspects and let
go.305
Still more dramatic was the testimony of torture and murder.
Duncan testified that while Special Forces doctrine favored the use of
psychological methods of interrogation, Special Forces training also
included torture techniques. He explained that Special Forces were taught
that it is impossible to resist interrogation by a determined interrogator.
A course called "countermeasures to hostile interrogation" was ostensibly
for the purpose of teaching Special Forces what they might expect if
captured. In reality, teacher and students alike understood that the course
was designed to teach physical methods that might be useful where
psychological techniques were impractical. 306

of Robin Moore).

ld. at 1025-26. For prohibitions of such conduct, see THE LAW OF LAND

305.

supra note 282,

WARFARE,
306.

Legions.

11 266, 271 , 504(m).

Record at 1015-16.
D UNCAN ,

supra

Duncan gives a more detailed description in

note 264, at 156-6 1 .

The New

There he describes the following

exchange between a student and the instructor:
"Sergeant Lacey , the name of this class is 'Counter-measures to Hostile
Interrogation,' but you have spent most of the period telling us there are no
counter-measures . If this is true, then the only reason for teaching them, it
seems to me, is so that we'll know how to use them . Are you suggesting we
use these methods?"
The class laughs, and Lacey looks down at the floor, creating a dramatic
pause. When he raises his head, his face is solemn but his deep-set eyes are
dancing.

"We can't tell you that, Sergeant Harrison.

America wouldn't approve . "

The Mothers of

The class bursts into laughter at the sarcastic

cynicism . "Furthermore, " a conspiratorial wink , "we will deny that any such
thing is taught or intended . "

ld. at 159. Duncan stated that he had both taken and taught the class on torture. Record
at 1015-16.

Later, other Vietnam veterans who had been interrogators would tell very

similar stories of what James Gibson has described as the "dual structure" of the Army's
intelligence curriculum, "a 'legal' education in the formal educational materials, and an
illegal education taught orally by instructors . " GIBSON,

supra note

192, at 183-85. Inga

Markovits describes a quite similar dual structure in the instruction of East German
judges.

The East German Supreme Court would issue "Guidelines " or "Viewpoints"

regarding noncontroversial matters to help direct lower court judges and prosecutors.
Policy directives that dealt with more ticklish matters or that contravened the formal
protections of East German law, such as the policy of denying the protections of the Labor
Code to people who had applied for exit visas, were hidden as part of the oral instruction
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Moore, Bourne, and Duncan each told of the nearly universal Special
Forces practice �f turning prisoners over to their South Vietnamese
counterparts or to the ClOG, even though it was understood that once

handed over, prisoners would be tortured and, frequently, murdered.307
Often these prisoners were tortured in the presence of Americans. While
they may have found torture distasteful and counterproductive, Special
Forces soldiers acquiesced in the practice and continued to turn prisoners
over to the Vietnamese. Duncan stated that " [t]he normal practice was
when it started you turned around and lit a cigarette. "308
Moore
attempted to explain this acquiescence:
I have seen torturing, but if an American was present, . . . the
only way he was allowed to express dissent and even though it
was his camp, . . . the only recourse allowed him by our own
rules was that he could walk out on it. . . . So if he did any
more than that, if he tried to stop the Vietnamese [camp
commander] chances were he would be relieved and his career
would suffer and also it would cause an incident between the
Vietnamese senior corps and American. 309
Yet, when asked by Morgan whether he had any knowledge of any Green
Beret who had been punished for attempting to stop the torture of a
prisoner, Moore had to acknowledge that he knew of no such case.310
Prisoners can be a liability in counterinsurgency warfare.

Their

intelligence value may be offset by their taxing of limited supplies and

of East Gennan judges. lnga Markovits, Last Days, 80 CAL L. REv. 55, 82-85 (1992).
.

307.

Record at 964-65 (testimony of Robin Moore);

id.

id.

at 995 (testimony of Capt.

see also MooRE,
supra note 264, at 39-43, 46-47, 80, 229; IN THB NAMB OP AMERICA , supra note 277,
at 58-61 , 66-87; Duncan, supra note 52, at 21 . For further examples , not contained in
the court-martial record, see DUNCAN supra note 264, at 166-69, 179-82. Article 12 of
Peter Bourne);

at 1013-14, 1021-22 (testimony of Donald Duncan);

,

the 1949 Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War limits the
circumstances under which a country that has captured prisoners of war may transfer them

to another country's control, and specifically requires that the capturing country satisfy
itself of the transferee's willingness to abide by the Convention.

Geneva Convention

see also THB LAw op LAND
WARPARB, supra note 282, 1 88. The Law of Land Warfare treats complicity in the
commission of war crimes as a war crime. See id. 1 500. Numerous paragraphs deal
Relative to the Treatment of War, Aug. 12, 1949, art. 12;

with the treatment of prisoners of war, outlawing torture, cruel treatment, and putting
prisoners to death summari
l y.

502.
308.
309.
310.

Record at 1014.

ld. at 972-73.

ld. at 976-77.

See, e.g. ,

id. 11 89, 90, 93, 1 1 8 , 128, 175,215, 270, 271,
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territory. 3 1 1 Duncan testified that in his training he was taught "to
avoid taking prisoners as much as possible," and that those taken and not
converted to our side had to be "eliminated. "312 Asked if he had ever
been told to dispose of prisoners, Duncan recounted one mission behind
enemy lines where the team inadvertently took two prisoners on the first
This jeopardized the mission, so Duncan radioed back for

day.

instructions.

Duncan was told to " [g]et rid of them," and when he

instead returned with the prisoners he was reprimanded for not killing
them.3t3
Sometimes the killing was in revenge for a village's support of the
PLAF (the so-called Viet Cong) or motivated by pure sadism, rather than
by a tactical purpose.

Bourne described an instance where his patrol

captured a village known to be harboring PLAF or their sympathizers.
After suspects were weeded out and other villagers were given some time
to gather belongings, the houses were set afire to ensure that the PLAF
could not use the village.

Bourne angered the LLDB lieutenant by

rescuing one man who had been tied up and left to burn to death in a hut.
Bourne filed a report on the incident, but was told by the Special Forces
captain in charge, "Don't rock the boat . "

The captain explained that

while he would be happy to pass the report up the chain of command,
"As soon as it gets to the Special Forces Corps advisor, he will just have
to ignore it. "314
Although the defense was able to develop negative images by
demonstrating Special Forces' violations of the law of war, their
construction of Special Forces as rule breakers evoked positive images as
well. Special Forces' willingness to cast aside the restrictions of the law
and traditions of war (or of one set of traditions of war) placed them in
the mythic tradition of the frontier fighter and ranger. 3 1 5 Throwing off
the constraints of the somewhat effete, Europeanized metropolis, they
became pragmatic innovators who embraced the methods of the "savage"
enemy, thereby appropriating his power for themselves.3 16 When one

311.

The Law ofLand Warfare nonetheless prohibits killing prisoners "even in the
supra note 282, 1

case of . . . commando operations." THE LAW OF LAND WARFARE,
85.
3 12.
313.

Record at 1021-22.

ld. at 1016-17;

see also id.

at 995 (Capt. Peter Bourne testifying that the

Vietnamese felt that there was no value in torturing "hard core VC" and that the
Vietnamese would usually "kill them immediately").
314.

ld. at 993-95.

315.

See SLOTKIN, supra note 55 passim.
Id. at 453-6 1 .

Slatkin also specifically addresses the

"ranger mystique."
316.

ld. at 455. The apotheosis o fthis mythic imagery i n recent American culture

is the ex-Green Beret John Rambo.

For a discussion of Rambo as an expression of the
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of Robin Moore's Green Beret captains was forced by his new, "in the
country for one week," B-team superior to divulge an intelligence source
to his Vietnamese counterpart, leading inevitably to the source's death, a
Green Beret intelligence specialist "grunt[ed] in disgust. . . . 'It takes a
good B-tearn commander a couple of months, sometimes more . . . to
learn when not to go strictly by State and Defense Department
policy . ' "317 Only then was he ready to fight a dirty war.
Richard Slatkin writes that at the core of the frontier myth was the
myth of "savage war." In the wilderness, temporarily separated from the
metropolis, the American would regress to a more primitive state, and
struggle both against a hostile environment and a primitive but relentlessly
savage people in a savage war, leading ultimately to triumph and
"regeneration through violence." Savage wars are especially horrifying
and bloodthirsty struggles that result from " ineluctable political and social
differences-rooted in some combination of 'blood' and culture-[that]
make coexistence between primitive natives and civilized Europeans
impossible on any basis other than that of subjugation. " The savagery of
the natives necessarily provokes an in-kind response; the rules of civilized
society, including the law of war, must be temporarily set aside.

In the

face of native savagery, these wars " inevitably become 'wars of
extermination. '"3 18
To Americans culturally nourished on the

struggle of the wilderness against the metropolis and of his ongms in the "liberal
aspirations of the Kennedy era," see John Hellmann,

New Frontier, in

INVENTING VIETNAM:

(Michael Anderegg ed . , 1991).

Rambo 's Vietnam and Kennedy 's

THE WAR IN FILM AND TELEVISION 140, 141

The contrast between European and American fighting

styles is a recurrent strand in American folklore and literature.

See

HELLMANN,

supra

note 57, at 28-29 .
317.

MOORE,

318.

SLOTKIN

supra note 264, at 105.
supra note 5 6 , a t 5 3

,

(" 'Savage war' was distinguished from

'civilized warfare' in its lack of limitations of the extent of violence, and of 'laws' for
its application."); SLOTKIN,

supra

note 55, at 10-12. Slatkin notes that the image of the

Indian savage was such that death was more welcome than capture and therefore:
"Military folklore from King Philip's War to Braddock's Defeat to Custer's Last Stand
held that in battle against a savage enemy you always saved the last bullet for yourself. "

Id.

In

The New Legions, that tradition is echoed by the Special Forces instructor teaching

the course in counter-measures to hostile interrogation:

"If you are operating a guerrilla

net in a foreign country, you must not be taken prisoner . . . . You will be interrogated
by experts . . . . I recommend that those of you who are Catholics and have scruples about
taking a pill try to make a break and get yourselves shot. " DUNCAN,

supra note 264, at

157.
One important difference between savage war and the counterinsurgency war of
Special Forces in Vietnam was that in its counterinsurgency phase, the war was never
conceived of as a war of extermination.

Instead, its premise was that the hearts and

minds of the Vietnamese could be won, leaving the NLF and its insurgents isolated. The
war took on the coloration of a war of extermination only after the build-up of 1965, and
the accompanying strategic transformation from a counterinsurgency to a war of attrition.
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Hollywood Western and the frontier myth, Vietnam looked l ike one more
recurrence of the frontier cycle.

A Rumor of War when

Philip Caputo captures these beliefs in

he writes:

As for the United States, we did not call it "the World" for
nothing; it might as well have been on another planet.

There

was nothing familiar out where we were, no churches, no
police, no newspapers, or any of the restraining influences
without which the earth's population of virtuous people would
be reduced by ninety-five percent. It was the dawn of creation
in the Indochina bush, an ethical as well as geographical
wilderness.

Out there, lacking restraints, sanctioned to kill,

confronted by a hostile country and a relentless enemy, we sank

into a brutish state. 319

The image of the Green Beret as frontier Indian fighter did more than
simply loosen the restraints of the law of war-it evoked images of the

Vietnamese as the savage, primitive Other. 320

These images were

reinforced by the prosecution's response to the Nuremberg testimony: an
effort to distance Special Forces and the Army from the acts of their
Vietnamese counterparts. Repeatedly, the prosecution elicited agreement
from the defense witnesses that the savagery they described were acts of

See sources cited supra note 60.
319.

PHU..IP CAPUTO, A RUMOR OF WAR, at

XX

(1977}, quoted in APPY, supra

note 43, at 252.
320.

The linkage between Indian savagery and that of the Vietnamese enemy is

quite stark in John Wayne's loose adaptation of Moore's book in the film version of THE
GREEN BERETS (Warner Bros. 1968).

When the Chief of a Montagnard village refuses

to cooperate with the "Viet Cong," the Chief and various other villagers are brutallly
murdered and the young men are forced to join the communist forces.

The enemy 's

depravity is symbolized by the fate of the Chiefs young granddaughter, who is carried
off into the woods by five Viet Cong soldiers where, we are to presume, she is repeatedly
raped and then murdered. The sight is apparently so ghastly that the Green Beret medic
who finds her will not let the antiwar journalist, who has attached himself to the A-team,
see her body.

The film audience is similarly spared.

Here, Wayne repeats a familiar

trope from two John Ford/John Wayne Westerns, RIO GRANDE (Republic 1950) and THE
SEARCHERS (Warner Bros. 1956). For a discussion of the use of this convention in those
films to represent the Indian enemy's "horror," see SLOTKIN, supra note 55, at 3 6 1 , 465-

66.

Soon after this incident, when the Viet Cong overrun the strike force camp that the

Green Berets are protecting, they are shown looting the bodies of the dead over the din
of "war whoops, " a scene reminiscent of the Hollywood western .

This construction of

the Vietnamese as Indians was not reserved for the enemy. Tl171e's annonymous reviewer
noted that "Berets even has the South Vietnamese talking like movie Sioux: 'We build
many camps, clobber many V.C. '

"

Farfrom Vietnam and Green Berets, TIME, June 2 1 ,

1968, a t 84 (quoted i n HELLMAN, supra note 57, at 91).

WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW

918

the LLDB or the strike force and that they had not seen Special Forces
soldiers engaged in atrocities.

There was no testimony that Special

Forces soldiers had mutilated the enemy dead.

Special Forces soldiers

did not go out on assassination team missions.321
or murder prisoners. 322

They did not torture

To be sure, American soldiers sometimes

witnessed these acts, but as helpless bystanders, not participants. 323
Indeed, Robin Moore would testify that the American presence had a
moderating effect on the Vietnamese inclination toward brutality.324
The image that emerges from this attempt to separate Special Forces
from these acts portrays the Vietnamese as the barbaric, alien, Oriental
Other. In his examinations of Moore and of Bourne, Brown referred to
the "endemic" propensity toward torture and the "rather careless attitude
toward life," which "seems to cover all [the indigenous people] of
Southeast Asia. "325

Moore, after playing on the image of the savage

Orient where "brutality . . . is a way of life," volunteered, "there seems
to be something in the brain cells of the people over there that this is part
of the game. "326
In reviewing the Nuremberg hearing, Ira Glasser writes:
The chilling fact is that the army does not deny the existence of
war crimes; it simply denies its responsibility for such crimes,
despite the clear requirements of its own written law. The army
continues to protest that American soldiers do not themselves
practice torture or commit murder, as if that alone released
them from all charges of complicity . . . .
. . . And so the Special Forces do not practice torture in
Vietnam.

Torture just happens, murder just happens, war

321.

Record at 978 (cross-examination testimony of Robin Moore) .

322.

/d. at 972-73 , 979 .(cross-examination testimony of Robin Moore);

(examination of Capt. Peter G. Bourne by law officer);

id.

id.

at 1004

at 1 027 (cross-examination

testimony of Donald Duncan).
323.

For conflicting testimony regarding the extent that LLDB control over the

camps was real or nominal, compare

id.

at 973 (testimony of Robin Moore) with

id.

at

995-96 (testimony of Capt. Peter G. Bourne).
324.

Id.

325.

/d. at 979, 1000.

at 975.
Morgan reports that Bourne paused and stared at Brown

before "icily" responding: "I gathered that this sort of feeling was regarded in some way
as a defense to what the Japanese did in World War II, but I think we judge [sic] them

by our standards then and I suppose this is how we judge incidents now."

supra note 46,

at 144 (quoting Record at 1000).

supra note 55,

at 527-28.

imagery to depict the PLAF and to justify
326.

Record at 973.

U.S.

M ORGAN,

For a discussion of the use of similar
involvement in Vietnam, see

SLOTKIN,
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crimes just happen. No one does it; no one is responsible. It's
called complicity and, in many ways, it is the major unpunished
crime of our century .327
Glasser i s correct in his characterization o f the intellectual gymnastics
the Army engaged in to say, "This is not our act . " The same rationale
allowed Brown to agree that while there may have been instances of

unnecessary

savagery, there was insufficient evidence to conclude that

Levy, or the Army, needed to worry about entanglement with war crimes.
Yet, by likening this distancing to the protests of the Nazi bureaucrat, as
Glasser does, he may understate the degree of Special Forces and U . S .
complicity i n these atrocities.328

For Levy's

Nuremberg hearing

contained evidence not simply of acquiescing in, but of directing the
brutal acts of Vietnamese.
The Nuremberg hearing illustrated a kind of division of terror.
United States forces used such "legal" terrors as free fire zones, napalm,
white phosphorous, defoliation, fragmentation bombs, the torching of huts
with Zippo lighters, and massive air strikes on populated target areas.
Our allies were relegated to such terrors as mutilation, assassination, and
the torture and murder of prisoners. We achieved a kind of savage war
by proxy. U . S . forces were not merely helpless onlookers, but benefitted
from the brutal acts of their Vietnamese or strike force counterparts.
While Americans might have considered Vietnamese torture techniques
to be unrefined, they thought that the information gleaned was useful all
the same.
Moreover, the testimony showed that, at least sometimes, this
. division of terror was deliberate, and the brutality of our counterparts was
at our direction. This does not mean that U . S . forces corrupted a gentle,
pacific people.

Certainly, the Vietnamese were capable of brutality

without instruction by Americans, the French, or the Japanese.329 Yet,

327.

Glasser, supra note 285, at 154.

328.

To be sure, Glasser's comparison is not with just any Nazi bureaucrat. The

elided text in the passage quoted above is:

Adolf Eichmann lodged a similar protest at his trial in Jerusalem ; "With the

killing of Jews I had nothing to do.

I never killed a Jew, or a non-Jew for

that matter-I never killed any human being.

I never gave an order to kill

either a Jew or a non-Jew; I just did not do it."
ld. at 154 (quoting testimony of Adolf Eichmann, quoted in HANNAH ARENDT, EICHMANN
IN JERUSALEM 1 9 (1963)).

Glasser's discussion seems to encompass not only the

Eichmanns, but those who are much more remote and yet ultimately necessary for the
commission of mass crimes.
329.

ld.

at 154-55.

See, e.g., NEIL SHEEHAN, A BRIGHT SHINING LIE: JoHN PAUL VANN AND

AMERICA IN VlETNAM 101-10 (1988) (describing use of torture, as well
bombing,

and

Vann's

belief

that

t.iese

activities

were

both

as

indiscriminate
immoral

and

WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW

920

the reason Montagnard strikers returned to camp with their victims' ears
was not because of something coded "in the[ir] brain cells," but because
Americans paid piece rate and demanded confirmation of their kills.
Special Forces did teach assassination and other "counter terror"
techniques.

Duncan testified that in Special Forces training, teachers

emphasized that it was important to avoid the

appearance

that U . S .

soldiers were involved i n torture o r murder because o f the racial
resentment such involvement would generate.330 Writing of the incident
when he was told to "get rid of" prisoners he had taken while on a
mission, Duncan recalls that when he returned to base a major told him,
"You know we almost told you right over the phone to do them in."
When Duncan said that he could not have done that and would have
refused, the major responded: "Oh, you wouldn't have had to do it; all
you had to do was give them over to the Vietnamese. "331
Duncan
bluntly described American direction of torture in 1he

New Legions

(which had not been published and was not in evidence at the Nuremberg
hearing).

He quotes his instructors in countermeasures to interrogation

as having said:
When you are in a foreign country as part of a guerrilla
organization, you will not be doing the interrogating. Your job
is to teach the various methods of interrogation to your
indigenous counterpart. It would be very bad form for you, as
an outsider, to do the questioning-especially if it gets nasty.
The forces opposing your guerrillas will probably be native, be
the same color, have the same religion.

If you display a

willingness to harm the natives, even though they are the
enemy,

it could be misunderstood by your guerrillas as

prejudice. The indigenous guerrilla leader must believe that the
idea for a course of action comes from himself; your control
must be by suggestion_332

counterproductive). For a critical discussion of the tendency of some on the antiwar left
to project the idealized image once reserved for America onto the NLF and North
Vietnamese, and onto third world liberation movements more generally, see GITLIN, supra
note 27, at 261-63, 270-74.
330.

Record at 1015, 1022.

331.

Duncan,

supra note 52, at 2 1 .

I n his

Ramparts article,

Duncan wrote of the

emphasis that his instructors put on the need not to be saddled with prisoners. "We were
continuously told 'You don't have to kill them yourself-let your indigenous counterpart
do that. ' "

He adds: "I know of a couple of cases where it was suggested by Special

Forces officers that Viet Cong prisoners be killed. "
332.

DUNCAN,

supra note 264, a t

/d.

at 14, 2 1 .

159. The instructor also taught that prisoners

may need to be disposed of: "[A]gain, this must be done by the indigenous leader. " ld.
at 1 6 1 .
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The defense was unable to show that this division of terror, while
partly real, also masked the reality of American brutality. Descriptions
of Vietnamese savagery were in part a strategy of projection to help
Americans evade responsibility for their participation in a savage
As the returned soldiers testified at the Vietnam Veterans
war. 333
Against the War Winter Soldier Investigation334 and at the Dellums
Committee Hearings on War Crimes in Vietnam,335 the Vietnamese held
no monopoly on brutality.

While it was contrary to official military

dogma, U . S . soldiers sometimes tortured prisoners.336

Christian Appy

notes that: "Mutilation was not universally practiced by American
infantrymen; but in some units it was common-place, and most combat
veterans at least witnessed it. "337

And the rape and indiscriminate

killing of Vietnamese civilians were commonplace enough to make My
Lai remarkable for its scale, but not for its occurrence.338

Yet, these

veterans most importantly tried to show that there was no clean or
unsavage side to the division of terror. As Appy writes, the deaths of at
least a half-million Vietnamese civilians were not "unfortunate accidents
[but the] inevitable result of American military strategy. "339
Some of the evidence that the defense offered during the Nuremberg
hearing was

little more than a description

(sometimes

description) of what might be an isolated incident.

a hearsay

As a law officer,

Brown knew that individual soldiers sometimes violated the law of war,
and that the military prosecuted them for their offenses. He could easily
assimilate isolated bad acts to his image of the U . S . military as a lawful

333.

supra

APPY ,

note 43, at 253; cf SLOTKIN,

supra

note 55, at 12-13

(describing process of scapegoating Indians "for the morally troubling side of American
expansion").
334.

THE VIBTNAM VETERANS AGAINST THE WAR, THE WINTER SOLDIBR

INVESTIGATION: AN INQUIRY INTO AMERICAN WAR CRIMES (1972).
335.

THE DELLUMS COMMITTEE HEARINGS ON WAR CRIMES IN VIETNAM: AN

INQUIRY INTO COMMAND REsPONSIBILITY IN SOUTHEAST AsiA (Citizens' Commission of
Inquiry eds . , 1972).

See GIBSON, supra note 192, at 1 82-87.
APPY, supra note 43, at 265; see also PARKS, supra note 204, at 95, 108-09
(describing incidents of mutilating the dead); John Balaban , Mau Than, in CARRYING THE
DARKNESS, supra note 200, at 9, 10 ("One counts the ears on the GI's belt."). The
336.

337.

practice of collecting ears and fingers of the dead had become so prevalent that in October
1967, Gen. Westmoreland issued a directive to all commanders ordering that steps be
taken to end it.

LEWY,

supra note 3 1 , at 329.

Nevertheless , the practice continued with

such sufficient regularity that in 1971, the U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Division was
compelled to outline a written policy on how to handle customs seizures of body parts.
MICHAEL BILTON & KEVIN SIM, FOUR HOURS IN MY LA! 367 n.* (1992).
prevalence of this practice during World War II, see DOWER,
338.
339.

APPY,

supra note 43,

ld. at 8.

at 268-77.

supra

On the

note 175, at 63-7 1 .
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participant in the war.
the

Other evidence, such as the testimony regarding

M-16 rifle, put into question universal U . S .

military practice. But the

law of war held the rifle to such vague and seemingly inapt standards as
the prohibition of weapons that caused "unnecessary suffering," which if
applied in this case might have led to paradoxical results. It was unlikely
that the fitness of the

M-16

rifle would be settled in this forum.340

Brown may also have been inclined to discredit Donald Duncan's
testimony.

At the end of Duncan's testimony, Brown asked him if the
point of his Rampans article was that we were supporting the wrong side
in Vietnam.341
Nevertheless, the defense offered substantial evidence that certain
violations did occur, not as deviations from the norm but as routine
practice. Certainly this was true with regard to the treatment of prisoners
and the American practice of turning prisoners over to an ally whom we
knew would not abide by the standards of the Geneva Conventions.
Certainly it was also true of paying bounties for kills and the concomitant
encouragement of mutilation. Significant evidence seemingly showed that
Special Forces taught and counseled assassination.
Other grounds might have foreclosed the Nuremberg defense.

It

could have been argued that the Geneva Conventions were largely
inapplicable to South Vietnam and U . S . conduct in South Vietnam,
especially as it affected civilians. However, the U . S . did not adopt that
position.342 Appl ication of the Nuremberg principles to Levy would
arguably extend them beyond existing precedents because of his attenuated
relationship to Special Forces conduct in Vietnam.343

340.

Yet, instead of

At the same moment, the M-16 was under attack by critics who claimed that

See William Beecher, Marines ' ChiefDefends the M-16
Rifle, N.Y. TIMES, May 27, 1967, at A3; Dick Elliot, Ml6: Combat Weapon, Center of
Controversy, COLUM. S.C. STATE, May 28, 1967, at 7; Eugene B. Sloan, Levy Trial
Issue: Ml6, COLUM. S.C. STATE, May 28, 1967, at I , 7.
it tended to jam and fail in battle.

341.

Record at 1040.

342.

For a discussion of the competing views , see LEWY,

supra note 3 1 ,

at 224-

28; TELFORD TAYLOR, NUREMBERG AND VIETNAM : AN AMERICAN TRAOEDY 130-34
(1970).
343.

Telford Taylor argues this position, likening Levy's invocation of Nuremberg

as a basis for his refusal to train to that of a hypothetical cook who might refuse to feed
aidmen at Fort Jackson because of their conduct in Vietnam. TAYLOR,
at 164.

supra

note 342,

The analogy is inapt because unlike the cook's act of feeding, Levy's act in

training the aidmen is directly related to their combat roles in Vietnam, since the purpose
of requiring the training was to facilitate their political and military mission in Vietnam.
The cook analogy would have been better suited had Levy refused to treat aidmen.
Notwithstanding the argument that Taylor frames, the question of how attenuated a
relationship would still support invocation of the Nuremberg principles was not a trivial
one.

Taylor was quite sympathetic to Levy 's medical ethics defense.

Id.

at 164-65.
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grounding the denial of the defense in one of these arguments, Brown
simply ruled that Levy had failed to make a prima facie showing.
Perhaps, then, I.F. Stone was right in cautioning that the invitation
of the Nuremberg defense "looks like a trap. "344

Certainly, the

constricted nature of the Nuremberg defense that Levy was permitted to
raise and the lack of time to develop the case gives hindsight support to
Stone's view. As Levy recalls: "If I had to prove that the whole war was
in violation of [the Nuremberg principles], that would've been simple as
pie . . . . To prove that the special forces medics were violating . . . that's
drawing the net pretty finely. "345
Yet, if it was a trap, it was not deliberately set. "Nuremberg"
carried with it connotations of Nazis and Nazi atrocities, and in so doing
set too high a threshold.

Certainly few Americans could accept an

analogy likening U . S . behavior to the Nazis.346

Indeed, Americans

would find it hard to believe that we could be capable of atrocities of any
sort.347

As Edward Opton and Robert Duckles showed in their study

of psychological defenses employed in the aftermath of the My Lai
revelations, a characteristic American response was disbelief that " [o]ur
boys would[] do this. "348 Against this backdrop of strong psychological
incentives for denial,

two intellectual forces helped to doom the

Nuremberg defense. On the one hand, the defense's failure resulted from
the construction of the war, of ourselves, and the Vietnamese within
which Brown, and at that time, most Americans, were prepared to hear
Levy's arguments. War was brutal , we told ourselves. And wars like the
one in Vietnam were especially savage. But the savagery was not our act;
it came from them. On the other hand, the defense failed because of the
awe and trepidation that any court (even one not presided over by a judge

I. F. Stone, The Meaning of the Nuremberg Issue in the Capl. Levy Court
STONE'S WEEKLY, May 29, 1967, at 2.
345.
Interview with Dr. Howard B. Levy, supra note 25.
346.
Some within the new left embraced this analogy in adopting the Germanic
spelling "Amerika. " See GITLIN, supra note 27, at 288, 408; CHRISTOPHER LASCH, THE
TRUE AND ONLY HEAVEN: PROGRESS AND ITS CRITICS 494 (1991). Their rhetoric was
neither illuminating nor likely to persuade the unconverted.
347.
See ZAROULJS & SULLIVAN, supra note 33, at 352-53 (describing minimal
interest in the findings of the Russell tribunal and n
i
In the Name of America).
348.
Edward M. Opton, Jr., & Robert Duckles, II Didn 'l Happen and Besides,
They Deserved It, in CRIMES OF WAR 441, 441 (Richard A. Falk et al. eds., 1971)
(condensed version of a study published by the Wright Institute under the title MY LAJ:
IT NEVER HAPPENED AND BESIDES, THEY DESERVED IT (1 970)); cf DOWER, supra note
175, at 61 ("The Japanese public was not completely unaware of brutal behavior by
Japanese troops abroad. . . . To the majority of Japanese, as to the Anglo-Americans,
atrocities committed by one's own side were episodic, while the enemy's brutal acts were
systematic and revealed a fundamentally perverse national character.").
344.

Martial, I.F.
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who regarded the President as his Commander-in-Chief) would feel
having been asked "to sit in judgment on the President's exercise of his
power in disposing the troops of the United States . "349

2.

MEDICAL ETHICS AND THE CRITIQUE OF COUNTERINSURGENCY

[T]here is every possibility of a positive use of Special Forces
in underdeveloped areas, in the manner of the 'Colonel
Hillandale' of

The Ugly American,

who had such a great

personal influence on Asian people by offering medical aid to
their children. 3so
Like the prosecution, the defense attempted to tell a story built upon
Of course, unlike the prosecution, the

its characterization of Levy.

defense described Levy not as a subversive, but as a good doctor. In its
attempt to defend Levy's refusal to teach Special Forces aidmen on
medical ethics grounds, the defense told a story of Levy as a caring and
dedicated doctor.351

According to that story, Levy, true to the precepts

of his profession and to his oath as a doctor, refused to compromise his
duty as a healer or to facil itate the misuse of his medical knowledge. In
framing its story this way, the defense evoked popular images of the

doctor as a dedicated healer. 352

The defense described three ethical objections to training the aidmen.
First, the aidmen's intrusion into the dermatology clinic threatened the
privacy of Levy's women patients and those patients seeking treatment for
venereal disease. 353

Levy's other objections bore directly on the way

349.

Record at 876.

350.

George J . W. Goodman ,

The Unconventional Warriors, EsQUIRE,

Nov. 1961,

at 128, 130. On the influence of William Lederer and Eugene Burdick's novel,

American, on U . S .

note 57, at 3-38; SLOTKIN ,
351 .

The Ugly

foreign policy and counterinsurgency doctrine, see HELLMANN , supra

See, e.g.,

supra

note 55, at 447-53.

Record at 610-11 (testimony of Capt. Ivan Mauer, describing Levy

as an excellent doctor and teacher);

id.

at 2035 (testimony of Capt. Joseph H . Feinstein,

noting his satisfaction with Levy as a physician);
Capt. Ernest Porter) ;

id.

id.

at 2084-85 (similar testimony of

at 2181 (testimony of Capt. Robert Petres);

id.

at 2628-29

(statement of Individual Counsel (Morgan) before sentencing deliberations).
352.

On the image of the doctor in popular culture, see generally RICHARD

MALMSHEIMER,

"DOCTORS ONLY":

THE EVOLVING IMAGE OF THE AMERICAN

PHYSICIAN (1988); JOSEPH TUROW, PLAYING DOCTOR: TELEVISION, STORYTELLING, AND
MEDICAL POWER (1989). Respondents to a survey conducted in 1961 indicated that they
were considerably more satisfied with and admiring of their own doctor than they were
satisfied with and admiring of the medical profession overall.

Women

Really

353.

Think .About Their Doctors,

Richard Carter, �at

GOOD HOUSEKEEPING, Aug. 1961, at 60.

For the defense's developmentofthis aspect of Levy's medical ethics defense,

see Record at 250-51 , 263-64, 273-74, 506-13 (cross examination of Col. Fancy) ;

id.

at
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in which Special Forces employed the aidmen in Vietnam (and potentially
elsewhere).

The defense showed that the aidmen, unlike other medical

corpsmen, performed a medical role similar to doctors, and portrayed
them as lacking the necessary knowledge and skill to avoid great medical
mischief.

Finally, the defense argued that the aidmen were more than

merely medically incompetent.

As warriors and participants in civic

action, the aidmen conflated the rol� of combatant and medic in violation
of the

Geneva

Conventions

and

medical

norms

prohibiting the

subordination of medicine to political and military goals. Consequently,
the aidmen practiced a politicized, distorted form of medicine. This last
defense argument suggested a broad critique of counterinsurgency
doctrine.

While focused on medical civic action programs, it suggested

more broadly that the benevolent facade of counterinsurgency's civic
action hid a raw exercise of power and imposition of American will
throughout the world.

The subordination of medicine to political and

military ends was inimical both to medicine and to the freedom of those
receiving America's supposed beneficence.
As

noted

above,

the defense

argued

that the

aidmen

were

incompetent to perform their medical role in Vietnam. That role was first
to administer to the medical needs of their A-team and their Vietnamese
counterparts.

They also had a critical civic action mission, to provide

medical care in the villages and hamlets of the contested countryside.
The trial testimony made plain two distinctions between the aidmen and
other medics: aidmen were not limited in their medical role to providing
first aid, and they generally operated without a doctor's supervision. The
defense distinguished between first aid-limited, stabilizing care for
emergency situations-and more advanced medical skills.
Defense
witnesses testified that the former should be universally taught, while the
latter should not be taught indiscriminately because of the potential for
misuse.354

The course coverage for aidmen at Fort Jackson indicated

615-16 (cross examination of Capt. Ivan Mauer);

id.

at 1079-94 (testimony of Dr. Robert

W. Ball, Director, Division of Venereal Disease Control, S.C. Board of Health) ;
1094-2005 (testimony of Mrs. Matjorie Helton);

id.

id.

at

at 2005-1 1 (testimony of Mitchell R.

Helton). Developing this as an important part of the ethics defense bolstered the defense's
portrayal of Levy as a good and caring doctor.

Nevertheless, privacy appeared to be a

secondary aspect of Levy 's objection to the training program for aidmen. Indeed , during
the period before Levy banished the aidmen from the dermatology clinic, he had dealt
with this issue without incident by simply excluding the aidmen from the room when he
examined a woman patient or took her medical history. Record at 701 (testimony of Spc.
Warren Gerig) .
354.

See, e.g.,

Record at 2070-7 1 (testimony of Capt. Ernest Porter: "I interpreted

their role to be as corpsmen, first aidmen"; "as first aid corpsmen, they had no need for
a stethoscope or a ophthalmoscope which involved certain diseases that require a doctor's
attention . . . they had too little background of education , and medicine itself, to be able
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that they were being prepared to do more than render first aid.355

The

dermatology training that Fancy ordered Levy to give the aidmen evinced
a similar expectation regarding the role of aidmen in Vietnarn.356
Witnesses agreed that Special Forces aidmen in Vietnam were
permitted to do things that only a doctor could do in the United States,
though they disagreed about the conclusions that one should draw from
that fact. Peter Bourne testified that Special Forces aidmen in Vietnam
dispensed drugs and narcotics with as free a hand as a U . S . physician, but
without equivalent judgment. 357

Lieutenant Col. Richard Coppedge,

formerly the Center Surgeon of the JFK Center for Special Warfare,
conceded that no state licensed Special Forces aidmen to practice
medicine in the U . S . in the manner that they did in Vietnam. He added
that probably none ever would. 358
Because of the nature of
counterinsurgency warfare, aidmen, unlike other Army medics, operated
essentially without physician supervision.359

to handle the problems that required the use of the ophthalmoscope or the stethoscope");

id.

at 2074 (testimony of Capt. Porter);

355.

id.

at

2270-71 (testimony of Jean Mayer) .

The rotation schedule for aidmen trainees divided their nine weeks among

surgery, dermatology, podiatry, pediatrics, dentistry, urology, orthopedics, cardiology,
general medicine, and contagious diseases .
Schedule Course:

Prosecution Exhibit 1 , Master Rotation
300-F1 Class No. 9, in Record , vol. 12; Record at 551-55 (testimony

of Sfc. Herman Cornell). The list of subjects also shows that soldiers were not the only
intended beneficiaries of the aidman's care.

Forces Medical Training

See Lt.

Col. Louis T. Dorogi,

Early Special

1952-1971, 3 SPECIAL WARFARE 28, 29-30 (1990) (describing

detailed didactic training in appendectomy procedure in the

1950s).
356.
See Prosecution Exhibit 2, Letter Order from Col. Fancy and Enclosure (Oct.
1 1 , 1966), in Record, vol. 12; Record at 2319-21 (testimony of Capt. Peter Bourne that

of all the diseases that Levy was ordered to cover in his instruction, at most one fell
within the ambit of first aid training) . Despite official dogma ostensibly providing stricter
control over Army medics and Marine corpsmen than over aidmen, actual practice often
deviated from stated dogma.
operations in the field);

id.

at

See Appy, supra note 43, at 280 (medic performing
284 (medics freely dispensing amphetamines).

357.
Record at 2321.
358.
1d. at 2136.
359.
/d. at 2334 (testimony of Capt. Peter Bourne); see aLso Dorogi, supra note
355, at 29 ("The prevailing philosophy was that the enlisted personnel were, in essence,
independent aidmen and physician substitutes . . . . The restrictions that applied to
stateside medicine would not be valid in a guerilla situation-especially when evacuation

from behind enemy lines was out of the question."); Interview with Col. Roger A. Juel,
U.S. Army Medical Corps, by Lt. Col. Louis Dorogi (Dec.

17, 1976) (on flle with the

U . S . Army Military History Institute Archives, Carlisle Barracks) [hereinafter Col. Juel
Interview] (noting that they had assumed that an aidman faced with a problem beyond his

level of competence would radio for a doctor's help, but that in Vietnam radio

communication was often impossible for tactical reasons, necessitating that the aidman do

the best he could on his own).
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Special Forces aidmen scored well on the Army's intelligence
tests.360 Yet the limits in their education, maturity, and medical training
ensured that some would do harm as medical practitioners. Captain
Ernest Porter, a Fort Jackson ophthalmologist, testified that they were
young, often high-school dropouts, whose greatest shortcoming was poor
judgment. This was not Porter's view alone. He explained that he was
repeating the opinion of a Captain who had come to Fort Jackson from
the Army Medical Field Service School to explain the aidmen training
program. 361
At the time Levy refused Colonel Fancy's order, aidmen followed a
thirty-seven week course of training.362 In addition to the eight-week
basic medic's course, aidmen received an extra ten weeks of classroom
instruction. Following the classroom work, they pursued a nine-week
"applicatory phase" in · an Army hospital, such as the hospital at Fort
Jackson. There they rotated through various hospital wards and clinics,
spending approximately ten hours in each. Then they returned to the JFK
Special Warfare School at Fort Bragg for additional classroom study and
participation in the "dog lab. "363
Speaking of the Army's civic action medical programs in Vietnam,
one proponent conceded of the "village sick-call patrol " that "[i]n many
cases less medicine is practiced than 'medical show business. ' " 364

360.
Record at 2020 (testimony of Col. Roger A. Juel). Aidmen were required
to have a GT score of at least 100, and their average score was 127. The GT test score
was roughly equivalent to an IQ test score. /d.
361.
Record at 2081 . The rapid expansion of Special Forces in the mid-1960s was
widely thought to have diluted the quality of the Green Beret recruits, including aidmen.
See DUNCAN, supra note 264; Col. Juel lnterview, supra note 359, at 18-19 (comment
by Dorogi, describing "inferior product" produced in 1965-66).
362.
Dorogi, supra note 355, at 32. Soon afterwards, the Anny reduced the
program to 32 weeks. /d. at 33.
363.
/d. at 32. In the dog lab, each aidman received a dog whose vocal cords had
been removed and who had been shot in the leg. The aidman performed the necessary
surgery on the leg wound, and then cared for the dog during its recovery. The aidman
also amputated the dog's left front paw. The purpose of the exercise was to teach both
surgical technique (debridement and amputation) and compassion . Record at 571-73
(testimony of Spc. Sanford Henry); Gen. Yarborough Interview, supra note 67, at 20;
Interview with Lt. Col. Richard Coppedge, U.S. Army Medical Corps, by Lt. Col. Louis
Dorogi (undated) (audio tape on file with the U.S. Army Military History Institute special
collections; copy of tapes on file with author). Morgan recounts that after he sent
Laughlin McDonald and Charles Sanders to Fort Bragg to gather evidence for the
Nuremberg hearing, New York Times correspondent Homer Bigart told him, "I think all
that your young man will come up with at Fort Bragg is the largest []herd of three-legged,
nonbarking dogs in captivity. " MoRGAN, supra note 46, at 137-38.
364.
C.R. Webb, Jr., Medical Considerations in Internal Defense and
Development, 133 MIL. MED. 391 (1968), quoted in E.A. Vastyan, Warriors in White:
Some Questions About the Nature and Mission of Military Medicine, 32 TEx. REP. ON
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Irrespective of the Army's and Special Forces' intent, often the training
of Special Forces aidmen had a similar Potemkin-village quality.
Lieutenant Colonel Coppedge noted that the doctors he spoke to at Fort
Jackson about training Special Forces aidmen were "quite uninterested in
the program. "365 Their nonengagement stemmed from the hospital
command's indifference, as well as their own. Prior to the time that
Colonel Fancy presented Levy with his written order to train, the hospital
staff had not been told what training they were expected to give. Indeed,
no other doctor was told what to teach before the preferral of charges
against Levy.366 The other doctors who testified said that they tolerated
the aidmen's presence, but did little more than permit them to observe.
Not knowing why the aidmen were in their wards or clinics, the doctors
offered little formal instruction and limited it to teaching first aid.367
Captain Porter testified that he did not learn of the purpose and nature of
the aidmen training until the day before his testimony, when some
members of the hospital staff met with a captain who had been dispatched
by the Army Medical Field Service School to Fort Jackson.368
There was little doubt that many of the aidmen were idealistic and
dedicated. At least some had been good students in their medical

BIOLOGY & MED. 327, 334 (1974).

365.

Record at 2232.

Coppedge added that he "[w]ould much preferred [sic] to

have had expressions of disagreement rather than the apathetic reception that we
encountered . " ld.

366.

id.

See, e.g. , id.

at 635 (cross-examination testimony of Capt. Del Lutsenhizer);

at 2070-71 (testimony of Capt. Ernest Porter);

id.

at 2169, 2172, 2 1 8 1 (testimony of

Capt. Robert Petres).

367.

ld.

Captain Petres stated that he assumed that the aidmen were merely

corpsmen assigned to help him. ld. at 2169. Captain Porter said that he assumed that the

instruction was to be in first aid only and refused to let them use a stethoscope or
ophthalmoscope. ld. at 2070-71 , 208 1 .

368.

ld. a t 2074-76. I t was not clear whether Capt. McBride's visit was simply

a matter of exquisite bad timing on the Army's part in scheduling its annual visits to
hospitals participating in Phase II of aidmen training, or whether his visit was

an

effort

to bolster the testimony of the Fort Jackson hospital staff in the hopes of averting further
embarrassing incidents like the adverse testimony of prosecution witness Capt. Ivan

infra text accompanying notes 4293 1 . Porter testified that after the court-martial charges were preferred against Levy, he
Mauer. For a description of Mauer's testimony, see

received a list of five diseases that he was supposed to talk about with the aidmen, but
since the list made little sense to him, he ignored it and continued to teach them fust aid.
ld. at

2074.
One Army doctor, Maj . Billy Jones, head of the dermatology clinic at Fort Gordon,

Georgia, testified that the aidmen dermatology training was adequate and was consistent
with medical ethics . He stated that "[i]n medical school, I had two hours of dermatology
my whole four years . . . . These men are getting more than I did in medical school. "
Record at 2441 .
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It was far less clear from the court-martial testimony

whether the aidmen were adequately prepared for their mission in
Vietnam and whether, as a purely medical matter, they were doing more
good than harm.
Both those persons charged with overseeing the Special Forces
medical program and the Fort Jackson doctors who testified noted their
concern that aidmen recognize and not exceed the limits of their
knowledge and ability.310
that

"[t]he

real

judgment. "371

Lieutenant Colonel Coppedge acknowledged

difficult

thing,

of

course,

to

train

anyone

is

From the vantage of the Fort Jackson hospital, Levy's

witnesses could only speculate about the harms that might result from the
aidmen's

poor

misdiagnose

judgment

an

eye

or incompetence: perhaps
disease;372
or
perform
a

they

would

nonindicated

tracheotomy;373 or promote disease-resistant strains of diseases through
the

indiscriminate

use

of

medicines.374

Brown

was

evidently

unimpressed . 375
Among Levy's nonhostile witnesses, only Peter Bourne had detailed
knowledge of aidmen practices in Vietnam. Bourne testified that despite
Army regulations relating to narcotics and drugs there were no real
controls on their use.

He stated that during a period when he had

oversight of twenty-six A-camps, there were problems in some camps
with aidmen "using up vast quantities of drugs and being unable to

369.
See Smithson, supra note 46 (Levy noting idealism of many of the Special
Forces soldiers he encountered). But see Interview with Dr. Howard B. Levy, supra note
25 (commenting on the cynicism of many of t!,,e Special Forces soldiers with regard to
their activity in Vietnam). For a study that examines the idealism and personality of
Green Berets and of war resisters, see generally DAVID MARK MANTELL, TRUE
AMERICANISM: GREEN BERETS AND WAR REsiSTERS; A STUDY OF COMMITMENT (1974).
In cross-examining Spc. Wayne Barrows, Morgan asked a series of questions about the
treatment of syphilis and gonorrhea. Record at 669-70, 672. Barrows appears not to
have stumbled, and Morgan did not pursue that tactic again in cross-examining other
aidmen.
370.
See, e.g. , Record at 2139-40 (testimony of Lt. Col. Richard Coppedge); id.
at 2170-78 (testimony 9f Capt. Robert Petres).

!d. at 2139.
371.
/d. at 2086 (testimony of Capt. Ernest Porter that aidmen were unequipped
372.
to diagnose any eye diseases other than conjunctivitis).
373.
/d. at 2173-74 (testimony of Capt. Robert Petres describing the risks of
unnecessary tracheotomy).
374.
!d. at 2 177-78 (testimony of Capt. Robert Petres relating to the risks of
prescribing medicines). This last danger was not all that speculative given the availability
of various medicines, the limits on supplies, and a medical delivery system built partly
on the village sick-call patrol.
375.
ld. at 2 178-79 (sustaining prosecution's objections and asking Morgan "to
bring it right back to Fort Jackson").
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explain where they went, using them promiscuously!'376

Major Craig

Llewellyn, who served for sixteen months as group surgeon for the
Special Forces in Vietnam, insisted that "there is a great deal of control
exercised over what drugs we allow them to requisition. "m
Bourne thought that the aidmen "were practicing inadequately"378
and were using medicine primarily for political purposes, in violation of

professional norms.379

Nevertheless, Bourne was willing to train

aidmen because he thought that the little good they did outweighed the
harm. 380

The Army's witnesses, along with Robin Moore, were much

more enthusiastic about the aidmen's medical performance.381

The testimony regarding the aidmen's value to the indigenous
population bespoke the arrogance of Western medicine and again reflected
a tendency either to see the Vietnamese as alien or to assume that they
inhabited a cultural vacuum. However limited the value of the aidmen's
care, it was at least within Western traditions of medicine and thus
presumptively superior to the care otherwise available to the Vietnamese.
Indigenous medicine, by contrast, was "primitive by our standards of
scientific medicine. "382 The Montagnards integrated disease into their
religious beliefs and sought cures through "spirit worship, " sacrifices, and

the aid of "witch doctors. "383 Other Vietnamese relied on "Chinese
doctors. "384
Except for Major Llewellyn, who noted that some
"herbalist doctor[s] . . . do a great deal of good," the witnesses were
utterly dismissive of Vietnamese medicine.

Dr. Edward Kimbrough,

testifying as a prosecution rebuttal witness, stated:
There were many-1 don't know exactly what they were-we
called them Chinese Physicians-! am sure that they weren't
Chinese or physicians either, but kind of witch doctors that

376.
377.

ld. at 2321, 2332.

ld. at 2487. Llewellyn's statement was somewhat ambiguous and may have

addressed only the issue of controlling drug supply, but not use.

378.

ld. at 2331.

He described the village sick-call as a kind of rapid-turnover

mass medicine marked by "rapid and superficial diagnosis and passing out pills." /d. at

2318.
379.
380.
381.

/d.

ld.

at 2322.

See, e.g., id.

at 971 (testimony of Robin Moore);

of Dr. Edward E. Kimbrough);

382.

/d.

id.

id.

a t 2406-08 (testimony

at 2488 (testimony of Maj . Craig Llewellyn) .

at 1037 (Prosecution's question during cross-examination of Donald

Duncan) .

383.

Id. (testimony of Donald Duncan) .

been accurate, although somewhat incomplete.
beliefs regarding disease, see

384.

Duncan's description appears to have
For further discussion of Montagnard

BOURNE, supra note 272,

at 145-65 (1970).

Record at 2486 (testimony of Maj . Craig Llewellyn).
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treated patients with aqua puncture [sic] and cupping on the
chest and painting designs on the chest for severe diseases.385
In Robin Moore's testimony, the "Chinese doctors" or "witch doctors"
disappeared completely, leaving a void.

Asked about the medical care

available to people in Vietnamese villages, he replied that "[t]he only
medical care they had was what medical care special forces gave
them. "386 In such a perceived vacuum, it is little wonder that the
aidmen, despite their deficiencies, were thought to be doing at least a little
·

good for the Vietnamese.

Nine years later, some of the friends of Special Forces medicine
would be far

less sanguine about the aidmen's

competence

and

In interviews conducted for a proposed

achievements in Vietnam.

monograph on the medical role of Special Forces in Vietnam, Major
Llewellyn and Colonel Roger A. Juel, who had command over Special
Forces medical training at the Medical Field Service School, revealed
doubts about the aidmen's training and ability, as well as their significant
problems in the field . Colonel Juel, in particular, dismissed the aidmen
as a "primitive product," and while insisting that many of them
performed impressively, h e also commented that the program was rife
with incidents of inadequate treatment.387

Major Llewellyn noted that

some of the aidmen they received had long since completed their medical
training and in the interim had been assigned to non-medical duties and
become quite "rusty . " He added that Special Forces did not inform U . S .
Military Assistance Command (MACV), Vietnam, o f this problem,
because had MACV known, it would have pulled those aidmen from the
field.388 Asked if aidman training was "adequate for Vietnam," Colonel
Juel replied: "No, it was the best we could do. "389 Asked if the aidman
could be tactically justified, he responded : "They are incompetent. "390
The court-martial did not hear these criticisms and concerns, however.

385.
386.
387.

/d.
/d.

at
at

2406.
971.

Col. Juel Interview,

supra note 359, at 17-18, 24, 26-27.

At the time of the

interview, Juel was engaged in a campaign to have Special Forces replace the aidman with
a more thoroughly trained physician's assistant, and he was meeting resistance from
Special Forces.

Jd.

at

17-18, 32.

Consequently, his criticism of the aidman program

might not have been wholly disinterested, much like his earlier praise.

388.

Interview with Maj . Craig Llewellyn, U . S . Army Medical Corps, by Lt. Col.

Louis Dorogi (undated) (audio tape on file with the U . S . Army Military History Institute
special collections; copy of tapes on file with author);
note

see

also Col. Juel interview,

supra

359, at 25 (describing problem of unused skills getting rusty). On the whole, the

Llewellyn interview is more positive about aidman performance than Juel's.

389.
390.

Col. Juel Interview,

Jd.

at

17.

supra note 359,

at

32.
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Other risks of the aidman program, such as frequent use of the antibiotic
chloromycetin, 391 never seemed to register. The case that Special
Forces aidmen were, as a purely medical matter, a harmful addition to the
Vietnam countryside, was never sufficiently made.
For Levy, political and military use of medicine and the contlation
of medical and military roles were the most objectionable aspects of the
aidman program. 392 No one denied that the aidmen were first and
foremost combat soldiers whose healing role was subordinate to their
combat mission. Like other Green Berets, the aidmen were cross-trained
in at least one other military specialty, and took their turns on
patrols.393
By blending military and medical functions, Special Forces had
abandoned the traditions of military medicine dating back to the first
Geneva Convention. Tracing that tradition from the 1 860s through the
1949 Geneva Conventions, Harvard nutritionist Jean Mayer, an expert on
paramedical personnel and a former officer in the Free French Forces,
stated that "the whole thrust of progress has been to separate the functions
of the doctor and his auxiliary from the main function of our means which
has to do with destruction of life and property . . . . "394 Mayer
explained that this tradition of separation served the utilitarian principle

391 .
See Record at 2082 (testimony of Capt. Ernest Porter regarding
chloromycetin, but not linking it to Special Forces medicine in Vietnam); id. at 614
(testimony of Capt. Ivan Mauer regarding dangers of chloromycetin). Levy said of this
practice: "They use drugs, such as Chloromycetin, that I hesitate to use myself. " See
Elinor Langer, The Court-Martial of Captain Levy: Medical Ethics v. Military Law, 156
SCIENCE 1346, 1349 (1967) (quoting Levy). Chloromycetin can cause aplastic anemia and
other blood disorders, resulting in death. It also can result in the overgrowth of
nonsusceptible organisms. In light of these dangers, the 1967 edition of the Physicians'
Desk Reference included a warning box for chloromycetin.
It cautioned that
chloromycctin "should not be used when other less potentially dangerous agents will be
effective," and that it "should be used only for serious infectiops . " It also noted that "[i]t
is essential that adequate blood studies be made during treatment with the drug" in order
to detect some resulting blood disorders before they became irreversible. MEDICAL
ECONOMICS, INC . , PHYSICIANS' DESK REFERENCE TO PHARMACEUTICAL SPECIALTIES
AND BIOLOGICALS 908-9088 (21st ed. 1966). For contemporary cases noting the dangers
of chloromycetin, see Stottlemire v. Cawood, 213 F. Supp. 897 (D.D.C. 1963);
lncollingo v. Ewing, 282 A.2d 206 (Pa. 1971).
392.
Interview with Dr. Howard Levy, supra note 25.
393.
See, e.g. , Record at 569 (testimony of Specialist Sanford Henry); id. at 1005
(testimony of Capt. Peter Bourne); id. at 1010 (Statement of the Information Office of the
U.S. Army Special Warfare Center); id. at 2205 (testimony of Donald Duncan). Robin
Moore wrote: "Every man is cross-trained in at least two other basic team skills. A
medic, say, can not only efficiently patch up the wounded and care for the sick, but
knows how to lay down a deadly accurate mortar barrage and blow up the enemy's rail
lines and bridges. " MOORE, supra note 264, at 10.
394.
Record at 2269.

1994:839

933

Coun-Manial ofDr. Howard B. Levy

of distinguishing doctors and medics from other soldiers on the battlefield,
so they could continue to provide care unmolested and without regard for
He added

the tides of battle or whether their forces had withdrawn. 395

that it was also derived from the medical ethics principle that the doctor
must be an impartial healer. 396
The Geneva Convention provided that medical personnel should not
abandon their patients when their forces retreat. Special Forces aidmen
purported, however, to have opted out of the Geneva Convention
protections.397 Unlike other medics, they were subject to the command
of a non-medical officer, who was the final arbiter of whether and when
they would function in a combat or a medical role.398

In that capacity,

the A-team commander made decisions regarding how the aidman would
practice medicine. 399 Donald Duncan testified that when a CIDG camp
was overrun, all Special Forces soldiers, including aidmen, were ordered
to evacuate and to leave their non-American patients behind.400
Jean Mayer noted that as an officer in the Free French Forces he
would not countermand his medical personnel .

He said that it would

violate his conscience to train paramedical personnel if he knew that they
would be required to subordinate medical judgment to their commanders'

political and military judgments. 401

Prosecution rebuttal witnesses saw their ethical duties differently.
Dr. William DeMaria of Duke University Medical School testified that his
obligation was to give the paramedical trainee the best education possible.
But in an eerie echo of the Nuremberg Hearing division of labor theme,
he added: "I cannot be responsible for his action once he completes this

395.
/d. ; see also id. at 2324 (testimony of Capt. Peter Bourne). This principle
of separating roles was widely believed imperiled by the North Vietnamese and the PLAF,
who were accused of showing little respect for the red cross brassard. Telephone
Interview with Col. Earl.V. Brown, supra note 45.
396.
Record at 2269-70.
397.
ld. at 1010 (Statement of the Information Office of the U.S. Army Special
Warfare Center).
398.
ld. at 21 5 1-52 (testimony of Lt. Col. Coppedge); id. at 2319 (testimony of
Capt. Peter Bourne) �
399.
/d. at 2319 (testimony of Capt. Peter Bourne).
400 .
ld. at 1023; see also id. at 2152 (testimony of Lt. Col. Coppedge conceding
this possibility); MOORE, supra note 264, at 63-66 (describing how preparations to
evacuate all Green Berets from camp under attack despite the medic's warning that "[i]f
we pull out . . . a lot of wounded are going to die," were obviated by last minute air
support destroying the attacking battalion).
401.
Record at 2270-71 , 2274. Asked if he would change his mind if shown that
these paramedical personnel did some medical good, Mayer responded that the threat to
medical independence seldom came from its opponents but rather "it is much more likely
to come from people who have very good intentions. " /d. at 227 1 .
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level of training. "402 This ethical detachment of cause from effect was
undergirded by a Panglossian view of what the aidman did in Vietnam.
Dr. DeMaria testified that knowing an aidman's commander might order
the aidman to abandon his patient for the greater good did not alter his
view on training aidmen. Nor would he question the order to abandon a
patient. If the commander gave the order, it would be appropriate. 403
Conflating the roles of healer and combat soldier similarly failed to
trouble DeMaria. His testimony spoke of the aidman's combat role as
casually as one might of someone's hobby: "I think the fact that he
chooses to do something else in addition to his health act is not my
concern ethically as a physician. "404 Reassured that aidmen do not wear
the red cross brassard, prosecution witness Dr. Amos Johnson thought the
conflation of killer and healer beneficial . Once the fight was over, he
explained, who but the aidman could best minister to those whom he had
wounded but failed to kill.405
While Levy had a "fleeting idea" of the Geneva Conventions'
prohibitions, he did not turn naturally to them in shaping a critique of
Special Forces medicine: "Those . . . questions . . . were largely raised
The Geneva Conventions argument was but one
by lawyers. "406
translation of Levy's fundamental objection to the aidman program for an
audience of legal decisionmakers : that it used medicine as an instrument
to effect political and mil itary objectives . The challenge for the defense
was to cast that objection in a way that would enable a court-martial to
find Levy's disobedience of Colonel Fancy's order excuseable.
At the court-martial, the defense could show only a handful of
examples of Special Forces aidmen using medicine for immediate overt
military ends. No biological warfare laboratories were hidden in the

402.

/d.

at

2364.

On the relationship between Duke's physician's assistant

program and Special Forces , see Col. Juel lnterview,

supra note 359, at 22-23.
2365; cj. Dr. Robert T. Jensen, Another View of Medical Ethics and
the Mililary, 20 THE NEW PHYSICIAN 505, 509 (1971) ("[l]t is not inappropriate that
403.

/d.

at

[medical officers] should be responsible to the line commanders in combat units . . . . If
war is too important to be left to the generais then medical care, and . . . medical ethics,
is too important to be left entirely to doctors . " ) .

Dr. Jensen's article is a response to a

position paper of Physicians for Social Responsibility , which was authored by three
doctors, including Dr. Victor Side!, one of Levy's medical ethics defense witnesses. Dr.
Robert Liberman et al., Medical Ethics and the Military, 17 THE NEW PHYSICIAN 17
(1968). Both articles focused much of their attention on issues raised in the court-martial.
Record at 2364.
404.
405.
ld. at 2398-99. Levy captured the absurdity of these conflated roles when he
doffed a green beret and came "charging into his chief counsel's motel room screaming,
'Kill!

Kill! Cure! Cure!'" Nicholas von Hoffman, The Troubled World of Captain Levy,
2 1 , 1967.
406.
Interview with Dr. Howard Levy, supra note 25.
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CIDG camps. The defense did elicit Robin Moore's acknowledgment of
at least one instance in which an aidman administered sodium pentathol
to aid in the interrogation of a prisoner.407 The Green Beret, which had
been placed in evidence, added only a couple of other instances of Green
Berets using medicine for immediate military purposes.408
But Levy's conversations with the Green Berets who sought
instruction in his clinic had led him to conclude that the danger of Special
Forces medicine was not especially that the aidmen would kill by medical
means (at least not in the sense of injecting poisons or pathogens into
their victims).409

He reached the decision to stop teaching medicine to

the aidmen when he came to see "that the medical aspect of the Green
Berets was a ruse . . . a method by which you could infiltrate Vietnam

viilages " to achieve military ends.410

Levy had concluded from his

conversations with aidmen that the aidman program converted medicine
into a sophisticated weapon of war.

Under the benign face of medical

aid, the aidman would gain entree into Vietnamese villages. They would
next militarize them by recruiting their inhabitants, isolating the insurgent
enemy from its popular base and destroying it. He recognized, in other
words, that civic action was merely another method of warfare.

Levy

came to believe that his participation in this program violated his ethical
obligations as a doctor and transformed him into something only slightly
removed from a combatant.411

407.
Record at 966-67.
408.
MOORE, supra note 264, at 1 12-13, 1 1 9 (aidman fits Vietnamese girl with
diaphragm so she can become mistress of PLAF colonel and eventually lure him to his
capture); id. at 137 (aidman injects sodium pentathol n
i captured colonel before
n
i terrogation); id. at 305, 307, 309 (aidman administers "nerve-paralyzing serum" in
portion of book that Moore does not purport to base on real incidents-a fantasy of
insurgency in North Vietnam). Writing about the court-martial, Dr. Peter Bourne
described an incident where aidmen "deliberately used their skills on the wives of known
Viet Cong in the hopes that these women could then be persuaded to provide intelligence
information which in tum would probably lead to the deaths of their husbands." Bourne,
supra note 38, at 58. This description was absent from his testimony.
409.
It did occur to him, however, that those taught to cure plague could similarly
be taught to spread it. Interview with Dr. Howard Levy, supra note 25.
410.
ld.
411.
Levy said:
I had already said to myself . . . I would go into the Army but I probably
wouldn't go to Vietnam. That's where I would draw the line . . . . I knew
that there would be a line drawn that I wouldn't cross and that line probably
was Vietnam. Well, . . . as I'm training these guys, I'm getting perilously
close to being in Vietnam even though I haven't gotten orders to go to
Vietnam, by proxy. So I'm saying to myself, wait a minute, this is where we
draw the line right now.

Id.
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Levy

was

unaware

at

the

that

time

the

proponents

of

counterinsurgency had explicitly described medicine as a kind of Trojan
horse, well-suited to the battle for the hearts and minds of Asian peasants.
Captain Leonard R. Friedman, a Special Forces psychiatrist, put it bluntly
in entitling an article he published in 1 966:
Friedman
Military-Political Weapon. 412

American Medicine as a
declared

medicine

the

"cornerstone" of civic action and "one of the most successful instruments
. . . in stability operations. "413 He proclaimed that "Western medicine
has been the key to the oriental home and has unlocked a store of good
will for Western man

entering an Eas'tern world. "414

Friedman
explained that in Vietnam, the tactical use of medicine might lead first to
a greater acceptance of the Saigon government by its people, especially
non-ethnic Vietnamese, and then to "further acceptance of Western ideas
and ideals. " "Subsequently," he continued, "the minority group may be
led to a wish to provide its own military contribution to the Central
Government"

beneficence. 41 5

as

an

expression

of

gratitude

for

its

medical

The value of medicine for counterinsurgency lay partly in its
appearance of universality and neutrality.

Colonel Spurgeon Nee!, a

former Surgeon of the U . S . MACV, could write with no apparent sense
of irony that the medical component of stability operations provides an
"essentially apol itical avenue through which favorable influence may be
6

maintained. "41

E.A. Vastyan, a critic of these "warriors in white," documents that
the doctrine of political medicine embraced both political and military

412.

Capt. Leonard R. Friedman,

Weapon, 1 3 1

MIL. MED.

1273 (1966).

American Medicine

as

a Military-Political

The U.S. Army exhibit at the

1967 American

Medical Association convention, which prominently featured a picture of a Special Forces
aidman treating a Vietnamese patient, appeared under the title: "medicine as a weapon."
Liberman et al.,

413.

supra

Friedman,

note

403, at 19.
note 412, at 1273. "Stability operations" was a common

supra

synonym for counterinsurgency.

Id.

414.

at

1276. Friedman lay partial blame for the fall of China on American

failure to use medicine to gain a foothold there.

For a different view of the political

efficacy of political medicine, at least among the Montagnards, see BOURNE,

272.
415.
416.

Friedman,

MIL. MED.

605, 605 (1967).

supra note

supra note 412, at 1277.
Nee!, The Medical Role in Army Stability Operations, 132

Col. Spurgeon

The contradiction was not lost on RichB .J Cowan, a

medical student who wrote in a letter to the New

England Journal of Medicine that what

Nee! was calling apolitical, others would recognize as interference "in the internal
political affairs of other countries, in behalf, if necessary, of governments disliked by their
people."

Cowan added that "[m]edicine is to be used politically because it provides a

facade of apolitical activity."
MED., Feb .

8, 1968, at 336.

Richard B.T. Cowan,

Letter to the Editor,

NEW ENO. J .
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objectives. He further shows some of the ways in which this approach to
medicine as an instrument of war distorted medical values and practices.
Political medicine generated a theory and practice of what Vastyan calls
"political triage, and "psychological triage. "417 Political triage entails
subordinating decisions regarding treatment and the allocation of medical
resources to such political and military goals as intelligence gathering and
41
Psychological triage entails medical
cementing local loyalty. 1
decisionmaking that seeks to achieve the greatest immediate loyalty impact
instead of medical impact. 419
Though unable to point to published Army doctrine, the defense
attempted to show that in Vietnam, Special Forces had converted medical
care into a military and political weapon.

Donald Duncan spoke of the

aidmen as "your greatest chance of getting entree, into contested
villages.420 Duncan explained that:
Once he leaves the camp [his primary mission] would be the
treatment of local civilians, holding sick call, and whatever.
It's in training-it is pointed out that in many areas in which
you will go, you are going to be very unpopular, especially you
as a guy carrying a gun, that is coming in there trying to
organize them into going out to get themselves shot in some sort
of a village defense organization; that the one great "in, that
you have is this medic because people are short on doctors and
trained medical personnel in there; that the thing to do is sort of

417.
Vastyan, supra note 364, at 333-34.
418.
Jd. at 334 (describing treatment in ancillary role to intelligence and the
procedures for justifying admittance of Vietnamese civilians to U.S. Army hospitals).
419.
Jd. at 333-34. Spurgeon Nee! noted that U.S. military hospitals admitted
Vietnamese civilians selectively for "'high impact' surgical procedures," focusing on
corrective surgery for major deformities and disfigurements, primarily in children. Nee!
writes that "[t]he psychological impact on the inhabitants of the village to which the
restored patient is returned is tremendous. " Nee!, supra note 416, at 607. In response,
Richard Cowan would write, "It seems to me that this program uses an indication for
surgery with :which I am unfamiliar-namely, psychological impact on the patient's
community." Cowan, supra note 416, at 336. In the mid 1970s, Col. Roger Juel, a
hostile defense witness at the court-martial, expressed the extent to which political and
military objectives had displaced medicine in civic action medicine. When told by Louis
Dorogi that some aidmen delivered babies in Vietnam, Juel responded with dismay. He
explained that aidmen were taught that they should defer to the village midwife, who
would be far more practiced in this area, and at most take a helping role under her
direction. He then made clear the source of his concern: "Leave the responsibility where
it belongs, because they could destroy a team's mission by being thrown out of a village
or having some important person's wife die as a result of their actions." Col. Juel
Interview, supra note 359, at 26-27.
420.
Record at 2204.
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push a medic up there in front and Jet him get the confidence of
these people by treating them; usually it starts off-sometimes
it starts off very slow, but the word gets around. More and
more people are coming for this treatment; certain dependency
is sometimes involved; then, of course, this lays the way open
now for the rest of the team to come in and organize them in
their primary mission which could be border surveillance; it
could be CIDG strike force; it could be regional forces, popular
forces_421
Bourne and Moore similarly defined the aidmen's function, which Bourne
labeled "the pursuit of political medicine, "422 as the effort to win hearts
and minds through the allurement of medical care. 423
The prosecution's rebuttal witnesses and the hostile defense witnesses
emphasized that the aidmen's primary mission was to ensure the health of
the A-team and their Vietnamese counterparts and diminished the
importance of the aidmen's civic action.424 The prosecution emphasized
the value of the aidmen to their comrades in situations where, because of
the nature of the mission, evacuation to an Army hospital might be
impossible.

Lieutenant Colonel Coppedge, one of the architects of the

Army's doctrine regarding medicine's role in counterinsurgency, did not
mince words, however. Asked what was medicine's primary mission in
Vietnam, he replied:
It became rather evident with our increasing involvement in
[counterguerrilla warfare] that the victory in this sort of struggle
was more than a matter of weapons, that is, arms, gunfire; that
in a struggle like this which is in many respects a social struggle
that we have got to turn to use of social instruments such as
medicine. So in this way we sought to use medicine as a means
of approaching the enemy and imposing our will on his. 425
Referring to Mao's aphorism that the guerrilla is a fish and the people are
the sea, Coppedge added: "The basic support for the guerrilla is really the

421.
/d. at 1034-35.
/d. at 2318.
422.
423.
/d. at 963 (testimony of Robin Moore); id. at 2321-22 (testimony of Capt.
Peter Bourne).
424.
See, e.g., id. at 2025-26, 2029 (testimony of Col. Roger Juel); id. at 2476-78
(testimony of Maj. Craig Llewellyn).
425.
/d. at 2128-29 (emphasis added).
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people around him . . . . We sought to deny the population support for the
guerrilla by winning him to us. "426
To succeed with the medical ethics defense, Levy's counsel had to
show first that Levy's objections were indeed those of a doctor rather than
those of an opponent of the war. Additionally, although the defense
witnesses stated that ultimate responsibility for ethical judgments must
reside in the individual doctor,427 they needed to show that Levy was
not a crank. 428 The defense sought supporting testimony from other
doctors to show that Levy's ethical concerns about the aidman program
were within the medical ethics mainstream.
Their case began to gel somewhat unexpectedly when prosecution
witness Captain Ivan Mauer demonstrated that Levy was not alone in his
concerns . Mauer, who was probably Levy's closest friend among the
Fort Jackson doctors, had been called to testify that he had pleaded with
Levy to reconsider his refusal of the order to train.429 On cross
examination, Mauer, who had succeeded Levy in the dermatology clinic,
but who had not been asked to teach aidmen, stated that if aidmen were
trained for combat and served as combatants or were ·used to gain entree
into Vietnam villages, he would refuse to teach them medicine.430
Mauer's testimony was sufficiently dramati� to capture the headline in
some newspaper accounts from the day's other big story, testimony by the
parade of black soldiers.431
As Mauer left the courtroom, someone at the defense table whispered
audibly, " [T]here goes our next client. "432 Mauer was not prosecuted,
but the rumor that he had been reassigned to Vietnam as punishment for
his testimony seemed all too plausible to defense witness Captain Ernest

/d. at 2129.
See, e.g. , id.

426.
427.

at

1 003 (testimony of Capt. Peter Bourne); id. at 2338-39

(testimony of Dr. Benjamin Spock) .
In an out-of-court hearing on the admissibility of Lt. Col. Coppedge's

428.

testimony and the testimony of other doctors on the medical ethics question , Brown said:

"I wonder if it would be advisable for me to hear testimony as to the respectability of
such

a

belief from other medical sources to show that it's really not so odd with the

accused . "

/d.

429.
Levy,

supra

at

2226.

On Levy's relationship with Dr. Mauer, see Interview with Dr. Howard
note 25.

rights community.

430.

/d.

Levy's closest friendships, however, were within the local civil

Record at 616,

624-26. The dermatology instruction had been farmed out to

a civilian doctor.

431.
Homer Bigart, An Army Doctor Backs Capt. Levy: Says He, Too, Would
Refuse to Teach Combat Men, N.Y. TIMES, May 16, 1967, at 8; Tony Burton, Another
Doc Says He Won 't Teach Green Berets, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, May 16, 1967, at 5 .
432.
Nicholas von Hoffman, Nuremberg Raised at Capt. Levy's Trial, WASH.
PoST, May 16, 1967, at A4.
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Porter.433 Fearing that he would share Mauer's or Levy's fate, Porter
repeatedly attempted to invoke the Fifth Amendment when asked his
views about teaching the aidmen medicine. 434 While Porter, who had
previously limited his instruction to first aid, attempted to avoid saying
that he would refuse to teach the aidmen more advanced topics, he
nevertheless indicated that he shared Levy's ethical objections to the
aidman program. 435 Captain Robert Petres, though repeatedly prevented
from answering Morgan's questions regarding the aidman program, also
expressed his ethical doubts about Special Forces medicine. 436
In addition to Peter Bourne and the Fort Jackson doctors, the defense
called a number of medical luminaries to lend credence to the medical
ethics defense and to bolster the image of Levy as the good doctor.
Along with Jean Mayer, Drs. Louis Lasagna,437 Victor Sidel,438 and
Benjamin Spock439 testified on Levy's behalf. Each witness testified

433.

Record at 2100-01 (testimony of Capt. Ernest Porter). Mauer was not sent

to Vietnam.

434.

/d.

435.

The following exchange is typical:

at 2072-74, 2089-92.

Q [Shusterman] : "The question is, Dr. Porter . . . . "
A: "Are you asking me, will I continue to train them the way I had trained
them?"

Q: "Yes."
A: "I think that could incriminate me. I refuse to answer that."
Q [by law officer] : "How would that incriminate you?"
A: "If you're asking me the way I train them, it would appear, presently,
since I have been informed how they are to be trained, and that the way I
trained them in the past was improper, and to state that I'm going to continue
that way, I think , would be to incriminate myself.

To say that they be

taught-if I say they're going to be taught all the intricacies of medicine, I
think that I would find myself going against the Hippocratic Oath in some
way . "

/d.

at 2090.

436.

/d.

437.

Dr. Lasagna was on the faculty at Johns Hopkins Medical School and had

at 2176-80, 21 82-83 .

published widely in the field of medical ethics.

438.

Jd.

at 2293-95.

Dr. Side! was on the Harvard Medical School faculty. He had published on

a variety of topics in medical ethics, including issues relating to medicine and warfare.

ld.

at 2279 .

439.

Dr. Spock was on the Western Reserve Medical School faculty.

A leading

figure in the antiwar movement, Spock would soon face trial (along with Rev. William
Sloane Coffm, Jr., Mitchell Goodman, Michael Ferber, and Marcus Raskin) for his part
in the circulation and publication of A

Call to Resist Illegitimate Awhority,

a statement

encouraging draft resistance. On the Boston 5 Conspiracy Trial, see JoHN F. BANNAN

& ROSEMARY S. BANNAN, LAW, MORALITY AND VIETNAM: THE PEACE MILITANTS AND

THE COURTS 87-106 ( 1 974); RON CHRISTENSON, POLITICAL TRIALS: GORDIAN KNOTS IN
THE LAW 131-37 (1986); JESSICA MITFORD, THE TRIAL OF DR SPOCK (1969); Noam
.

Chomsky et al.,

Reflections on a Political Trial, in TRIALS OF THE

RESISTANCE 74-105
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that medical ethics was central to the practice of good medicine; that the
separation between the roles of healer and combatant created by the
Geneva Conventions was grounded in important ethical and practical
considerations; and that medicine must remain nonpartisan and not serve
as an instrument for achieving military or political goals.440

Each,

when presented with a hypothetical based on the aidman program,
supported Levy's decision as ethically appropriate.441 In rebuttal the
prosecution called several witnesses who testified that they did not see a
basis for an ethical objection to the aidman program.442

Whose ethics

witnesses fared best was a matter in the eye of the beholder.443
In its medical ethics case the defense sought to deemphasize Levy's
political motivation for refusing Colonel Fancy's order.

Instead, it cast

Levy's act in terms of universal medical principles embodied in the
Hippocratic Oath and the American Medical Association Principles of
Medical Ethics.444

To do otherwise would have strengthened the

prosecution's efforts to depict Levy as bent on subverting the war effort.
Yet, by universalizing the argument, the defense blunted the impact of its
critique of the Army's use of medicine in Vietnam.
Also, the attempt to cloak Levy's act under the mantle of the good,
apolitical doctor created contradictions within the medical ethics defense.
Shusterman was right in characterizing Levy's refusal to train aidmen as
bound up with his opposition to U . S . intervention in Vietnam.

Levy

would say retrospectively:
[A]t that time . . . I had very strong feelings, but they were
largely political feelings. I knew what the war in Vietnam was

(1970).
440.
Record at 2269-70, 2274-75 (testimony of Jean Mayer); id. at 2280-81 , 228384, 2287-88 (testimony of Dr. Victor W. Side!); id. at 2299-302, 2307-08 (testimony of
Dr. Louis Lasagna); id. at 2337-40 (testimony of Dr. Benjamin Spock); see also id. at
2324 (testimony of Capt. Peter G. Bourne).
441.
ld. at 2270-71 , 2274 (testimony of Jean Mayer); id. at 2283 (testimony of Dr.
Victor W. Side!); id. .ai 2299-300, 2304-05 (testimony of Dr. Louis Lasagna); id. at 2341
(testimony of Dr. Benjamin Spock).
442.
The prosecution called Drs. William J. DeMaria, Amos Neill Johnson,
Edward E. Kimbrough, Maj. Billy E. Jones, Capt. Sander S. Shapiro, and Maj. Craig
Llewellyn.
443.
Compare Telephone Interview with Col. Earl V. Brown, supra note 45, and
Telephone Interview with Richard Shusterman, supra note 127 (expressing view that
prosecution medical witnesses were more convincing than defense witnesses) with
Interview with Dr. Howard B. Levy, supra note 25 ("People . . . Jove Ben Spock . . .
Craig L!ewllyn just ain't no match for Ben Spock. ").
444.
Dr. Spock testified that general medical principles, not his opposition to the
war, undergirded his support for Levy's decision. Record at 2341-42.
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all about, and I was very profoundly . . . opposed to that war.

So, much of what I said and did was colored by that
background. Had it not been that, who the bell knows what I
would have done. . . . To me, medical ethics is not just an
abstraction out there. If it were just an abstraction, I might not
have done anything. I might have been just like all the other
doctors. But, in the background was my opposition to the
war.445
As Levy noted, his response to the aidmen program was not typical of the
other doctors. Although Ira Glasser would later report that other Army
doctors who were not permitted to travel to Fort Jackson for the court
martial were prepared to testify that they shared Levy's objections to
training the aidmen, there could be little doubt that Levy did not represent
the dominant view in the medical profession.446 The effort to frame
Levy's objection as a doctor's response was undermined by its atypicality.
The attempt to identify Levy with the image of the good doctor also
left the defense vulnerable to criticism that drew on less flattering images
of doctors as monopolists and elitists.447 The prosecution cast Levy as
an elitist who would sooner see American soldiers denied medical care
than permit paramedical personnel to attend to them.448 Indeed, the
prominence of Levy's medical ethics witnesses in contrast to such
homespun prosecution witnesses as small-town North Carolina practitioner
Amos Johnson may also have undermined Levy's medical ethics
defense. 449

445.
446.

Interview with Dr. Howard B. Levy,

supra

M . D . (Southem StudentOrganizingCommittee) 4 (1967),
CRISIS, Aug. 7, 1967.

reprinted in CHRISTIANITY AND

More probably the American Medical Association expressed the

dominant view within the profession.

447.

note 25.

IRA GLASSER, JUDGMENT AT FORT JACKSON: THE TRIAL OF HOWARD LEVY

See infra

note 474.

This image of the profession has a long history. For discussions of nineteenth

century characterizations of the medical profession as aristocratic and monopolistic, see
generally JOSEPH P. KETT, THE FORMATION OF THE AMERICAN MEDICAL PROFESSION:

THE ROLE OF INSTITUTIONS, 1780-1860, at 97-131 (1968); WILLIAM G. ROTHSTEIN,
AMERICAN PHYSICIANS IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY: FROM SECTS TO SCIENCE 123-74

(1972).
448.

Record at 2003-04 (cross-examination of Maljorie Helton);

(cross-examination of Sgt. Mitchell Helton) .

id. at 2009-10

Elinor Langer detected this tactic and

See Elinor Langer, The Court-Martial of
Captain Levy: Medical Ethics v. Military Law, 156 SCIENCE 1346, 1350 (1967); see also
Telephone Interview with Richard Shusterman , supra note 127 (characterizing Levy 's

discussed it in her article reporting the case.

medical ethics defense as elitist).

449.

See Telephone Interview with

Col. Earl V. Brown, supra note 45 (discussing

relative impact of Johnson's testimony and the testimony of Levy's witnesses). Johnson
described how he trained a black paramedic to assist him in his practice.

His assistant
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New York Times correspondent Homer Bigart called the medical
ethics defense "eloquent. " "Yet," he added, "in the minds of the ten
stony-faced career officers [of the court-martial panel] , there must have
remained a simplistic but commonsense notion that the Green Beret
medics did more good than harm. "4.50 In the end, the court-martial
panel was not asked to decide the issue.
Brown ruled that Levy's medical ethics objections to teaching
medicine to the aidmen did not give rise to a defense. He instructed the
court-martial that the order was lawful and that Levy was not entitled to
disobey on the grounds of a conflict between the order and his notion of
medical ethics.451 Colonel Brown has said that he would have been
very troubled and might have let the medical ethics defense go to the
court-martial had Levy shown that Special Forces were using the aidmen
as a recruiting device in Vietnamese villages.452 He is also convinced
that Levy made no such showing at the court-martial. 'Perhaps Brown's
perspective on the medical ethics issue has evolved over time, and he was
far less will ing to recognize so unprecedented a defense at the time than
he now believes. Perhaps the evidence of the political and military use
of medicine was overwhelmed and lost in the untidiness of the case. Or
perhaps, as was true of the war crimes evidence, the difficulty of
acknowledging that these acts were ours and not some other nation's made
it all too easy not to see what had been shown.
Brown's ruling left unanswered the questions whether and when a
doctor could be compelled to follow military orders that required that she
or he disregard personal beliefs regarding the dictates of medical
ethics. 453 At first blush, the claim that an Army doctor might refuse to
obey a facially lawful order on medical ethics grounds closely resembles
was trusted by both Johnson and his patients and performed a large array of procedures
skillfully without immediate supervision.

Record at 2391-94 (testimony of Dr. Amos

Johnson).
450.

Levy,

Homer Bigart, Military

Justice: The Issues Went Beyond the Case of Captain

N.Y. T!MES,__June 4, 1967, at D4.

451.

Recoi:d at 259 1 .

452.

Telephone Interview with Col. Earl V. Brown,

453.

For a recent variant on the issue involving conflicting demands of obedience

to military and religious authority , see Eric Schmitt,

over LuyalJies,

supra note 45.

Military Chapiflin Fights a Battle

N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 21, 1993, at A20 (describing Air Force Chaplain

Garland L. Robertson, who was disciplined and discharged after he published a letter
shortly before the start of the Persian Gulf War in which he questioned the morality of
using force against Iraq).

The question of conflicting loyalties and professional ethical

obligations within the military has received scant attention in nonlegal sources as well.
For one exception, see Arlene K. Daniels , The Captive Professional: Bureaucratic
Limitations in the Practice of Military Psychiatry, 1 0 J . HPALTH & Soc. BEHAV. 255
(1967).
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a claim of selective conscientious objection, and it is not surprising that
so construed, the argument was fated to fail. 454 Beyond the claim of
selective conscientious objection, however, lay a more potent argument,
though one that never quite gelled at trial, that suggested that the
military's power to direct the conduct of its doctors was subject to the
constraints of law.
If such constraints did exist, they derived from two sources. First,
as a signatory to the Geneva Conventions, the U.S. could not use its
military medical personnel as combatants. Most directly, as Levy's
defense argued, this meant that using medical personnel like the aidmen
to realize military objectives constituted a violation of the laws of war.
Therefore Levy might legitimately refuse to abet such violations. More
indirectly this allowed the defense to argue, or at least to suggest, that
Levy's role itself had been transformed from physician to an ancillary to
combat in violation of the Conventions' separation of the roles of healer
and combatant.
Somewhat more perilously, the defense might have drawn on the
Supreme Court's suggestion in Orloff v. Willoughbf55 that the
government may not specially subject doctors to the draft because of their
professional skills, but deny them the opportunity to practice medicine
once conscripted .456 The defense could have used this suggestion to
argue that requiring Levy to violate his understanding of medical ethics
would be tantamount to the deprivation condemned in the Orloff dicta.
The defense might have argued, in other words, that because the practice
of medicine necessarily entails the freedom to follow one's understanding
of the dictates of medical ethics, any interference with Levy's ability to
make ethically informed medical decisions would constitute an assignment
to nonmedical duties. The defense medical ethics witnesses had laid the
foundation for such an argument by contending that a doctor denied the
ability to follow his conscience and training regarding medical ethics
"would stop . . . in his tracks within an hour of getting up in the
morning. "457 Yet the defense never explicitly drew the connection from
this testimony to the Orloff argument.
Orloff, a cold-war-era decision, was certainly a two-edged sword.
It upheld the Army's right to draft and retain, without commissioning as

454.

Recently, however, the Department of Defense has accepted precisely that

sort of claim made by military doctors who have refused to perform abortions . According
to a Department spokesperson, the military ucannot force doctors who cite the Hippocratic
oath to perform the procedure. "

Overseas Bases (National
455.

Morning Edition: Abortions Still Not Perfonned at

Public Radio broadcast, June 14, 1993).

345 u.s. 83 (1953).

456.

!d.

457.

Record at 2339 (testimony of Dr. Benjamin Spock).

at 87-88.
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an officer, a doctor who had refused to sign a loyalty certificate and to
answer

questions

organizations.

regarding

membership

in

various

"subversive"

While Justice Jackson's majority opinion stated that the

government had a legal obligation "to assign Orloff to duties fall ing
within 'medical and allied specialist categories , ' " it also proclaimed that
the military was a specialized, largely self-regulating community entitled
to enormous deference and minimal scrutiny in its assignments of
duty.458 Indeed, Orloff would eventually serve as a foundation for the
Supreme Court's characterization of the mil itary as a "society apart from
civilian society, " upon which it buttressed its decision in

Parker

v..

Levy. 459
D. Hearts and Minds
Who cared about the defense?
about.

That wasn't what this was all

I mean, the part that I was concerned about, I thought

we won.
Howard Levy400
Bereft of defenses, Morgan attempted to recast the case as one in
which the local command had acted rashly and set in motion a chain of
uncontrolled events that would result in tragedy for Levy, the Army, and
the nation, unless the court-martial acted heroically and stopped its
progression. Everyone recognized, he argued, that Levy did not belong
in the Army.<Ui1

The process leading toward conviction should never

have begun, because Levy should never have been at Fort Jackson. Once
begun, the process should never have culminated in a court-martial.
Morgan told the court-martial: "I think, looking back on it, that each of
you knows that . . . there are procedures all the way along the l ine to
stop this case from coming here.

And that in this rather terrifying

comedy of errors, we wind up now in a case . . . that has grown to
monumental proportions. "<Ui2

458.
459.
Or/nff in

Orw.fl 345

92-95.
417 U.S. at 744.

U.S. at

Parker v . Levy,

When the defense eventually did draw on

the Middle District of Pennsylvania habeas proceedings, the focus of the case

had so shifted that the defense only hinted at the argument described above and focused,
instead, on Justice Black's statement in his dissenting opinion that the military could not
treat Dr. Orloff as a "pariah " because he exercised his constitutional rights .
Court Habeas Bri�f, supra note 68, at 159-63.
Interview with Dr. Howard Levy,
460.

461.
462.

Record at

ld.

2569.

supra note 25.

District
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Morgan insisted that to convict Levy would be to punish him for
"words, political beliefs and opinions. "463 Such a conviction not only
would make an unnecessary martyr, it would tarnish the image of the
military and harm the nation. Morgan explained: "I've felt ever since
December, when we got into this case, that it wasn't just Howard Levy
who was on trial, and it's proved to be pretty true, I think. "464
Morgan invited the court-martial to transform the story into one
about their own heroism and dedication to country and the Army.465 He
told them that someone had to stop the chain of events that had spun out
of control and that only they could.466 Asking them to write the story's
end, he said: "I know that you know that you have an opportunity for
greatness, and there's a call for that greatness. "467
It is not clear what impact Morgan's closing argument had on the
court-martial. On June 2, 1967, the panel found Levy guilty of the order
charge and the two speech charges that did not relate to the Hancock
letter.468 They convicted him of the lesser included offenses of writing
to Hancock "with culpable negligence," rather than with the intent to
impair his performance. 469 Believing that the court-martial finding was
tantamount to an acquittal on the letter charges, the prosecution moved to
dismiss those charges. 410 The following day, the court-martial imposed
a three-year sentence. 471
Within the Fort Jackson courtroom, a particular construction of the
case prevailed. The war escaped condemnation and was safely restored
to its place as a backdrop, rather than as a matter for legal dispute.
According to that construction, bad things sometimes happened in
Vietnam, but such is the nature of war. Besides, we had a civilizing
influence on an otherwise primitive people. The allegiances of Army
officers were deemed to take precedence over the oaths of doctors . And

463.

464.

/d.
/d.

465.

This genre of closing argument casting the jury as the hero may be one of the

at 2566.
at 2575.

standard scripts in the defense attorney's narrative quiver.

For a detailed analysis of a

closing argument built upon a narrative of jury heroism, see Anthony G. Amsterdam &
Randy Hertz,

An Analysis ojCwsing Arguments to a Jury,

37 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 55

(1992).

466 .

Record at 2574.

467.

Id.
Id.
/d.
/d.
Jd.

468.
469.
470.
471.

at 2586.
at 2617.
at 2618.
at 2619.
at 2634. For a discussion of the sentence, see Telephone Interview with ·

Col. Earl V. Brown,

supra

note 45 (noting that the three-year sentence did not reveal

much about the jury's reaction to Levy and to Morgan's argument, and expressing
surprise that the convening authority did not reduce the sentence).
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military discipline was restored. The prosecution's vision of the case by
and large prevailed. Law Officer Brown and the court-martial agreed that
despite some interesting detours, the case had been about Levy and his
acts of defiance.
Outside the courtroom, the meanings gleaned from the case were
much more varied. Within the medical community and, particularly, the
military, the case had an immediate impact.
crystallize a medical resistance movement.

The case helped to

Galvanized by the case,

medical students signed and circulated pledges not to serve in the
military. 472 Others in the medical community who were not confronted
with the immediate issue of the draft also seized on the case to help create
opposition to the war.

Opponents of the war within the medical

community report having felt challenged by Levy's act to consider
whether they should be doing more.413 Although they always remained
a minority within the medical community,474 the medical resistance

See Student Dissent on Vietnam, 278 NEW ENG. 1. MED. 282 ( 1968)
472.
(containing "A Pledge of Nonparticipation" and reporting that in the New York City area,
at least 90 medical students had signed the pledge not to serve in Vietnam); The Doctors '
Dilemma, THE NATION, May 29, 1967, at 676-77; The Draft: Protest, Debate, Renewal,
NEWSWEEK, May 22, 1967, at 25 ; Physicians Urge Draft Revision, BALTIMORE SUN, May
18, 1967, at 1 ; Spock on a Visit Backs Capt. Lery, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 12, 1 967, at 5;
Statement of Arthur Kaufman, LIBERATION, Aug. 1967, at 22 ("Let us serve notice to the
Army and to the administration that if they think Doctor Levy's non-cooperation is an
isolated affair, they haven't seen anything yet."). Ironically, while Levy initially
supported medical draft resistance, he ultimately advocated that doctors enter the military
and work from within to end the war and reform the military. For an expression of the
former view, see Letter from Dr. Howard B . Levy to Charles Morgan, Jr. (Dec. 16,
1967), in Levy Litigation Files, supra note 27. For expressions of the latter view, see
Smithson, supra note 46; Dr. Reuben Barr, What Ever Happened to Captain Lery, HosP.
PHYSICIAN, May 1970, at 65, 139-40.
Telephone Interview with Dr. Benjamin Spock (May 1 1 , 1993) (recalling his
473.
admiration for Levy's courage and describing Levy as more courageous than he, although
also noting a feeling of foreboding that he might end up imprisoned after visiting Levy
following Levy's confmement); see also Dr. Arthur S. Blank, Jr., The Army and Dr.
Lery, LIBERATION, Aug. 1967, at 20.
474.
In rdponse to Levy's court-martial, the American Medical Association's
House of Delegates unanimously approved a resolution declaring:
There is no conflict between the ethics of the medical profession and the oath
which officers must take when sworn into the Armed Services. This oath,
applicable to medical and other officers , provides that all officers shall support
and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign
and domestic, that they will bear true faith and allegiance to the Constitution
of the United States and that they take such obligation freely and without any
mental reservation or purpose of evasion. There is nothing in this oath which
conflicts in any way with the ethics of the medical profession.
AMERICAN M EDICAL ASSOCIATION , HOUSE OP DELEGATES, Resolution 89 (June 18,
1967), quoted in United States v. Levy, 39 C.M.R. 672, 677 n.3 (1968); see also Donald
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remained a voice of opposition to the war and the locus of a counter
interpretation of the Levy case.
Levy's impact within the military was powerful and immediate.
News of the court-martial prompted expressions of support from other
soldiers.475 Levy recalls that he was greatly surprised at the large
number of Gls who flashed him a peace sign or a clenched fist salute at
the time of the court-martial. 476 During the court-martial, five Fort
Jackson Gls invoked Levy's stand on the Green Berets and refused to
carry their weapons. 477 According to Army documents, three Fort
Jackson enlisted men refused orders to go to Vietnam.478 Fort Jackson

Janson,

Doctors Urged to CombaJ Government Planning,

N.Y. TIMES, June 2 1 , 1967 at

A24 (discussing House of Delegates vote and describing it as a "rejection of the
contention of Dr. Howard B. Levy that the physician's Hippocratic Oath might conflict
with orders from military superiors"); Telephone Interview with Dr. Benjamin Spock,

supra

note 473 (guessing that perhaps as much as 90% of the profession either did not

notice the

Levy

case or considered Levy "very deviant" and believed that he was using

ethics as an excuse for being uncooperative, and adding that the AMA "felt responsibility
for making it clear that Levy didn't speak for them").

For other indications of support

for Dr. Levy within the medical community in addition to materials previously cited , see

We Support Capt. Howard Levy, M.D. ,

N.Y. TIMEs, May 7, 1967, at D4 (advertisement

sponsored by the New York Medical Committee to End the War in Vietnam, signed by
672 doctors , nurses, medical students, and other health professionals);

Backed by Pickets Here,

Captain Levy

N.Y. TIMES, May 28, 1967, at AS; Letter from Dr. Lytt I.

Gardner, National Chairman, the Physicians Forum, to Charles Morgan, Jr. (May 12,
1967),

in

Levy Litigation Files,

supporting Levy).

supra

note 27 (noting resolution of the organization

Doctors and medical students also organized the Committee for

Howard Levy, M . D . , which circulated petitions in support of Levy .
Howard Levy, M . D . , materials,
475.

in

Levy Litigation Files,

supra

See

Committee for

note 27.

Six soldiers from Fort Sill, Oklahoma, telegraphed their support for Levy.

See Soldiers Support Levy, THE BOND, June 23, 1967, at 3. This was followed by other
statements of support. See Another Gl Speaks Out, THE BOND, July 2 1 , 1967, at 1
(statement of Pvt. Richard Perrin); Levy Gets New Backing, THE BoND, July 7, 1967, at
1 (soldiers from Fort Sheridan, Ill .).
476.
Interview with Dr. Howard B. Levy, supra note 25.
477.
Letter from Howard Levy to Charles Morgan, Jr. (July 14, 1967), in Levy
Litigation Files, supra note 27 (letter from jail abstracting conversation from Col. Herbert
Meeting, Jr., Fort Jackson Staff Judge Advocate, in which Meeting told Levy about the
five Gls, how they were put in the stockade and were persuaded to end their protest after
Levy's conviction).

478.

Memorandum to Secretary of the Army from Brig. Gen. Kenneth J . Hodson

(June 5, 1967),

in

JAG Files ,

supra

note 77 (noting in discussion a paper prepared for

meeting between the Secretaries of the Army and Defense regarding the issue of post-trial
confinement and other issues relating to the Levy case which stated that "[a]t the present
time three enlisted men at Fort Jackson are in pre-trial confinement for refusing to obey
orders to depart for Vietnam"); Col. Waldemar Solf, Talking Paper 2 (June 8 , 1967),
JAG Files,

supra note 77.

in
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GI coffeehouse. 479 As an early
resister, Levy became a part of the folklore of the GI movement.4lKl
soon became the target of the first

Often, the specifics of the case were lost, replaced by the image of Levy
as someone who had stood up to the Army, said no to the war, and had
willingly faced punishment rather than abandon his convictions.481
Once released from prison482 Levy became a frequent speaker both at

479.
Fred Gardner, Hollywood Confidential: 1, 3 VIETNAM GENERATION 50, 50
(1991). The idea of the Gl coffeehouse was to provide a place off base, where Gls could
talk about the war and their other concerns, and where a Gl movement could naturally
grow. ld. at 51-52; Interview with Dr. Howard B. Levy, supra note 25.
480. . Conversation with Skip DeLano (July 20, 1993).
481.
For a typical example of a garbled account of the case, see Citizens
Commission of Inquiry, Introduction to THE DE.LLUMS COMMTITE.E. HEARINGS ON WAR
CRIMES IN V!E.TNAM, at vii (The Citizens' Commission of Inquiry ed. , 1972). Levy
recalls that when he was transferred from Fort Jackson to the United States Disciplinary
Barracks at Fort Leavenworth, he arrived too late for officers' mess and was brought in
to be fed while the enlisted prisoners were eating (even at the disciplinary barracks, the
privileges of rank inhered). As he entered the room, he received a standing ovation from
the enlisted prisoners, many undoubtedly supporters of the war who were applauding Levy
not for the substance of his position but for standing up to the Army. Interview with Dr.
Howard B. Levy, supra note 25; see also Letter from Dr. Howard B. Levy to Charles
Morgan, Jr. (Dec. 15, 1967), in Levy Litigation Files, supra note 27 (describing reception
at Leavenworth as "tumultuous" and stating that "we've got about 1400 sympathizers
here. ").
482.
After Levy's ·convictio� and sentencing, the issue of bail pending appeal
became a critical part of Levy's case. The Manual for Courts-Martial vests broad
discretion in the Commanding Officer to either hold or release the prisoner pending
appeal. M.C.M., supra note 138, 1 21(d). The Acting Commander, Brig. Gen. E.B.
Roberts, denied Levy's requests for release pending further review. Letter from Brig.
Gen. E.B. Roberts to Charles Morgan, Jr. (June 3 , 1967), in JAG Files, supra note 77;
Letter from Brig. Gen. E.B. Roberts to Charles Morgan, Jr. (June 12, 1967), in JAG
Files, supra note 77; see also Memorandum from Brig. Gen. Kenneth J . Hodson, Acting
the Judge Advocate General, to the U.S. Army Chief of Staff (June 1 5 , 1967), in JAG
Files, supra note 77. Secretary of the Army Stanley Resor similarly denied Levy's
request for release pending appeal. Letter from Alfred B. Pitt, General Counsel of the
Army, to Charles Morgan, Jr. (June 15, 1967), in JAG Files, supra note 77.
In making his decision, Gen. Roberts relied partly on an FBI report that an unnamed
informant had learned from Levy's girlfriend that Levy expected to be convicted and
intended to flee to a communist country from whence he would "denounce the United
States by every means available to him." FBI Memorandum Titled "Howard B. Levy"
(May 3 1 , 1967), in JAG Files, supra note 77. The n
i formant stated further than Levy
would eventually seek to return to the U.S. The report misidentified Levy's girlfriend,
Trina Sahli, as "Tina or Nina (last name unknown)." /d. The Defense Department and
the Army felt some discomfort in relying on this confidential report. A memo in the
litigation flles states: "Vance [probably Deputy Secretary of Defense Cyrus Vance] read
news story & called Rezor [sic) & said we can win w/o stooping to that confidential
informer," and that the Army decided to "playO down" the FBI report. Memorandum
from Philip M . Surrey [?] (June 29, 1967) (signature illegible), in JAG Files, supra note
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GI protests and within the larger antiwar community. 483 That these
groups sought him as a speaker suggests that many did not accept the
construction of the case that prevailed at Fort Jackson. Indeed, the
existence of a GI movement stood as a rejection of that interpretation.
That Dr. Levy served just shy of twenty-six months in prison is
testament to the coercive power of the law. That his case inspired acts
of resistance by soldiers, medical students, and others, that it helped some
soldiers and civilians alike to see the potential for a GI antiwar
movement, and that it was yet another instance demonstrating that one

77; see also

Draft of District Court Brief,

in

JAG Files ,

supra

note

77

(noting that the

sentence "The infonnation as to intent to flee would of itself warrant the restraint

imposed " was to be "deleted per Gen. Fuller's direction").

Nevertheless, the affidavit

submitted by Gen. Roberts to the district court recited the content of the FBI report.

Affidavit of Brig. Gen. E.B. Roberts (June

26, 1967), in

JAG Files,

See

supra note 77.

Levy unsuccessfully sought relief from Gen. Roberts ' adverse decision both within

the military justice system and the federal courts.

See Levy v . Resor, 17 C.M.A. 135,
37 C.M.R. 399 (1967); Levy v. Resor, Civ. No. 67-442 (D.S.C. July 5, 1967), a.ff'd, 384
F.2d 689 (4th Cir. 1967) (per curiam), cert. denied, 389 U . S . 1049 (1968).
On August 2, 1969, Justice Douglas, who had dissented from the denial of certiorari
in Levy's bail case, granted Levy 's motion for bail pending appeal in his federal habeas

proceeding. Levy v. Parker,

396

U.S.

nine days left to serve on his sentence.

1204 (1969).

At the time of his release Levy had

When Judge J. Robert Elliot ordered Lt. William Calley, Jr., released on bond

pending his appeal, he noted Levy's release as precedent for his action.

Without any

sense of irony the Judge stated : "The only difference which I can observe in the position

of Lt. Calley as compared to that of Captain Levy is that Captain Levy was convicted for
refusal to perfonn a military duty, whereas Lieutenant Calley 's conviction arose from his

See Wayne King, Calley Free on $1000 Bond l7y
Order of Civilian Judge, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 28, 1974, at A 1 , A 17 .
483.
See Interview with Dr. Howard B. Levy, supra note 25; Short & Seidenberg,
supra note 24, at 67-69; Smithson, supra note 46. Levy's antiwar activities were reported
both in the GI press and in his Anny Intelligence ftles. For a sampling, see Gl's United
Marchfor Peace, BRAGG BRIEFS, Nov. 1969, at 1 , 6; November Moratorium-New Twist,
As You WERE, Nov. 1969, at 1 , 2 ("Published Underground Of, By, and For G . l . 's At
The Fort Ord Military Complex."); Levy Anny Intelligence File, supra note 25, at 2-4
(speech in Monterey, Cal., in conjunction with November Moratorium); id. at 241-43
(speech given at cocktail party sponsored by the ACLU in Moorestown, N . J . , Oct. 1970);
id. at 244-45 (demonstration at Fort Gordon-Augusta, Ga., area, July 1 1 , 1970); id. at
251-52 (demonstration sponsored by Gl's and WAC's United Against the War, Port
McClellan/Anniston, Ala., May 16, 1970); id. at 290-91 (demonstration at University of
willing service in the anned forces . "

South Carolina protesting the closing of the UFO Coffee House [Gl Coffee House in
Columbia/Fort Jackson area] , Jan.

18, 1970); id. at 295-97 (speech to University of
19, 1970); id. at 378-81 (demonstration sponsored by
Vietnam at Fort Bragg/Fayettesvilie, N . C . , area, Oct. 1 1 ,

Kentucky medical students, Jan.
GI's United Against the War in

1969); id. at 384-85 (speeches at Duke University and University o f North Carolina, Oct.
10, 1 969).
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could find a powerful critique of the war even within law's language, is
testament to the I imits of that coercive power.
CONCLUSION

I stood before the judge that day as he refused me
bail.
I knew that I would spend my time awaiting trial in
jail.
I said, "There is no justice," as they led me out the door.
The judge said: "This isn't a court of justice, son.
This is a court of law."

Billy Bragg"84
I remember once I was with [Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes];
it was a Saturday when the Court was to confer . . . . When we
got down to the Capitol, I wanted to provoke a response, so as
he walked off, I said to him: "Well, sir, goodbye. Do
justice!" He turned quite sharply and he said: . . . "That is not
my job. My job is to play the game according to the rules . "

Judge Learned Hand485
thought we were going to lose, before the court-martial, at the
court-martial , and after the court-martial . . . . [E]ven in those
days, I had very little faith in this legal system.
I

Howard Levy486
By the time the Supreme Court decided Parker v. Levy in 1 974, the
U.S. was no longer in Vietnam in a combat role. The war was similarly
no longer actively in the case. Hidden beneath exchanges in the Justices'
opinions about ,the changing or enduring nature of the military and of
moral proscriptions, lay a debate about the war and the manner in which
it was fought. The opinions also hid a battle over the symbols with which
484.
1988).

BILLY BRAO<J, Rotting on Remand, on WoRKERS PLAYTIME (Elektra Records

485.

PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OP

LE!ARNE!D HAND, THE SPIRIT OP LmE!RTY:

LEARNED HAND 306-07 (Irving Dilliard ed., 3d ed. 1960). Judge Hand added:

"I have
never forgotten that. I have tried to follow, though oftentimes I found that I didn't know
what the rules were. " Jd. at 307.
486.
Interview with Dr. Howard B. Levy, supra note 25.
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best to debate these questions that were permitted brief expression in what
in other times would have been an obscure makeshift courtroom i n South
Carol ina. The racial imagery, the competing constructions of the
Vietnamese and of black soldiers, which had so occupied the stage at
trial, and which, in so doing, had doubtless distracted attention from the
debate about the war, also had blended into the background, obscured by
the Court's debate. In place of a discussion of whether there were any
constraints on the manner in which Americans would make war, there
were formal, technical arguments about the extension of the vagueness
and overbreadth doctrines to the military.
A case that had been
overflowing with political heat now imparted the relative coolness of a
constitutional debate over two statutory provisions that would not touch
most Americans.487 It masked its political origins.488
James Gibson and others have noted that few Americans during the
mid- and late 1970s wanted to talk about the Vietnam War.489 There
was, instead, a collective evasion. Viewed in this context, Parker v.
Levy's suppression of the war and failure to confront the issues related to
how it was fought are unremarkable.
But the courts' evasions in the Levy case, and in other cases relating
to the war, were not the cultural or psychological products of the mid1970s. From the first, these courts were unwilling to wrestle with the
legality of the war in any of its aspects . As Anthony D' Amato and
Robert O'Neil noted in 1972: "Few controversies in our history have so
clearly warranted resolution of conflicting constitutional claims at the
highest level. Yet few major issues-perhaps none-have been so
persistently avoided, postponed and deferred by the courts than the
Indochina War. "490
The United States Supreme Court repeatedly
avoided deciding cases putting into question the legality of the war. 491
487.

Of course, the issue of soldiers' rights, which remained in the case, was no

less political, but it was not at the center of most Americans' political concerns.

488.

If the politics of such an overtly political case are so easily buried, one

wonders how mu.ch more effectively courts mask the more subtle politics of more
mundane cases .

489.
490.

GIBSON,

supra note 192,

at 3-1 1 ; Fuchs,

supra note 185.

ANTHONY A. D'AMATO & ROBERT M.

O'NEIL, THE JUDICIARY AND

VIETNAM 3 (1972).

See generally BANNAN & BANNAN, supra note 439;

ONLY JUDGMENT:

THE LIMITS OF LITIGATION IN SOCIAL CHANGE 141-53 (1982);

ARYEH NEIER,

LAWRENCE R. VELVEL, UNDECLARED WAR AND CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE: THE AMERICAN
SYSTEM IN CRISIS 1 1 3-80 (1970).

491.

See, e.g. ,

DaCosta v. Laird , 405

U.S. 979 (1972);

Orlando v. Laird , 404

U . S . 869 (1971); Massachusetts v. Laird , 400 U.S. 886 ( 1 970); Mora v. McNamara, 389
U . S . 934 (1967); Mitchell v. United

States, 386

U.S. 972 (1967).
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Generally, lower federal courts were no more receptive to these
issues.492 The courts' performance in the face of the crisis created by
492.
For examples of courts declaring these questions nonjusticiable or finding no
standing to raise them, see Velvet v. Nixon, 415 F.2d 236, 237-39 (lOth Cir. 1969), aff'g
287 F. Supp. 846 (D. Kan. 1968); United States v. Battaglia, 410 F.2d 279, 284 (7th Cir.
1969); Simmons v. United States, 406 F.2d 456, 460 (5th Cir. 1969); Ashton v. United
States, 404 F.2d 95, 97 (8th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 960 (1969); Luftig v.
McNamara, 373 F.2d 664, 665-66 (D.C. Cir. 1967), a.ff'g 252 F. Supp. 819 (D.D.C.
1966); United States v. Mitchell, 369 F.2d 323, 324 (2d Cir. 1966), cerl. denied, 386
U.S. 972 (1967); Atlee v. Laird, 347 F. Supp. 689 (E.D. Pa. 1972) (three-judge panel),
a.ff'd, 41 1 U.S. 91 1 (1973); Davi v. Laird, 3 1 8 F. Supp. 478 (W.O. Va. 1970); United
States v. Sisson, 294 F. Supp. 5 1 1 (D. Mass. 1968); Medeiros v. United States, 294 F.
Supp. 198 (D. Mass. 1968). Ultimately, the United States Courts of Appeal for the First
and Second Circuits both addressed the issue of the war's legality, and each rejected
claims that the war was illegal. Massachusetts v. Laird, 451 F.2d 26 ( 1 st Cir. 1971);
Orlando v . Laird, 443 F.2d 1039 (2d Cir. 1971), aff'g Orlando v. Laird, 317 F. Supp.
1 0 1 3 (E.D.N.Y. 1970) and Berk v. Laird, 317 F . Supp. 715 (E.D.N.Y. 1970). Judge
William Sweigert of the Northern District of California, while not reaching the ultimate
question of the war's legality, also held that the issue was justiciable and that several
reservists had standing to raise it. Mottola v. Nixon, 3 1 8 F. Supp. 538, 553-54 (N.D.
Cal. 1970) (denying the government's motion to dismiss), rev'd, 464 F.2d 178, 183 (9th
Cir. 1972). Similarly, Judge Orrin Judd, who had ruled in the government's favor in
Berk, granted Congresswoman Elizabeth Holtzman's and several airforce servicemen's
request for a declaratory judgment that the continued bombing of Cambodia during the
summer of 1973 was unauthorized by Congress and therefore illegal, and for an order
enjoining the bombing. · Holtzman v. Schlesinger, 361 F. Supp. 553, 566 (E.D.N.Y.
1973), rev 'd, 484 F.2d 1307 (2d Cir. 1973) (holding that the issue was a nonjusticiable
political question and that, at any rate, the bombing was authorized hy Congress and that
plaintiffs Jacked standing), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 936 (1974). On Hollvnan, see
WALKER, supra note 1 3 1 , at 287. One other court that did hear testimony about the war
was the Wisconsin court that tried Karlton Armstrong for the 1970 bombing of the Army
Math Research Center at the University of Wisconsin, in which Dr. Robert Fassnacht was
unintentionally killed and five other people were injured. Pursuant to a plea agreement,
Armstrong pleaded guilty to second degree murder, arson, and possession of explosives.
At his sentencing hearing, the defense called 41 witnesses, including several Vietnam
veterans and prominent figures in the antiwar movement, in an effort to put the war on
trial and provide a context for Armstrong's acts. See RON CHRISTENSON, POLITICAL
TRIALS: GORDIAN· KNOTS IN THE LAW 147-63 (1986) ("The Wisconsin Bomber: Trial
of a Frustrated Dissenter").
That judicial evasion was not always the equivalent of judicial neutrality is perhaps
most clearly demonstrated in the first Mitchell decision. Judge Timbers, in rejecting as
irrelevant Mitchell's challenges to the war, remarked on "the sickening spectacle of a 22
year old citizen of the United States sei1.ing the sanctuary of a nation dedicated to freedom
of speech to assert such tommyrot and . . . the transparency of his motives for doing so."
United States v. Mitchell, 246 F. Supp. 874, 899 (D. Conn. 1965); see also id. at 907-08
("Remarks of District Court at Time of Sentencing Mitchell on September 1 5 , 1965,"
noting with satisfaction that "[t]he so-called 'cause' which Mr. Mitchell espouses
apparently has fallen on deaf ears" and has instead "galvanized determination on the part
of upright Joyal citizens of this country to rally to the support of their government in a
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the war prompted Robert Cover to write "A Polemic Against the
American Judiciary. "493 Cover compared the contemporary judiciary
to judges who enforced the fugitive slave law during the 1 850s. He
concluded that by enforcing the selective service law against resisters and
by refusing to hear, and to help craft, innovative challenges to the war,
the judiciary had become an "accompliceO in that which the Executive
perpetrates. " 494
This pattern of evasion makes the willingness of the Levy court
martial to permit ventilation of issues related to the war all the more
striking, irrespective of the restrictions, both legal and practical, that were
placed on the discussion. Yet the restrictions were real. Levy's price for
litigating the war at his court-martial was a significant loss of control over
his own arguments.
Good legal explanations lay behind the Levy case's narrowing on
appeal and on habeas review. The transformation of the Nuremberg
question into a factual issue and the limits on the courts' jurisdiction in
the habeas proceeding meant that tools were available to end the
discussion of the war begun at the court-martial. Moreover, the defense
played an active role in refocusing the case. While never abandoning its
arguments about the war itself, the defense shifted its emphasis to
questions of servicemen's rights and to the argument that the court-martial
had been instigated to punish Levy for his political views and civil rights
activities .495 Yet the tools were also available for a court that was

time of need").

In response to this tone, the U . S . Court of Appeals for the Second

Circuit, which vacated the conviction and ordered a new trial, suggested that Mitchell's
retrial be assigned to a different judge. United States v. Mitchell, 354 F.2d 767, 769 (2d
Cir. 1966).

For a discussion of the Mitchell case, see BANNAN & BANNAN,

supra note

439, at 23-39.
493.

Robert M. Cover, Book Review, 68 COLUM. L. REV. 1003, 1003 (1968)

(reviewing RICHARD HILDRETH, ATROCIOUS JUDGES: LIVES OP JUDGES INFAMOUS As

TOOLS OP TYRANTS AND INSTRUMENTS OP OPPRESSION (1856)).

theme in a 1984 lecture.

See

Cover returned to this

ROBERT COVER,

The FolkJales of Justice: Tales of

173, 195-201 (Martha Minow et al. eds . , 1993).

In his article Cover described the

Jurisdiction, in NARRATIVE, VIOLENCE, AND THE LAW:

THE EssAYS OP ROBERT COVER

Supreme Court's decision in the Levy case as "the final and most grotesque instance of
this averting of the eyes . " ld. at 198 n. 74.
494.

Cover, supra note 493, at 1008 n . 3 1 .

But cf

BASKIR & STRAUSS, supra note

43, at 73-82 (describing pockets of resistance by federal judges, along with their clerks
and some prosecutors and jurors, to strict enforcement of the selective service laws in the
mid-1960s and growing resistance as the war continued).
495.

The shift in emphasis is manifest in the District Court Habeas Brief and

accompanying affidavits ("Exhibit C").

The bulk of the 272-page brief, including, but

not restricted to, the first 158 pages, was dedicated to arguing that the prosecution was
politically and racially motivated, and all of Exhibit C's 148 pages were intended to set
the factual foundation for that argument.

See District Court Habeas

Brief,

supra note 68.
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willing to hear argument, especially regarding the medical ethics
defense. 496 Instead, the evasion continued.
That the courts once again failed to engage the legality of the war
raises, in turn, a number of questions for anyone interested in the recent
history of American law and legal institutions. First, could the courts
have been adequate fora for the resolution of these issues, or was their
evasion inevitable given political, institutional, or constitutional
constraints?
Second, how did lawyers and non-lawyers perceive the courts'
repeated unwillingness to confront the central legal issues posed by the
war? Did the growing number of the war's opponents view these
decisions as a failure of law and the legal system? Did they regard the
oft-repeated litany of rationales for nondecision-sovereign immunity, the
political question doctrine, and lack of standing-in the face of the tragic
choices confronting part of a generation of young men and the horrors
unleashed on the Vietnamese as an unacceptable elevation of law over
justice, or, worse still, as a cowardly or result-oriented deformation of the
law?497 Or did they see these decisions in terms of institutional
competence and the separation of powers? How widely shared was
Cover's vision of a crisis of judicial morality and of legal legitimacy?
We know that during the lifetime of the Levy case, critics from both the
left498 and the righ�99 bitterly challenged the authority and fairness of
496.
Rather than drawing arguments from Orloff v. Willoughby, see supra text
accompanying notes 455-59, Levy's lawyers invoked Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S.
479 (1965), and Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973), to emphasize the Supreme Court's
recognition of the sanctity of the doctor-patient relationship. They also invoked Eisenstadt
v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972), Clay v. United States, 403 U.S. 698 (1971), Gillette v.
United States, 401 U.S. 437 (1971), Stanley v. Georgia, 394 US. 557 (1969), and
Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963), for the proposition that the Constitution protects
the privacy and conscience of individuals and should therefore protect Levy's ethical

beliefs from sanction. See Brief of Appellee at 55-62, Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733
(1 974) (No. 73-206) .
497.
E.P. Thompson has noted that:
Most men have· a strong sense of justice, at least with regard to their own
interest. If l�w is evidently partial and unjust, then it will mask nothing,
legitimize nothing, contribute nothing to any class's hegemony. The essential
precondition for the effectiveness of law, in its function as ideology, is that
it shall display an independence from gross manipulation and shall seem to be
just. It cannot seem to be so without upholding its own logic and criteria of
equity; indeed, on occasion, by actually being just.
.
E.P. THOMPSON, WHJGS AND HUNTERS: THE ORIGIN OF THE 8U.CK Acr 263 (1975).
498.
See, e.g., LAW AGAINST THE PEOPLE: EssAYS TO DEMYSTIFY LAW, ORDER
AND THE COURTS (Robert Lefcourt ed., 1971); Edgar Z. Friedenberg, The Side Effects
ofLegal Process, in THE RULE OF LAW 37, 37-53 (Robert Paul Wolff ed., 1971); Robert
Paul Wolff, Introduction to THE RULE OF LAW, supra, at 7, 7-12; Howard Zinn, The
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the courts. To what extent did the courts' refusal to confront the
questions posed by the war contribute to a crisis of legal legitimacy, and
how extensive was that crisis?
Further, while Levy was unwillingly dragooned by the Army's legal
system, others, like the Catonsville Nine and the other participants in the
"Ultra Resistance" willingly invited prosecution in order to challenge the
legality of the war.500 Given the courts' rather consistent rejection of
defenses grounded in the illegality of the war, what expectations led some
people to choose law and the courts as the forum in which to debate the
war? More generally, what hold did law talk and legal form have on the
war's opponents? Why did other opponents of the war embrace legal
form and language to challenge the war, as did at least two groups of GI
dissenters who staged war crime trials of the military "brass"'(i01
Finally, if for many people, the failure of courts to confront the
central legal issues raised by the war eroded the legitimacy of legal
institutions, what were the sources of those institutions' resilience? How
did the courts weather the crisis, and what has become of their scars?

Conspiracy of Law, in THE RULE OF LAW, supra, at 1 5 , 15-36.
499.
See, e.g., Fred E. lnbau , "Playing God": 5 to 4, 57
CRIMINOLOGY 377 (1966).

J. CRIM. L. &

The 1968 Richard Nixon presidential campaign 's invocation

of "law and order" and attack on the purported pennissiveness of the Warren Court
represented a similar attack from the right.

500.

For discussions of the largely Catholic "U ltra Resistance," see generally

BANNAN & BANNAN,
TRIAL:

supra note 439,

at 124-50; STEVEN E. BARKAN, PROTESTERS ON

CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN THE SOUTHERN CiVIL RIGHTS AND VIETNAM ANTIWAR

MOVEMENTS 1 19-31 (1985); FERBER & LYND,
Plessix Gray,

supra note 199, at 201-21; Francine Du
The UIJra-Resisrance, in TRIALS OF THE RESISTANCE 1 25-61 (1970). Other

instances of litigants choosing the courts as a forum for challenges to the war include the

Massachusells and Ho/Jzman cases cited supra note 471.
501.
Union Gls Pur Military on Trial: Seallle-1he Verdier Is Gui/Jy, the Sentence:
Death, THE BOND, Feb. 1 8 , 1970, at 1 , reprinted in ABOVEGROUND, Mar. 1970, at 19
("Gls from Fort Lewis and McChord Air Force Base held a trial of the Brass and its war
in Vietnam before an audience of 1 ,500 at the University of Washington tonight. A jury
of twelve active-duty soldiers found the military 'guilty' on charges of genocide, crimes

Gls and Supporters Turn Armed
Forces Day Around: GI Jury Tries Brass-Union Chairman Prosecures, THE BoND, June
against humanity and violations of soldiers' rights . ") ;

17, 1970, at 1 (describing May 16 trial at the University of Illinois before a jury of 13

active-duty servicemen); see also

Georgia Group Plnns War Crimes Tribunal, THE BoND ,

Apr. 22, 1970, at 6 (describing a joint Gl/civilian plan to hold a war crime tribunal in
Columbus, Georgia (Fort Benning) in May); Copy of photograph captioned "Dr. Howard
Levy testifying at People's Tribunal, Columbus, GA," (May 17, 1970),
Intelligence File,

supra note 25,

in

Levy Army

at 19. For a discussion of this impulse toward a utopian

exercise of jurisdiction, see COVER ,

supra

note 493, at 195-201 (discussing the

Stockholm/Copenhagen "International War Crimes Tribunal" organized by Bertrand
Russell and Jean Paul Sartre).
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APPENDIX I

Specification to Charge I
In that Captain Howard B. Levy, U.S. Army, Headquarters &
Headquarters Company, United States Army Hospital, Fort Jackson,
South Carolina, having received a lawful command from Colonel Henry
F. Fancy, his superior officer, to establish and operate a Phase II Training
Program for Special Forces AidMen in dermatology in accordance with
Special Forces AidMen (Airborne), 8-R-Fl6, Dermatology Training, did,
at the United States Army Hospital, Fort Jackson, South Carolina, on or
about 1 1 October 1966 to 25 November 1966, willfully disobey the same.
Specification to Charge II
In that Captain Howard B. Levy, U.S. Army, Headquarters &
Headquarters Company, United States Army Hospital, Fort Jackson,
South Carolina, did, at Fort Jackson, South Carolina, on or about the
period February 1966 to December 1966, with design to promote
disloyalty and disaffection among the troops, publicly utter the following
statements to divers enlisted personnel at divers times: "The United
States is wrong in being involved in the Viet Nam War. I would refuse
to go to Viet Nam if ordered to do so. I don't see why any colored
soldier would go to Viet Nam; they should refuse to go to Viet Nam and
if sent should refuse to fight because they are discriminated against and
denied their freedom in the United States, and they are sacrificed and
discriminated against in Viet Nam by being given all the hazardous duty
and they are suffering the majority of casualties. If I were a colored
soldier I would refuse to go to Viet Nam and if I were a colored soldier
and were sent I would refuse to fight. Special forces personnel are liars
and thieves and killers of peasants and murderers of women and
children", or words to that effect, which statements were disloyal to the
United States, to the,.prejudice of good order and discipline in the armed
forces .
Specification to Additional Charge I
In that Captain Howard B. Levy, United States Army, Headquarters
and Headquarters Company, United States Army Hospital, Fort Jackson,
South Carolina, did, at the United States Army Hospital, Fort Jackson,
South Carolina, at divers times during the period from on or about
February 1966 to on or about December 1966 while in the performance
of his duties at the United States Army Hospital, Fort Jackson, South
Carolina, wrongfully and dishonorably make the following statements of
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the nature and to and in the presence and hearing of the persons as
hereinafter more particularly described, to wit: (1) Intemperate,
defamatory, provoking, and disloyal statements to special forces enlisted
personnel present for training in the United States Army Hospital, Fort
Jackson, South Carolina, and in the presence and hearing of other enlisted
personnel, both patients and those performing duty under his immediate
supervision and control and dependent patients as follows: "I will not
train special forces personnel because they are 'liars and thieves, ' 'killers
of peasants,' and 'murderers of women and children,'" or words to that
effect; (2) Intemperate and disloyal statements to enlisted personnel, both
patients and those performing duty under his immediate supervision and
control as follows: "I would refuse to go to Vietnam if ordered to do so.
I do not see why any colored soldier would go to Vietnam. They should
refuse to go to Vietnam; and, if sent, they should refuse to fight because
they are discriminated against and denied their freedom in the United
States and they are sacrificed and discriminated against in Vietnam by
being given all the hazardous duty, and they are suffering the majority of
casualties. If I were a colored soldier I would refuse to go to Vietnam;
and, if I were a colored soldier and if I were sent to Vietnam, I would
refuse to fight," or words to that effect; (3) Intemperate, contemptuous,
and disrespectful statements to enlisted personnel performing duty under
his immediate supervision and control , as follows:
"The Hospital
Commander had given me an order to train special forces personnel,
which order I have refused and will not obey, " or words to that effect; (4)
Intemperate, defamatory, provoking, and disloyal statements to special
forces personnel in the presence and hearing of enlisted personnel
performing duty under his immediate supervision and control, as follows:
"I hope when you get to Vietnam something happens to you and you are
injured, " or words to that effect; all of which statements were made to
persons who knew that the said Howard B. Levy was a commissioned
officer in the active service of the United States Army.
Specification to Additional Charge II
In that Captain Howard B. Levy, United States Army, Headquarters
and Headquarters Company, United States Army Hospital, Fort Jackson,
South Carolina, with intent to impair and interfere with the performance
of duty of a member of the military forces of the United States, did, at or
near Columbia, South Carolina, on or about September 1965, conduct
himself in a manner unbecoming an officer and gentleman by wrongfully
and dishonorably communicating by mailing to Sergeant First Class
Geoffrey Hancock, Jr., a member of the United States Army then
stationed in Viet Nam, and known by the said Captain Howard B. Levy
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to be so stationed, but not personally known to him, a letter written by
his (Levy's) own hand containing the following statements:
Dear Geoffrey:
Let me begin by introducing myself. My name is Howard
Levy. I am an Army Dermatologist at Fort Jackson, S.C.
. . . . I would not attempt to contest your views on the military
situation there although I would suggest that you read (if you
have not already done so) Jules Roy's book, "The Battle of
DienBienPhu. " I am, however, deeply distressed at your
reasons for fighting in Viet Nam. I am one of those "people
back in the States" who actively opposes our efforts there &
would refuse to serve there if I were so assigned . . . .
The only question that remains, is essentially 1 ) were we
merely naive and therefore did we make unintentional mistakes
or 2) does the U . S . foreign policy represent a diabolical evil .
A s you would guess, � opt for the second proposition . .
.

.

Communism worse than a U.S. oriented government? . . .
Are the North Viet Namese worse off than the South Viet
Namese? I doubt it . . . .
Geoffrey who are you fighting for? Do you know? Have
you thought about it? You're [sic] real battle is back here in the
U . S . but why must I fight it for you? The same people who
suppress Negroes and poor whites here are doing it all over
again all over the world and your [sic] helping them. Why?
You, no doubt, know about the terror the whites have inflicted
upon Negroes in our country. Aren't you guilty of the same
thing with regard the Viet Namese? A dead woman is a dead
woman in Alabama and in Viet Nam. To destroy a child's life
in Viet Nam,_': equals a destroyed life in Harlem. For what
cause? Democracy, Diem, Trujillo, Batista, Chang Kai Shek,
Franco, Tshombe - Bullshit? . . .
would hasten to remind you that despite your obvious courage
and enthusiasm Viet Nam is not our country and you are not
VietNamese. At least the Viet Cong have that on their side . .
. . Geoffrey these people may not be sophisticated (American
Style) but their [sic] grown men and women who have a right
to live and choose their own government. You know they're
I
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even allowed to make a mistake-at least let them make
it-don't make it for them . . . . ,

or words to that effect.
Specification to Additional Charge m
In that Captain Howard

B. Levy, United States Army, Headquarters

and Headquarters Company, United States Army Hospital, Fort Jackson,
South Carolina, with intent to interfere with, impair, and influence the
loyalty, morale, and discipline of the military forces of the United States,
did at or near Columbia, South Carolina, on or about September 1965,
advise, counsel , urge and attempt to cause insubordination, disloyalty and
refusal of duty by a member of the military forces of the United States by
communicating by mailing to Sergeant First Class Geoffrey Hancock, Jr.,
a member of the United States military forces then stationed in Viet Nam,
and known by the said Captain Howard

B. Levy to be so stationed, but

not personally known to him, a letter written by his (Levy's) own hand
containing statements to the following effect: ( 1 ) advocating opposition to
the United States involvement in the Viet Nam war; (2) describing United
States foreign policy as a "diabolical evil" designed more to protect
selfish American business

interests than to contain the threat and

aggression of world Communism; (3) characterizing the United States
position and policy in Viet Nam as a suppression of Negroes and poor
whites; (4) praising Communists, and Communist countries, including
North Viet Nam and the Viet Cong as being better than the United States
and United States oriented countries; (5) declaring that he (Levy) would
refuse to serve in Viet Nam, and that he has actively opposed the United
States involvement in Viet Nam; (6) encouraging Sergeant First Class
Geoffrey Hancock, Jr., to give up his involvement and commitment as a
United States serviceman fighting in Viet Nam, and to return to the
United States to fight for the cause of the suppressed Negroes and poor
whites; (7) ridiculing and criticizing Sergeant First Class Geoffrey
Hancock, J r . , for fighting with the United States Army in Viet Nam; (8)
ridiculing and criticizing Sergeant First Class Geoffrey Hancock, Jr.'s
motive for being in Viet Nam, stating that Sergeant Hancock does not
have the best interests of the Viet Namese people at heart, in violation of
Title 1 8 , Section 2387 United States Code, June 25, 1948, Chapter 645,
62 Statutes 8 1 1 , amended May 24, 1949, Chapter 139, Section 46, 63
Statutes 96, a Statute of the United States of America.
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APPENDIX II
The Geoffrey Hancock Letter

1041 Marion Street
Columbia, South Carolina
9-10-65
Dear Geoffrey,
Let me begin by introducing myself. My name is Howard Levy.
I'm an Army Dermatologist at Fort Jackson, S.C. I'm a friend of Bill
Treanor with whom I've worked during this summer on the SCLC civil
rights drive in my spare time.
I've read your letters to Bill and have been especially interested in
your views on Viet Nam since I too have had a deep seated interest in the
situation there. I would not attempt to contest your views on the military
situation there although I would suggest that you read (if you have not
already done so) Jules Roy's book "The Battle of Dienbienphu." I am,
however, deeply distressed at your reasons for fighting in Viet Nam. I
am one of those "people back in the states" who actually opposes our
efforts there and would refuse to serve there if I were so assigned. I
would like to outline some of the -reasons for my stance.
Bill has informed me that you are well acquainted with the history
of Viet Nam so that I will not cover old ground. I think you would agree
that from the time we backed Diem that we have politically not been very
astute. The only question that remains, is essentially 1) were we merely
naive and therefore did we make unintentional mistakes or 2) does the
U.S. foreign policy represent a diabolical evil. As you would guess I opt
for the second proposition.
I do not believe that you can realistically judge the Viet Nam war as
an isolated incident. .. It must be viewed in the context of the recent
history of our foreign policy-at least from the start of the Cold War.
Basically there are two aims to our foreign policy-one stated by our
State Department and the other unstated . 1) The stated part-to contain
"Communism" and 2) the unstated part-to support "stable" governments
so that our foreign investors may profit. It should be noted that our
definition of "Communism" is very, very broad. So broad in fact as to
become practically worthless. The record is clear-the U . S . has helped
suppress every left liberal revolt that you could name if there was
available in the country a "more acceptable" right wing figure who could
be more easily manipulated. You see, unfortunately for our government,
left liberal governments often have the interests of their countrymen at
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heart and this runs counter to our interests. For example the Alliance for
Progress has been almost a total failure-largely because every time a
Latin American government tried to implement a true land reform
program (part of the Alliance for Progress program) we have found some
reason to balk and not approve the project. This isn't surprising since
either U.S. companies own or control much of the land in these countries.
Yet without land reform nothing will work in Latin America.
Of course our propaganda mills, the newspapers and the mass media,
cover up our sins. Invariably Communists are found to take the blame.
Do you really believe that the Dominican Republic was in danger of a
Communist overthrow. Responsible noncommunist critics in Latin
America don't. Juan Bosch said "those 56 communists couldn't run a
first class hotel let alone a country." He was being generous to the U . S .
because later events prove that there weren't even 56 Communists in the
country at the time. The same is true in the Congo. Is Tshombe a great
patriot? Few in the Congo think so. Yet we support him. Could it be
because he can be "counted on"? I think so.
Let's attack it from another, more radical, approach . What if the
majority of a people decide that Communism is good for them? Do we,
does anybody, have a right to deny them this choice. We might disagree
emotionally and might try to prove that our way is better but by any
stretch of any moral principal can we deny them the choice.
Is
Communism worse than a U . S . oriented government? The fastest
growing economy in Latin America is Cuba. Everybody reads and writes
in Cuba. Everybody has medical care. Was this true with the previously
American backed governments? Not on your life. Is it true in other
American backed governments in Latin America? Far East? Near East?
Where? The only true examples are Europe and Japan and here only
because it served as a bulwark against the Communists. To get closer to
home (your home and I hope it's temporary) are the North Vietnamese
worse off than the South Vietnamese? I doubt it. If they are why do so
many back the Viet Cong? Guerrilla terrorism? Unlikely. The truth is
that the North has instituted land reform, schools and medical facilities (as
best as they could in a still very poor country). Why hasn't it happened
in the South and why do you insist that it will happen. It hasn't in any
of our other colonies. It didn't even happen in the U.S. until the Negro
got off his ass and has made it happen. Do you really think that the big
business-military complex in the U.S. are big-hearted . They never have
been. In the early 1900's labor men and women fought and died for what
they obviously deserved-enough food to live. And it's still happening.
Ask Bill about unions and labor conditions in the South. Well these same
companies have vastly more influence on our foreign policy and their
effective.
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Geoffrey, who are you fighting for? Do you know? Have you
thought about it? You're real battle is back here in the U.S. but why
must I fight it for you? The same people who suppress Negroes and poor
whites here are doing it all over again all over the world and your helping
them. Why? You, no doubt, know about the terror the whites have
inflicted upon Negroes in our country. Aren't you guilty of the same
thing with regard the Vietnamese? A dead woman is a dead woman in
Alabama and in Viet Nam. To destroy a child's life in Viet Nam equals
a destroyed life in Harlem. For what cause? Democracy? Diem,
Trujillo, Batista, Chiang Kai-Shek, Franco, Tshombe-Bullshit?
As I mentioned earlier I don't contest your position that we can win.
The question is win what. If we must destroy a whole people to win than
I don't understand the true context of the word. Who are we winning
for? The government in Saigon? Which one? It may change before you
receive this letter. I would hasten to remind you that despite your
obvious courage and enthusiasm Viet Nam is not our country and you are
not a Vietnamese. At least the Viet Cong have that on their side. Or do
you take the position that you are the noble white father helping these
poor ignorant people? How uplifting it must seem to you. Unhappily it's
an illusion. These people know more about America and her generosity
than you or !-thanks to American puppets in Saigon. You're no
different than the governor of Alabama telling the Negroes that he has
their best interests at heart. Even if it were true, and it's not, it would
be a contemptible argument because it's so damn condescending.
Geoffrey these people may not be sophisticated (American style), but their
grown men and women who have a right to live and choose their own
government. You know-they're even allowed to make a mistake-at
least let them make it-don't make it for them.
I've enclosed an article you might find interesting-maybe it will
help explain some of the "morale back home. "
I would appreciate your views on some of the points I have raised.
In any event, let me wish you good luck and saf� conduct in your present
situation.
Yours truly,
Howard Levy

